

# The Princeton Theological Review

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# The Princeton Theological Review

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# The Princeton Theological Review

OCTOBER, 1924

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## THE PERSON OF CHRIST IN RECENT RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY

The high claims of Jesus in our historical sources and the claim of Christianity to finality or to be the absolute religion have proved a difficulty to all modern types of religious philosophy which reject the claim of the New Testament to be a supernatural revelation and which cannot accept the New Testament doctrine of the Incarnation of the Son of God.

In point of fact all attempts to give a philosophical basis for Christianity which could do justice to its historical element, to the central place of the Person of Jesus, and to the finality of Christianity, apart from Christian supernaturalism, have failed.

We agree with Karl Heim<sup>1</sup> when he says that the attempts to bridge the gulf between the eternal and the historical, and to see in Jesus the central object of religion and in Christianity the final religion, have been along two lines. One is the Hegelian which by a process of logic attempts to see the fulness of the Divine Idea in the form of a popular representation (*Vorstellung*) in historical Christianity. But in the last analysis we have only the *Idea* of Divine Sonship and Saviourhood. Its full and final realization in Jesus is not done justice to, and can never be reached along this high *a priori* road. Just why these ideas could not be realized in many mediators, the Hegelian philosophy of religion can never show. And Heim is right in saying that Hegel was the last great religious philosopher who attempted to deduce from a philosophical system the New Testament idea that there is

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<sup>1</sup> "Zu meinem Versuch einer neuen religionsphilosophischen Grundlegung der Dogmatik" (*Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, N. F. Jahrgang 4. Heft 6. 1924).

only One Mediator between God and man, viz., Jesus Christ.

Since Hegel every attempt which starts from a religious philosophy and endeavors to take a positive attitude toward the New Testament teaching has been along the lines of either value judgments or Christian experience, and has suffered from the charge of subjectivity. We have previously criticised these attempts,<sup>2</sup> and need not repeat their examination here.

Troeltsch's view, which we there examined, cannot be said to take a positive attitude. He gave up the idea of "absolute-ness" at the supposed demands of the comparative study of religions, and yet at the same time unites with this a value judgment in the old Ritschlian fashion, claiming the highest place for Christ as the revealer of God and for Christianity as a religion. But in his small volume, *The Significance of the Historical Jesus For Faith*, we see what his attitude really was. Jesus has really no soteriological significance for faith. If He did not exist faith in God and in deliverance from sin could do without Him. We need Him only because religion is social and we require a rallying point, or social center of fellowship. We shall not pause now to consider Troeltsch's view. It cannot be said to take a positive attitude toward the New Testament claims, and we have criticised it before in the above mentioned essay.

Two attempts at a philosophical basis for Christianity have recently been made, and we shall examine these briefly. They are those of Rudolf Otto, of Marburg, and Karl Heim, of Tübingen. It is true that these attempts all hail from Germany. But in so far as the high supernaturalism of New Testament Christianity is abandoned, American theology is still, generally speaking, under the dominion of the old fashioned liberalism about which enough has been and is being said.

Rudolf Otto<sup>3</sup> in his well known book, *The Holy*, in which he sets forth what he calls the "numinous" or mysterious and

<sup>2</sup> "The Finality of the Christian Religion," in *Biblical and Theological Studies*, by the Faculty of Princeton Theological Seminary (1912).

<sup>3</sup> *Das Heilige*, Elfte Auflage, 1923.

transcendent aspect of the Divine Nature, attempts to relate this *a priori* element in religion to history and to find in Jesus the Son of God, and in Christianity the one final religion. What he means by his "*a priori category*" of The Holy, we have fully outlined in reviewing the book in this issue of the *Review*, and need not go into it here. Suffice it to say that he shows that besides the known or conceivable attributes of God such as consciousness, will, omnipotence, etc., there are "non-rational" and transcendent elements which make up what he terms "the awful mystery" of Deity. To these he gives the name of the *numinous* aspect of God. What concerns us now is to examine how he relates this idea, which he calls "*a priori*," to experience and history, and how he finds it fully realized in Jesus, so that all religion finds its full, final, and absolute realization in Christianity. In discussing this we shall be obliged to repeat some of what we said in reviewing this volume. The historical element in religion, especially historical Christianity, is related to the transcendent or *a priori* aspect, or in other words God is found in Christ, not by means of a supernatural revelation in the sense of the old theology and the Scripture, but in a philosophy of religion and theory of knowledge which rests on Fries.<sup>4</sup> This discussion occupies the last part of his book. It fails equally with the Hegelian philosophy to do justice to historical Christianity as a redemptive religion finding redemption realized in the Divine Christ. Otto's position is not new; it is the philosophy of Fries applied to the specific question in hand.

The *a priori* element in man's religious consciousness must be aroused and called forth, Otto holds. How then, he asks, is religion "experienced"? There must be external historical facts or an "outer revelation," and there must be also a power to recognize the Divine in the external revelation. Otto calls

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<sup>4</sup> Fries and Jacobi accepted the position of Kant regarding the limits of our knowledge of God and religious truth, and prepared the way for the advance beyond rationalism by asserting that man has a special religious faculty, a faith, feeling, or intuitive sense of the Infinite. The latter Fries called *Ahndung* (old spelling of *Ahnung*).



this power "divination," which is the power to discern the presence of the Deity in historical events and persons. This faculty or power is similar to Fries' "intuition" of Deity. Like Schleiermacher, Fries, and DeWette, Otto ascribes such a religious "intuition" to the human spirit. It is actualized, however, only in "prophetic" natures upon which the ordinary man must depend. Jesus above all others had such a prophetic gift. But he was more than a prophet. He was not only the "subject" of divination, but also its "object." Others recognized the Divine in Him. This is true of His first disciples, and it is true today. By reflection on Jesus and the New Testament redemptive history, we experience "salvation," which is independent of historical details. Thus the experience of religion and Christianity rests on this twofold basis of intuitive endowment and external manifestation. And since Jesus is the "object" of this religion, while other prophets cannot be said to be in the same sense, Jesus is *the* Son of God.

What is to be said of this attempt of Otto to find a philosophical basis for the uniqueness and absoluteness of Jesus, and for the finality of Christianity?

In the first place the impossibility of passing from the eternal God to a specific and exclusive manifestation of Him in history by an *a priori* road when the idea of supernatural revelation has been abandoned, is seen in the fact that the result obtained does not rise above the level of natural religion, and can contain no redemptive element. All religion, including Christianity, is traced back to *a priori* or rational elements. This can be seen from what has been said concerning the idea of "divination," and the relation of the religious *a priori* to history. We consider first, then, the way in which Otto relates his idea of "divination" to the historical Jesus. In place of supernatural revelation we have "divination" or the religious "intuition" (*Ahnung*) of Fries. In a word we "intuit" the Divine in Jesus. It is true that Otto says Jesus is more than a prophet with this prophetic gift of divination to see God and show Him to others. Jesus is said to be the

*object* of "divination" i.e. we see God manifest in Him. But this only means that somehow we feel the presence of God in Jesus. It is really difficult to see how this view differs from the Ritschlian judgment of value so well illustrated in Herrmann's *Communion of the Christian with God*, which Otto would call mere subjectivism. In the last analysis Jesus is only a means by which these vague feelings of Deity or "*the numinous*" are aroused in us. The essential element in Christianity is found in this *a priori* category, not in the historical revelation or the great Christian facts and their interpretation in the New Testament. In this way we might have our religious natures stimulated and so have a natural religion, but no Gospel, no good tidings of salvation. For unless we know that Jesus is Divine, that He died for our sins and rose again, we have no Gospel and no historical and supernatural Christianity. No intuitions, even when called forth by history, can give us Christianity because Christianity is a historical religion. We cannot know *a priori* that Jesus is the incarnate Son of God, nor what He has done for man's salvation. Neither can Jesus be the *object* of religious adoration and trust unless we do know who He was and what He did. The philosophy of Kant and Fries leaves no place for a genuine historical revelation, much less for a supernatural one. But this is precisely what the Christianity of the New Testament claims to be, and no philosophy of religion is adequate which does not at least examine these claims and so determine whether or not, in rejecting them, it has taken into account all the phenomena. We said in the review of his book that his English translator<sup>5</sup> allies him with the Mystics, and that E. W. von Mayer<sup>6</sup> calls his religious philosophy a type of rationalism. But it makes little difference. Christianity is not the product of either reason or feeling, and the great Christian facts have a deep redemptive significance. They are more than the occasion of calling forth the *a priori* elements of

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<sup>5</sup> *The Idea of The Holy*, English translation from the ninth edition by John W. Harvey.

<sup>6</sup> *Theologische Rundschau*, July-August, 1917, pp. 214 ff.

religion. They claim to be, and, if there is to be any historical Christianity, they are, the supernatural work of God for man's salvation. Deprive them of this claim, and you deprive them of everything which renders them specifically Christian.

In the second place the concluding chapter on "The Religious *A Priori* and History" shows the same tendency to do scant justice to the historical facts of Christianity. The contrast between the *a priori* religious principle and its outer manifestation is the same, Otto says, as that between general and special revelation. We would be inclined to disagree with him that all natural religion is *a priori* in its basis. We have the revelation of God in nature, for example. But this is not the point now in question. It is true, as Otto maintains, that special historical revelation is organically related to, and based upon, general revelation. Special revelation extends over the ground covered by general revelation and adds a sphere of soteriological and trinitarian truth not contained in general revelation at all. Also, it is without significance to call Jesus God if we have no idea of God apart from Jesus. But the part history plays in this relation to the *a priori* or innate religious elements, is, after all, only the occasion of calling them forth, according to Otto. In a word *a priori* elements of knowledge are not ready made in the mind; they need historical experience to call them forth. But if this is all, then nothing can be called forth which was not already contained in the *a priori* element, and this, as we said is bare natural religion. There are, according to Otto, three stages of the religious consciousness. First, that of most men, who have only the "predisposition" to religion. Second, the prophetic stage when the prophetic power of "divination" enters, so that the prophet can point others to God. This stage was realized supremely in Jesus. Third, there is a stage of "revelation" beyond this: "We can look beyond the prophet to one in whom is found the Spirit in all His fulness, and who at the same time in His Person and work has become the object of divination, in whom Holiness is openly manifest.



Such a one is more than prophet.—He is the Son.”<sup>7</sup> This is a real attempt to see in Jesus more than a prophet, and to make Him the *object* of faith. But from Otto’s philosophical premises we do not see how it can mean more than the indefinite Ritschlian statement that Jesus is the supreme manifestation of God in human experience. If so, He may be called a Son among other sons, but not *the* Son in any supreme, exclusive, and metaphysical sense. Even if He be more than a prophet, He is not the divine Son of the New Testament writings. This is only to say again that the rational *a priori* principle is the all important thing for Otto, and the historical Jesus only its illustration. It is on a Kantian and Friesian basis, but it does not seem to differ essentially from the Hegelian view.

Consequently Otto fails to ground the exclusiveness and finality of Christianity. Karl Heim makes some pertinent remarks on this point.<sup>8</sup> He points to this exclusiveness and absoluteness of Christianity as a fact which is not comprehensible from the philosophical presuppositions of Schleiermacher, or the religious *a priori* of Troeltsch and Otto. This element, which Heim calls “intolerance,” he finds an original datum of the history of religion and especially of Christianity. From Otto’s standpoint, Heim says, it is conceivable and necessary that the innate religious disposition of man should individualize itself in many prophets. But it is inconceivable how any one should claim to be the supreme and final revealer of God. This element of Christianity, he properly says, stands outside the boundaries of the religious *a priori*, i.e., man’s innate religious nature. One might do away with this, Heim continues, as a “hateful malformation” of religion were it not for the fact that “every sentence of the New Testament breathes forth this intolerance” or the ex-

<sup>7</sup> *op. cit.*, p. 199.

<sup>8</sup> Karl Heim, “Otto’s Kategorie des Heiligen und der Absolutheitsanspruch des Christus-Glaubens” (*Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1920. Heft 1). Also the article already referred to, “Zu meinem Versuch einer neuen religionsphilosophischen Grundlegung der Dogmatik,” pp. 1 ff.

clusive claim of Christ. If such an essential element of primitive Christian faith is inconceivable from Otto's philosophical premises, Heim adds that it may cause us to pause and ask whether the trouble does not lie in the philosophy with which we approach the study of the historical facts. We can at the most, from such a philosophy, reach the "idea of a saviour" which could be manifested in a number of historical forms, but not in one Saviour alone. We can say there are not only average men who are religiously receptive, there are not only prophets who show us God, there are sons of God in whom we see manifested qualities of the Divine nature. In a word we can call Jesus *a* Son, but not *the* Son. And it is, as Heim says, characteristic of the New Testament to see in Jesus *the* Son of God, God's only Son. Between this New Testament idea and the philosophies of Schleiermacher, Troeltsch, and Otto, Heim sees a broad gulf. The passage from the rational *a priori* to the historical is incomprehensible. We think Heim is right. We believe that his criticism of this passage over the high *a priori* road is convincing and will prove difficult to answer.

But what, we ask, does Heim offer us himself to bridge this gulf? What is his position on the relation of the eternal God to His historical manifestation, of philosophy to faith and history?

Heim asserts that we must have a philosophical basis to ground Christian faith and to connect the *a priori* religious idea with the historical Christ. Between these two factors must come a third which he had worked out in his *Certitude of Faith* and now develops in a recent article<sup>9</sup> in reply to criticisms of R. Paulus.<sup>10</sup> Paulus claims that all that is needed

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<sup>9</sup> *Glaubensgewissheit*, 3 Aufl., cf. also the article, "Zu Meinem Versuch einer neuen religionsphilosophischen Grundlegung der Dogmatik," especially pp. 417 ff.

<sup>10</sup> R. Paulus, "Geschichtliche und übergeschichtliche Grundlagen des Glaubens," in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1922 Hefte 3. u. 4; Paulus' view also will be found in his book *Das Christusproblem der Gegenwart*, 1922, p. 159. But see also p. 164 where Paulus claims a uniqueness in Jesus not to be found in any other; and again p. 127 where

is a recognition of the superhuman in the second factor, the historical Christ. This will account for the Christian view that Jesus is *the* Son. But Heim replies that it will never account for the idea that the final destiny of all humanity is centered in Jesus alone. Paulus' idealistic philosophy and Christianity cannot be harmonized and in the end we have a set of religious symbols on the one side and a number of historical examples on the other. In Paulus' language, "Christ is a symbolical expression for the saving and reconciling presence of God." Paulus does not save historical Christianity by a parallel historical line of thought which seeks to give finality to the entire Christian movement. Philosophical Idealism and historical Christianity are left side by side. The "superhuman" element in Jesus can be found, according to Paulus' admission, in Laotse, Gotama, and Plato. Here we are brought into contradiction with the New Testament, Heim says, and we must choose between mysticism apart from history, or admit that salvation is in Christ alone and that He is *the* Son. Paulus seeks to find an "intensive finality" in Jesus but his philosophical principles can never make room for it.

In place of all such attempts Heim gives a speculative view which he claims will furnish a basis for Christian faith. Heim's idea, briefly summarized, is as follows. The manner in which all previous Systematic Theology has sought to pass from the religious *a priori* to historical Christianity is a false attempt to escape from the situation in which we find ourselves as a fallen race estranged from God. This has introduced a fundamental contradiction or antinomy which runs throughout all our knowledge, and this fact must be frankly realized and admitted. The peculiarity of our situation consists in the fact that we have necessarily two mutually exclusive "pictures" of our entire world of experience. One is the "neutral picture" of scientific

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Paulus reverts to the former position for which Heim criticised him. In fact Heim is right in saying that Paulus says both yes and no to the question of the absolute significance of Jesus for faith.

objectivity, free from all individual "perspective." It is universal, relativistic, or as we would say naturalistic. The other is the picture "with perspective." It is a true and necessary view, but arises in us only when we are willing to make the necessary sacrifice of "neutrality" and "objectivity." It has an absolute center of value to which everything must be related, and from which everything must be viewed. The "painfulness" of our situation lies in the fact that these two "pictures" of reality or world-views are absolutely mutually exclusive. They cannot be harmonized, and this fact must be recognized. Of course the human mind is forced to seek to escape from this "curse" which rests on human knowledge, and the weightiest of such attempts is that of philosophical Idealism which regards the concrete, individual, "perspectivistic" view as but a symbol of the objective or philosophical and scientific view. But all such attempts have proven failures. The most that we can do to bring any unity into our experience is to point out that these two contradictory aspects of our knowledge, the conflict between which we experience so painfully in the religious sphere, runs throughout all our knowledge. This "law of perspective" is universal in its reach. It finds its simplest illustration in sense perception. If we look out of our window on the landscape, we see things and objects in perspective from our standpoint. But we are involuntarily obliged to abstract from our standpoint and think of the objects as they are in themselves. Both aspects are necessary, and both are irreconcilable. But while they are irreconcilable, they are inseparable. We cannot help making in thought this abstraction from our own view-point. (One of the American neo-realists has called this the "egocentric predicament.") But when once we have realized this fact, Heim continues, we are in a position to understand why human thought has been driven to seek to harmonize and bring unity into our knowledge, and how all such attempts are hopeless. The most common of such attempts rests, he says, upon a mythological conception of the soul, and a distinction between an "inner world" and an "outer world," or

between consciousness in opposition to "objective reality." This is a great mistake, Heim thinks. Kant has shown that we cannot thus hypostatize the self and separate it from its conscious states in which are united both aspects of reality falsely called inner and outer. In this fallacious way we are led to assign the world-view which has our own necessary perspective to the sphere of the "subjective," and to regard the neutral or scientific view as objective. In this way we are led into all manner of difficulties.

If we admit this false distinction, Heim continues, we are led to seek by it to escape the difficulties inherent in our religious knowledge. If this so-called subjective attitude is necessary to the human spirit, and if over against it is an objective view, then in regard to our knowledge of God two opposite conclusions are drawn. Either we take the subjective view-point seriously and value the human spirit and its view-point higher than nature, and then, following Ritschl, we seek a moral proof of God's existence and assert the deity of Christ in a judgment of value, supposing we have overcome the neutral, scientific, or so-called objective point of view according to which Jesus is only a man, miracles impossible, and Christianity only relative. Or, on the other hand, we do not take the non-neutral, so-called subjective point of view seriously, but recognize as valid only the neutral, objective, naturalistic view-point. Then all value judgments are worthless, Jesus is no longer the central personality of human history, miracles are impossible, and a pure relativism and naturalism is all that remains. As long as the "perspectivistic" point of view is relegated to a mythical "inner world," this result is unavoidable. In fact in this way we escape from any question as to the existence of God Himself. By the first alternative we seek faith in God and Christ in an unjustifiable manner. By the second alternative we seek to escape all religious questions in an equally illegitimate way.

Let us then abandon this above described great source of error, continues Heim. Let us give up the vain attempt to



escape from the necessary conditions of our human knowledge. Then at once the "law of perspective" ceases to be a mere psychological law and becomes a universally valid law. When we do this we get a world-view which can form a basis for the belief in Christ which the New Testament presents. We have at last found a philosophical starting point, universal in its scope, which can do justice to the Christianity of the New Testament which regards Christ as *the* Son of God, and the *only* Saviour of men. In all theological systems since Hegel, this necessary non-neutral or "perspectivistic" point of view is dragged in as an after thought to save Christian faith. Here it is recognized from the start as a necessary part of all human knowledge. Hegel's attempt to relate the Absolute to history in a logical way is recognized as a false attempt to escape from the antinomy which is essential to human knowledge in our state of estrangement from God. We cannot escape. On the one side stands relativism with its neutral objective point of view, and the Person of Jesus loses the position He occupies in Christian faith. On the other side stands the non-neutral and perspectivistic view, and Christ takes His place as *the* Son of God and the object of Christian faith. Neither view-point should be related to the other; neither subjected to the other. Each must be thought through consistently. But we can only attain the world-view of faith as we ever anew pass over the "abyss" of offence which the absolute claims of Jesus arouse on the basis of the "relativistic" view of the world. But once we seek to lessen this "offence" of Christianity, Christian faith at once loses its power to conquer the world.

This is, briefly put, Heim's view. What is to be said of it? In our attempt to escape *a priori* logic shall we flee to the refuge of a necessary antinomy? Can Christian faith survive on this philosophical basis? These are the questions which we shall now seek to answer briefly.

The most important thing to say and the fundamental criticism of Heim's view is that knowledge and belief cannot survive a final antinomy or contradiction. The law of contra-

diction is a fundamental law of human thought. Do away with it and we are inevitably led to a thorough going scepticism. We can believe in things that we cannot fully comprehend and even in those that we cannot clearly see can be harmonized. But we cannot believe in two views which we clearly see are contradictory. We cannot be convinced of the truth of a proposition on one set of grounds and at the same time be convinced of its falsity on another set of grounds. The law of contradiction is unescapable in every sphere of our knowledge. Charles Hodge, among many others, showed this very clearly,<sup>11</sup> both in discussing the proper function of reason in religion and in criticising the Christian Agnosticism of Mansel. In the former place he says, "Christians concede to reason the *judicium contradictionis*, that is the prerogative of deciding whether a thing is possible or impossible." He says that among impossible things is that one truth should contradict another. "That reason has this prerogative," he continues, "is clear from the very nature of the case." "Faith includes an affirmation of the mind that a thing is true. But it is a contradiction to say that the mind can affirm that to be true which it sees cannot by possibility be true. This would be to affirm and deny, to believe and disbelieve, at the same time." Recently it is the merit of Friedrich Traub to have emphasized the same truth.<sup>12</sup> There are matters in our religious knowledge which he thinks involve seeming contradictions, but he holds that we are bound by the laws of thought to seek a harmony or at least to believe such a harmony possible. Otherwise belief is impossible. This is what we wish to emphasize. It is not merely that complete scepticism would result from giving up this fundamental law of contradiction; it is that it is psychologically impossible for belief to arise or exist under such circumstances. It is simply that we cannot believe to be true that which we see to be false.

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<sup>11</sup> *Systematic Theology*, vol. I, pp. 51, 352.

<sup>12</sup> "Das Irrationale" (*Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1921, Heft 6).

If this be the case then it follows that if the religious and Christian or "perspectivistic" world-view be true, the "neutral" or so-called scientific, *i.e.*, relativistic and naturalistic view, must be false, and *vice versa*. We cannot believe them both; and if this contradiction is an ultimate result of our thought, we can believe nothing.

But it should be noted, secondly, that there are not two such necessary views. There is of course, to take Heim's illustration, the "picture of the world" which we get from sense perception. Then there is the "picture" or conception we get by the process of abstraction from and criticism of this view from the standpoint of natural science apart from the concreteness of our sense perception point of view. But the two are not contradictory, and what is more the second is a construction of our minds equally subjective with the other point of view. In no case and in no department of our knowledge can we get outside of ourselves and view things as "they are in themselves," that is as God sees them. To do this our knowledge would have to become like that of God. It is to demand the impossible. We are bound to trust the laws of belief which God has implanted in our mind or to acknowledge an utter scepticism.

Turning to the sphere of religious knowledge, we would remark thirdly, that the effect of sin upon our knowledge, according to both Scripture and experience, is spiritual blindness, and not, as Heim asserts, the "curse" of contradictions or antinomies. Our natural knowledge of God has been darkened, but not destroyed. The laws of our thought have not been rendered untrustworthy. What we need is not resignation to antinomies but spiritual illumination. This is the clear teaching of Scripture which not only asserts that our minds are darkened; that we are spiritually blind and in need of spiritual illumination; but which also recognizes with equal clearness the prerogatives of human reason in matters of religious belief. And to this Scriptural teaching our experience gives abundant witness.

Finally we should note that the view which Heim calls "neutral," "unperspective," and "relativistic" in the religious

and Christian sphere is neither necessary nor true: it is just naturalism. By this we do not mean simply the philosophical sense of the term or the "mechanistic conception" of the Universe, but the view which denies to God the power to intrude in the sphere of second causes and produce effects due to His Omnipotence alone. Now what should be carefully observed is that this naturalistic view is neither a necessity of thought nor a legitimate result of genuine empirical science, whether of nature or mind. It is a piece of philosophical or speculative dogmatism. The writer of this article sought to show this in the essay on the "Finality of the Christian Religion," above referred to. It has recently been clearly and forcefully put by Bishop Gore.<sup>13</sup> He tells us rightly that if we believe in an Infinite Personal God, the Creator and Ruler of the Universe, we may believe in supernatural Christianity, and can approach the evidence for belief in the supernatural Christ of the New Testament without naturalistic basis. We will not repeat the discussion we gave in the above mentioned essay. We said that all anti-theistic views must deny Christian supernaturalism, but that the theist in the full sense of that term can believe in it. We sought to examine the two main reasons why many theists reject it. A truly theistic philosophy of religion and an adequate theory of knowledge are the fundamental demands of Christian Apologetics today. But into these great matters we cannot now enter. Our purpose in this article has been the more modest one of examining the relation of recent speculation to the Person of Christ, and of criticising the religious philosophy of two leaders of German thought, Rudolf Otto and Karl Heim, as a basis for belief in the Christ of the New Testament.

Princeton.

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<sup>13</sup> *Belief in Christ* (1922), p. 3 f. See also his previous volume, *Belief in God*.

## THE GOD OF THE EARLY CHRISTIANS\*

A marked characteristic of the present time is the intellectual decadence which has affected most departments of human endeavor except those that are concerned with purely material things. This decadence has been felt in no department more clearly than in the sphere of the Christian religion. And the reason is not far to seek—it is found in the pragmatist philosophy of the day, which divorces right living from right thinking and supposes that religion may be the same no matter what may be the intellectual conceptions with which it is connected. Such exclusion of the intellect from the highest sphere of human life has very naturally degraded the intellect, and the result is a lamentable intellectual decline. No doubt the men who laid the foundations of the modern anti-intellectualistic philosophy and anti-intellectualistic religion were men of great intellectual power, and for a time the logical results of their endeavors were obscured. But to-day the inevitable result is becoming more and more clear. The intellect has been browbeaten so long in the field of theory that one cannot be surprised if it is now ceasing to function in the field of practice. Schleiermacher and Ritschl, with all their intellectual gifts, have, it may fairly be maintained, contributed largely to produce that indolent impressionism which, at least in the New Testament field, has now largely taken the place of the patient researches that were being carried on a generation or two ago.

But in this development from anti-intellectual theory to anti-intellectual practice, the distinguished president of Union Theological Seminary is to be connected clearly, not with the latter, but with the former phase. In the sphere of theory, Dr. McGiffert is clearly to be included among the enemies of the intellect; few men have separated more sharply than he between theology and religion, and few have more ruthlessly drawn the skeptical conclusions from that separa-

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\* *The God of the Early Christians*. By Arthur Cushman McGiffert. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1924.



tion. But even in dethroning the intellect, Dr. McGiffert, like the older Ritschlians, has displayed marked intellectual power; unlike most contemporary writers on Biblical themes he belongs spiritually to a better day when scholarship was at least thought to involve painstaking intellectual work.

And so in this volume of Nathaniel William Taylor Lectures, delivered before the Divinity School of Yale University in 1922, the author has produced a learned and brilliant, though at the same time provocative and (we are constrained to think) erroneous, book. Underlying the book, it is true, and more fundamentally, we suppose, than the author himself realizes, is the anti-intellectualistic philosophy of our day, with its separation into water-tight compartments of theology and philosophy on the one hand and religion and ethics on the other. But this philosophy, though it does, we think, influence and even determine the conclusions, does not lead to the shallow sentimentality and meaningless repetition of cant phrases which characterize the great mass of religious books at the present time. On the contrary Dr. McGiffert has examined the problem of Christian origins for himself, with ruthless disregard of what is usual in the ecclesiastical circles to which he belongs; and far from falling into sentimentality he has, we are almost tempted to say, erred on the other side—he has, despite his own exaltation of experience at the expense of theology, displayed, not too great, but too little, sympathy with religious feeling, at least where religious feeling is connected with convictions which he does not himself share. Such a book, with its learning and its originality, whatever may be its faults, repays careful examination far more than many a five-foot shelf of the ostensibly startling and progressive but really thoroughly conventional religious books which are so popular just now.

Jesus, according to Dr. McGiffert, did not teach a new view of God, but simply continued the teaching which was common among His people and in His day. In particular it is a great mistake, according to Dr. McGiffert, to suppose that Jesus emphasized in any revolutionary manner the love

or the Fatherhood of God—indeed, he says, in the Synoptic Gospels (which are here treated as the sole authentic sources of information), the love and the forgiveness of God are very seldom directly in view, and the Fatherhood of God was perhaps even more prominent in the teaching of Jesus' contemporaries than in His own. Indeed, our author insists, if any element in Jesus' teaching about God is distinctive, it is the awful severity of God rather than the love of God; Jesus had much to say about punishment as well as bliss in the future world, and differed from his contemporaries in breaking down their easy complacency and bringing them face to face with the dread decision between death and life. "Strait is the gate," according to Jesus, "and narrow is the way, which leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it." But even in this element in His teaching, Dr. McGiffert maintains, Jesus clearly was following in the line of an Old Testament prophet such as Amos; and in general, in the whole outline of His teaching about God—His thoroughgoing theism, with its insistence upon the sovereignty of God with which none can argue or bargain, and His doctrine of creation—He was simply a child of His people and was not the originator of distinctively Christian ideas.

It will not be possible here to examine these contentions in detail: they are based, we think, upon a false limitation of the sources; and even within those sources that are used they are at a number of points clearly one-sided. But if they are one-sided, they constitute at least a salutary protest against a modern presentation that is more one-sided still. In a few ruthless strokes Dr. McGiffert has here demolished the entire sentimental picture of the "liberal Jesus." It is only necessary to compare, for example, Professor Ellwood's absurd but exceedingly popular and altogether typical assertion that "Jesus concerned Himself but little with the question of existence after death"<sup>1</sup> with our author's insistence upon Jesus' utterances about heaven and hell and upon the central place which they had in His teaching, in order to detect the

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<sup>1</sup> Ellwood, *The Reconstruction of Religion*, 1922, p. 141.

difference between popular Modernism,<sup>2</sup> with its thoughtless repetition of current phrases and its complete refusal to separate the question what we should have said from the question what Jesus actually said, on the one hand, and real scholarship, no matter how radical, on the other. The truth is that our author has indicated with admirable clearness, despite the one-sidedness of his presentation in detail, how false is the appeal of the dominant optimistic and positivist Modernism to the real Jesus of Nazareth. To put the matter briefly, Modernism (including Dr. McGiffert himself) thinks of religion exclusively "in terms of salvation," whereas the real Jesus of Nazareth thought of it also in terms of judgment; Modernism relegates the doctrines of creation and the divine sovereignty to the realm of metaphysics, whereas the teaching of the real Jesus was theistic through and through.

Thus according to our author Jesus was, and always remained, a Jew; and his doctrine of God was Jewish and not Christian. In what sense, then, was He the Founder of the Christian religion? The obvious answer might seem to be, from the point of view of our author, that He was not the Founder of the Christian religion at all, and that Christianity originated after His time and had little to do with Him. But we desire earnestly to be fair; indeed at this point we want, if possible, to be fairer to Dr. McGiffert than he is to himself. He does not himself make the matter very clear, certainly he does not lay very much stress upon it; but still he does find something in Jesus that was distinctive as over against His contemporaries. That something was not His teaching, but it was His life; in Jesus the gospel of the kingdom was "irradiated by the intimacy and beauty of Jesus' own relation to God and by the quality of his life of service and sacrifice" (p. 193). No doubt, Dr. McGiffert holds that without that *life* of Jesus, the whole subsequent development, the whole formation and development of Christianity, would

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<sup>2</sup> We are using this word in a broad sense, in which it would include Harnack, for example, as well as Loisy.

have been impossible.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly our author is not so very far away from the current Modernism after all—he probably agrees with the Modernist preachers in holding that Jesus was the Founder of Christianity because He was the first to live the Christian life. But at any rate he does emphasize with a salutary clearness the falsity of the customary Modernist appeal to the *teaching* of Jesus. The impression is constantly being produced by the popular exponents of Modernism that although they have given up the authority of the Bible they do hold to the “authority of Christ.” That impression would be removed by a perusal of Dr. McGiffert’s book. Our author has shown, with all requisite clearness that the God of Modernism is quite different from the God of Jesus of Nazareth. The admission, we think, ought to be taken with very great seriousness. It will not indeed bring the Modernists back into conformity with the Word of God; for when, learning from Dr. McGiffert, they have to choose between their own view of God and the view which Jesus held, they will no doubt hold to their own view and let the teaching of Jesus go. But at least the alternative will have been placed clearly before the rank and file of the Church, and that will be immense gain. Dr. McGiffert has shown very boldly and very clearly, in the brief but weighty first section of his book, that the God of Jesus of Nazareth was quite different from the God proclaimed by the antitheistic Modernism of the twentieth century, including Dr. McGiffert himself.

So much for Jesus’ view of God; it was, according to our author, simply the view commonly held by the Jewish teachers of Jesus’ day. But an important step in advance, it is held, was taken by the apostle Paul. Paul did indeed retain his allegiance to the God of the Jews and of Jesus; but he added to that God a second object of worship—namely Jesus Himself. At this point it is interesting to observe the insistence of Dr. McGiffert upon the Pauline doctrine of the deity of Christ; indeed the reference of the word “God” (Θεός) to Jesus in Rom. ix. 5, which was singled out by

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<sup>3</sup> See, for example, p. 21.

Jülicher for special criticism in his review of a book by the writer of the present article,<sup>4</sup> here receives the weighty support of one who certainly cannot be accused of orthodox prejudices. But at any rate whether or no Paul applies the word "God" to Jesus he constantly applies to Him the word "Lord" (Κύριος), and refers to Him Old Testament passages where in the Septuagint that word is used to translate the "Jahwe" of the Hebrew text. What is more important still, Paul recognizes Christ throughout as an object of worship and even addresses prayers to Him. With this second object of worship whom Paul added to God the Father, and with the closely related idea of the Holy Spirit, the distinctive mystical piety of the apostle, according to our author, was connected. At this point, Dr. McGiffert believes, is to be found the influence, important though indirect, of the non-Jewish and non-Christian religion of Paul's day; Paul "illustrates in his own thinking the twofold strain which has run through nearly all Christian thought since his day, for Christianity was the child both of Judaism and of the orientalized Hellenism of the Roman world" (p. 34). "The God of Paul was the God of the Jews, expanded to include the divine Saviour Jesus Christ the Lord, by mystical union with whom believers are transformed from flesh into spirit and are thus saved" (pp. 193 f.).

This exposition of Paul is correct, of course, in emphasizing Paul's full belief in the deity of Christ, and also in representing Paulinism as in the fullest sense a religion of redemption. But it is wrong, we believe, in several respects: it is wrong positively, in finding the origin of Paul's redemptive religion in the orientalized Hellenism or the Hellenized oriental mysticism of Paul's day; and it is wrong negatively because of its ignoring of important elements in Pauline thought and Pauline experience. It ignores in the first place the entire forensic aspect of Paul's doctrine of salvation—the aspect which is concerned with justification or with the

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<sup>4</sup> See *The Origin of Paul's Religion*, 1921, p. 198, and Jülicher in *Christliche Welt*, 36, 1922, col. 625.



question how a sinful man becomes "right with God"—and it ignores in the second place the factual or historical basis which the apostle himself clearly attributed to his religious life. Paul's religion was not founded, as the reader of Dr. McGiffert's book might suppose, merely upon what Christ was, but it was founded also, and primarily, upon what Christ had done; Paulinism is based not merely upon things that always were true but upon something that happened—namely the redemptive work of Christ in His death and resurrection.

We understand of course that Dr. McGiffert is discussing, not soteriology, but theology in the narrower sense; he is discussing not Paul's doctrine of the way of salvation, but Paul's doctrine of God. Yet even in such a discussion the strictly factual basis of Paul's religion should not have been ignored: attention to it might have led to a clearer recognition of the identity between the God of the old dispensation, with His promises of redemption to come, and the God of the new dispensation holding closer fellowship with His people because of the redemption already accomplished through the death and resurrection of Christ; and it might have led also to a recognition of the difference between the mystery religions, with their dimly conceived saviour gods, whose experiences, even if they were really regarded as taking place at all otherwise than in the constantly repeated cult, lay at best in the remote past, and the religion of Paul, with its clear account of a redeeming act that had taken place before the gaze of the multitude outside the walls of Jerusalem only a few years before. Paulinism was founded upon a plain account of something that had happened, upon a piece of good news, a "gospel." Ignore that fact and you are without the key which unlocks the meaning of all the rest.

But it is time to return to the exposition of Dr. McGiffert's book. Two steps in the reconstruction have so far been noticed. There was according to our author first the thoroughly Jewish monotheism of Jesus; and there was in the second place, added to this Jewish monotheism, the Pauline notion of Jesus as a Saviour God. These two elements in

Paul's thought were, according to Dr. McGiffert, brought together in a sort of rough, provisional way by the Pauline designation of Jesus as "Son of God." This designation, or rather the Pauline use of it, shows, Dr. McGiffert thinks, that Paul had come to conceive of God in quite an un-Jewish way as a sort of substance in which two persons (God the Father and Jesus the Son) could share, and that this conception involves the conception of the divine immanence and the momentous notion, common to Paul and to the mystery religions, that salvation consists in a sharing, on the part of men, of the nature of God. All of this, our author thinks, is non-Jewish, and the union of it with Paul's Jewish monotheism, which conceives of God in a strictly personal way, means merely that two elements, really disparate, were allowed to rest side by side in the mind of Paul. Paul began, it is supposed, with Jewish monotheism, like that of Jesus; but added to it, as an entirely new and disparate element in his thinking, the Christ-mysticism which made of Jesus a Saviour God.

Yet, according to Dr. McGiffert, disparate as the two elements really were, they were both present in Paulinism and in the thought of some men, like the author of the Fourth Gospel, who were his followers. But—and here we come to the boldest and most distinctive contention in this remarkable book—there were many persons who accepted one of the two elements in Paulinism and did not accept the other, who accepted Jesus as a saviour-god, but did not accept the monotheism which Jesus and Paul derived from their Jewish inheritance. These persons, it is supposed, were not at all exceptional, and did not creep into the Church at any late date, but on the contrary formed the rank and file of primitive Gentile Christianity. There were no doubt, it is admitted, some Gentile Christians who, coming into the Church through the gateway of the synagogue, believed in the one God, Maker and Ruler of the world, before they came to believe in Jesus. But the great majority, it is thought, were of the way of thinking which has just been indicated; the great

majority accepted Jesus as *their* saviour god, but were not at all concerned to deny the existence of other gods, and in particular were not at all interested in the connection of Jesus with the Maker and Ruler of the universe or indeed with the question whether there is any Maker and Ruler of the universe at all. At an early date, Dr. McGiffert says, "there came into the Christian church from the Gentile world many who found in Jesus Christ their saviour, and to whom the God of the Jews—the God worshipped by both Jesus and Paul—meant nothing" (pp. 193 f.). A somewhat extended quotation may be necessary to set forth this central thesis of the book (pp. 46 ff.) :

"The saviour gods of the current mystery religions were not supreme gods—creators and rulers of the world—nor were they thought of by their votaries as the only gods. Initiation into this or that cult did not mean the denial of other deities, but only the special consecration of oneself to the service of a particular deity. This may well have been the situation of many early Christians. Their personal piety centred in the Lord Jesus Christ. In communion with him and in devotion to him they found their religious life. But they may not have felt it necessary to deny the existence of other deities or to accept the one God of Israel as their God.

"There was no antecedent reason, indeed, why the Gentile Christians should accept the God of the Jews whom Jesus worshipped, any more than the Jewish ceremonial law which he observed and the Jewish practices in which he was brought up. The fact that Jesus himself and his personal disciples were Jews no more required the Gentile Christians to be Jews in their customs and beliefs than the fact that Adonis was a Syrian deity, Attis a Phrygian, and Isis and Serapis Egyptian deities required their adherents to become Syrians or Phrygians or Egyptians, and to accept the religious tents of those peoples. Whether Judaism or any part of it was to be regarded as permanently essential to Christianity was a matter to be determined, and by no means went without saying. The early Jewish disciples thought the whole of it essential and regarded the new faith as only a form of Judaism. Paul broke with Judaism and made of Christianity a new religion, but he did not break with the Jewish God. On the contrary, he recognized him as the God of Christians as well as Jews.

“But by what right did he reject a part of the old system and retain another part? Evidently there was room for a difference of opinion. Paul’s authority was not great enough to compel the general adoption of his doctrine of redemption, nor were other Christians under the necessity of accepting the Jewish God simply because he did. We can hardly avoid the conclusion that if belief in the God of the Jews was finally universal among Christians it was because it commended itself as sound rather than because it was from the beginning an essential part of the new faith. As already said, most of the early Gentile converts were not seeking monotheism, but salvation through Christ. This being so, it is gratuitous to assume that they must have accepted monotheism when they accepted Christianity. On the contrary, they may well have taken Christ as their Lord and Saviour, without taking His God and Father as their God.”

Thus, according to Dr. McGiffert, primitive Gentile Christianity thought of religion “in terms of salvation” but not in terms of metaphysics; it was Christian without being theistic; it accepted Jesus but did not accept Jesus’ God.

It would be difficult to imagine a more revolutionary thesis; and if such a thesis were proposed by one of the merely impressionistic historians of the day, who either dispense themselves from any examination of the sources, or else, completely abandoning scientific historical method, make the sources subservient to the practical needs of the modern Church, then the thesis could perhaps safely be passed by. But when it is proposed by one of the most distinguished American scholars, who in his *Apostolic Age* has produced perhaps the ablest American exposition of the older “Liberal” view of primitive Christianity—a view widely different from the one which the author now sets forth—and who by the solid learning of his commentary on Eusebius has placed all students of Christian literature very deeply in his debt—when so revolutionary a thesis is proposed by such a scholar it certainly ought to be examined with some care.

But before the examination, it is important to fix in our minds, just as clearly as possible, exactly what it is that Dr. McGiffert is undertaking to prove. If he were maintaining

merely that individual Gentiles, not understanding the apostolic proclamation of the one God, found their way into the Church without having really freed themselves of their polytheistic point of view, then we should not perhaps venture upon a summary denial. Certain Athenians supposed that when Paul spoke of "Jesus and the resurrection" he was a setter forth of "strange gods;" they did not understand or perhaps mockingly pretended to misunderstand the monotheism which underlay everything that the apostle said. These Athenians were indeed certainly not received into the primitive Christian community; they are spoken of, rather, as typical representatives of those who scornfully rejected the new faith. But it is conceivable, though perhaps improbable, that individual Gentiles made their way into the apostolic churches without inwardly relinquishing their polytheistic point of view and without becoming deeply interested in the apostolic teaching about the one living and true God. In the subapostolic age, moreover, there were those who perhaps called themselves Christian and who accepted some at least of the Christian claims for Christ and yet were very far from accepting the central elements in New Testament Christianity. It is conceivable, though by no means certain, that such heresies as those of Cerinthus and Carpocrates, for example, had their precursors even in the earlier part of the apostolic age. And it is conceivable, though again by no means probable, that among such isolated phenomena is to be put a non-theistic<sup>5</sup> Gentile Christianity such as that which Dr. McGiffert describes.

But even if such an admission should be made it would not at all touch the matter now under discussion. What Dr. McGiffert is undertaking to establish is not merely the existence, in individual converts in the apostolic and subapostolic age, of a non-theistic Christianity, but the existence of such a

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<sup>5</sup> It is hoped that the reader will pardon the use of this hybrid word. "Atheistic" would obviously not do at all. And even "antitheistic" would perhaps be too strong; since Dr. McGiffert does not maintain that these Christians expressly denied theism but only that they were not interested in it.



Christianity as embracing the great mass of early Gentile Christians, as having a recognized place in the Church instead of being rigidly excluded as were the adherents of Carpocrates and Cerinthus and the later Gnostics, and indeed as forming the basis for the whole subsequent development of the Christian religion. That, and nothing less than that, is the astonishing thesis which our author endeavors to establish. Indeed so fundamental does he regard this non-theistic Christianity in the subsequent history of the Church that at times he seems almost to ignore the possibility of any other influence, and in particular the possibility of any considerable direct influence of the New Testament. Were the primitive Gentile Christians so predominantly worshippers of Jesus without being worshippers of the God of Israel, were they so predominantly Christians without being monotheists, that this non-theistic Gentile Christianity could form the basis of the whole subsequent development of the Church? That is the question which is raised by Dr. McGiffert's book.

In proposing so provocative a thesis it is unfortunate that the author has not allowed himself more space than is afforded by a short volume of lectures. Dr. McGiffert is proposing nothing less than a rather radical reconstruction of early Christian history; yet he has flung his suggestion out into the world with only very sketchy argumentative support. One could wish that like Baur or Bousset he had made public at once the materials upon which his reconstruction is based. Nevertheless he has at least clearly indicated the main arguments by which his thesis is to be supported, and we do not think that the addition of details could essentially change our estimate. We shall therefore endeavor briefly to set forth and criticize the arguments by which the existence of a non-theistic Gentile Christianity as a dominant factor in the life of the primitive Church is here thought to be established.

In the first place, the author deals with the antecedent probabilities of the case. Before adducing positive evidence as to the existence of a non-theistic Gentile Christianity he seeks to show that the existence of such a Christianity is

only what might have been expected, especially on the basis of the Epistles of Paul. The early converts from the Gentile world, except those who had already been attracted by the synagogue, were, Dr. McGiffert insists, in a very different situation from that which prevailed among the Jewish Christians; the "Christians of Jewish birth or training worshipped the God of the Jews from the beginning, and only afterward worshipped Christ and recognized him as divine, as many of them never did."<sup>6</sup> But converts drawn directly from the Gentile world were in a different situation. They did not begin with the God of the Jews, but with the Lord Jesus Christ. Not the former, but the latter, brought them into the Christian circle" (p. 44).

It cannot be said, however, that this consideration supports Dr. McGiffert's thesis. Indeed it is not even clear that the situation of the Gentile Christians is here correctly stated; it is by no means clear that the Gentile Christians "began" with the Lord Jesus Christ and not with the God of the Jews. In the precious summary of missionary preaching to Gentiles which Paul gives in 1 Thess. i. 9, 10, the apostle indicates the contrary; in that summary the proclamation of "the living and true God" comes before the proclamation of Jesus. "For they themselves," Paul says, "show of us what manner of entering in we had unto you, and how ye turned to God from idols to serve the living and true God; and to wait for his Son from heaven, whom he raised from the dead, even Jesus, which delivereth us from the wrath to come." But even if it should be granted that the primitive Gentile Christians began with Jesus rather than with God, it would still not follow that acceptance of Jesus was ever possible without acceptance of God. For in all our sources of primitive information the Lordship of Jesus and His Saviourhood are represented as being indissolubly connected with the relation that He sus-

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<sup>6</sup> There is really not the slightest evidence that the words "as many of them never did" are correct for the early period. Even in arguing with his bitterest Jewish Christian opponents Paul gives no evidence of any difference of opinion between himself and them with regard to the person of Christ.

tained to God the Father. There is not the slightest evidence for the opinion that the title "Son of God" was a mere invention of Paul to show a relation between Jesus the Saviour God and the God of the Jews whom Paul continued to worship. On the contrary Jesus is presented in every aspect, including His aspect as Saviour, which Dr. McGiffert makes the sole aspect in which he appeared to the Gentile Christians, as standing in relation to God. Indeed the very idea of salvation involves the idea of the one God. What did the primitive Gentile Christians understand by "salvation"? Did they not understand by it—whatever else it might mean—did they not understand by it salvation from the final condemnation *of God*? Will Dr. McGiffert venture to remove—and just in the case of the simple-minded rank and file—this eschatological reference? He insists indeed that the primitive Gentile Christians thought of religion in terms of salvation, not of judgment. But does not the very idea of salvation involve, as its correlative, the idea of judgment; and does not the idea of judgment involve the idea of God as judge?

Moreover, if the result of salvation or the very nature of it thus involves the idea of God, so does also the act by which salvation was consummated; in speaking of the resurrection of Christ, Paul speaks, in the Thessalonian passage just quoted and elsewhere in the Epistles, of the One who raised Him from the dead. So it is also with regard to all other aspects of salvation. In attributing to those supposedly simple-minded Gentile Christians of the first century the sublimated mysticism of the twentieth century, which is not interested in the thought of a life after death or in the relation of man to the inscrutable and terrible power that the ancients called fate, Dr. McGiffert is, we are constrained to believe, guilty of a very serious anachronism. Indeed even in connection with the Holy Spirit, where the affinity with a mere mysticism might naturally be expected to appear, if it appears anywhere, Paul speaks of the sending of the Spirit or the supplying of the Spirit *by God*. So monotheism is connected even with what might be regarded as the most mystical

aspect of salvation. The truth is that so far as the primitive sources permit us to judge, Christ was valued as Saviour just because of His relation to the one supreme God; it is, so far as we can see, quite typical of primitive Christianity when Paul couples "God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ" together regularly at the beginnings of his epistles. There is not the slightest evidence that in the apostolic age Jesus was ever preached in such a way that the acceptance of Him as Saviour and Lord was possible without the acceptance of God His Father.

Against this conclusion Dr. McGiffert employs one of the most extraordinary arguments in the whole book. In certain passages, he says, Paul speaks of the gospel as having "to do only with Christ, not God." So for example in I Corinthians xv.1 ff. But could there be any greater conceivable misuse of the passage? Paul was led to give this excerpt from his fundamental missionary teaching because of an error that was concerned specifically with the resurrection and with nothing else; it is absurd to expect him, in such a connection, to reproduce other elements in his teaching, which no matter how fundamental would here have been entirely irrelevant. Again Dr. McGiffert refers to Phil. i. 15-21, where the rival teachers are tolerantly spoken of because they are preaching Christ, and where nothing is said about God. But would Paul ever have spoken with tolerance of a preaching which ignored God the Father? The question needs only to be put in order to be answered. The truth is that preaching "Christ" for Paul necessarily involved preaching the one God the Father; the idea of "Christ" had as its absolutely necessary correlative the idea of God; the former could never be thought of without the latter. Finally Dr. McGiffert asks that with the tolerance of Phil. i. 15-21 there should be contrasted the stern words of Gal. i. 7,8: "There are some that trouble you and would pervert the gospel of Christ. But though we or an angel from heaven preach another gospel than that we have preached unto you, let him be anathema." The point seems to be that Paul was intolerant where as in

Galatia "Christ" or the way of salvation was not correctly set forth, but could be very tolerant about errors concerning other things, including the doctrine of God. But could there be any more complete abandonment of grammatico-historical interpretation? The reason why Paul does not in Galatians pronounce an anathema upon those who fail to proclaim God the Father is simply because he is there arguing against Jews, whose doctrine of God the Father was presumably all that could be desired; very naturally he refers to the matter that was in dispute and not to other matters, important though they might be, which were utterly irrelevant at that particular time. If the opponents in Galatia had failed to proclaim the one true God set forth in the Old Testament and in the teaching of Jesus, then we can be sure that Paul's anathema would have lacked nothing in sternness. But as a matter of fact a proclamation of Christ which was not also a proclamation of God the Father was so absolutely inconceivable in the early Church that anathemas against it were never needed. Where Paul does refer, as in the case of the Thessalonians, to his missionary preaching among Gentiles, he places the proclamation of "the living and true God" at the very beginning.

But Dr. McGiffert has not quite finished with Gal. i.7,8. "Of this gospel preached to the Galatians," he continues, "Paul says: 'Neither did I receive it from man, nor was I taught it, but by revelation of Jesus Christ,' showing that it was something different from Judaism and Jewish monotheism." Here appears, in a peculiarly poignant way, the failure of our author to recognize the dispensational, or factual and historical character of Paul's teaching. It is perfectly true that the doctrine of God did not, strictly speaking, form a part of Paul's "gospel"; for gospel meant to Paul, as the very word implies, a piece of good news, an account of something that had happened. The doctrine of God sets forth what God was and always had been; and in itself, far from being a gospel or a piece of good news, can lead us sinners only to despair: whereas the "gospel" sets forth something that God did at



a definite point of time near Jerusalem when He saved sinful mankind through the death and resurrection of the Lord Jesus Christ. But although the gospel itself does not contain the doctrine of God, it presupposes it and is absolutely meaningless without it. In isolating the gospel from its presuppositions, Dr. McGiffert, in accordance with the dominant tendency of today, has made of the gospel something totally different from that which Paul understood it to be. If the gospel of Paul is said to be "something different from Judaism and Jewish monotheism" that is perhaps true, provided that "Jewish monotheism" (in what is really a thoroughly unhistorical way) be abstracted from the element of promise with which it was always connected. But if the assertion is true, it is also valueless. "Jewish monotheism" sets forth what God is; the gospel of Paul sets forth something that He has done: but what He has done is entirely unintelligible without a knowledge of what He is.

The same consideration—namely, insistence upon the factual or historical nature of Paul's gospel—serves to refute the next argument which Dr. McGiffert brings forth. "Paul's teaching about the law in his Epistle to the Galatians—that they were not justified by works of law but by faith in Jesus Christ, and that they who were justified by law were severed from Christ—and his declaration that circumcision is nothing nor uncircumcision, but a new creation, might easily lead his converts to think the whole Jewish system including Jewish monotheism itself of small importance" (p. 50). "There was no antecedent reason . . . . why the Gentile Christians should accept the God of the Jews whom Jesus worshiped, any more than the Jewish ceremonial law which he observed and the Jewish practices in which he was brought up" (p. 47). This argument ignores the difference between a command, which deals with what *ought to be*; and a doctrine of God which deals with what *is*. A command may be absolutely authoritative and yet temporary, whereas a doctrine of God, if it be abandoned, can be abandoned only because it never was true at all. If a boy's father, to use a homely

example, tells him to chop up the wood on the woodpile, that does not mean that he is to continue chopping wood to the end of time; he is not at all disobeying or setting aside his father's command if he quits chopping wood when the job is done. So it is exactly with the ceremonial requirements of the Old Testament law; they were, according to Paul, commands of God, but they were commands which God intended from the beginning to be in force only until the coming of Christ. When their purpose was fulfilled, it was not obedience but disobedience to insist upon the observance of them. But to reject the "Jewish" doctrine of the one living and holy God would not be to declare a command to be temporary, but it would be to declare an assertion of fact to be false. The two things are entirely incommensurate. If God commanded Jewish fasts and feasts and the separation of Israel from other nations, it was quite conceivable that He should declare that the purpose of those commands was fulfilled with the completion of Christ's redeeming work. And if He did so, that did not involve at all any confession that those previous commands had been, under the old dispensation, anything but holy and just and good. But to say that the God of Israel was not really the Maker and Ruler of the world—indeed to say that there was no supreme Maker and Ruler of the world at all—that would be an entirely different matter. Dr. McGiffert says: "Paul broke with Judaism and made of Christianity a new religion, but he did not break with the Jewish God . . . . But by what right [the Gentile disciples are represented as possibly saying to themselves] did he reject a part of the old system and retain another part?" The answer to this question of Dr. McGiffert's is that Paul did not reject any part of the old system at all. He did not reject the ceremonial law, but believed that it was authoritative throughout. But he believed that though absolutely authoritative it was intended by God to be temporary.

So the whole notion that Paul was picking and choosing in Judaism, and that in retaining the Old Testament idea of God while rejecting the ceremonial law he was stopping

arbitrarily in a half-way emancipation, is based upon an ignoring of the dispensational or historical basis of Paulinism. Paul preached his gospel of Gentile freedom not because he took the Old Testament law with a grain of salt, but on the contrary because he took it strictly—so strictly that he could not be satisfied with half-way measures, but was led on to a clear recognition of the epoch-making significance of the Cross of Christ. He emancipated his converts from the ceremonial law, not because he accepted part of what the Old Testament teaches and rejected the rest, but on the contrary just because he accepted all of it; his doctrine of redemption is based not upon a lax or eclectic, but upon a strict and comprehensive, view of the law of God.

No doubt it may be said in reply that, although Paul himself was not really rejecting the authority of any part of the Old Testament, yet simple-minded Gentile converts might have thought that he was doing so, and so might have thought that they were only going a little farther in the path in which Paul had led, if, in addition to the rejection of the ceremonial law, they rejected or at least ignored the Old Testament teaching about God. But the reply is hardly satisfactory. Despite the Epistle of Barnabas, with its different teaching (which was due to the anti-Jewish polemic of the second century), the Pauline doctrine of the temporary character of the ceremonial law may probably have made its way generally in the early Church. The point was so very simple that even simple-minded, untheological Gentile Christians could understand it. And were any human beings ever quite so simple-minded and quite so untheological as Dr. McGiffert's Gentile Christians are thought to have been?

But even if the Pauline teaching about the one God, Maker and Ruler of the world, was perfectly clear, would the authority of Paul and of the other Jewish Christian apostles and teachers be sufficient to compel the Gentile converts to accept this "Jewish God"? Dr. McGiffert thinks that it would not. "Paul's authority," he says (p. 48), "was not great enough to compel the general adoption of his doctrine of redemption,

nor were other Christians under the necessity of accepting the Jewish God simply because he did." This reference to the Pauline doctrine of redemption is ingenious but hardly convincing. The point here made seems to be that many post-Pauline writers—for example the Apostolic Fathers and the later writers of the Old Catholic Church—display a woeful lack of understanding for the Pauline doctrine of redemption. Might not others in the Church, then, have displayed a similar lack of acceptance of the Pauline doctrine of God? In answer, it must be admitted that there is in early Christian literature outside of the New Testament evidence of a failure to understand or at least to state at all fully or clearly the Pauline doctrine of justification by faith. That is why the achievement of Augustine and of the Reformation, in bringing to light things that are indeed at the very centre of the Bible but that the Church had failed fully to understand and use, must be rated very high; and that is also why the true "progressives" are not those who now busy themselves with the "simplification" of creeds but those who value the rich theological heritage which on the basis of Scripture the Holy Spirit has given to the Church. Nevertheless the failure of the sub-apostolic Church to make full use of the Pauline doctrine of redemption is not at all comparable to that ignoring of Pauline monotheism which Dr. McGiffert attributes to the primitive Gentile disciples. The Pauline doctrine of redemption was not denied, nor even altogether ignored, but was merely not made use of in its full richness and depth; whereas this supposed ignoring of Pauline monotheism would mean the missing of that feature of Paul's preaching which according to I Thessalonians came at the very beginning, which was perhaps most strikingly distinctive as over against the beliefs from which the Gentiles were won, and which appeared in the simplest possible way in everything that Paul said. What did those Gentile Christians, according to Dr. McGiffert, make of the terms "God" and "the Father" which appear every few lines in the Pauline Epistles and which were undoubtedly equally frequent, if not more frequent, in his

oral missionary teaching? Did they suppose that those terms meant nothing at all, so that they could be safely passed by? The supposition, we think, is nothing short of absurd.

But Dr. McGiffert has raised the question of authority; and it is an important question which cannot be ignored. What, according to our author, were the authorities or the influences which led the early Gentile converts to ignore monotheism, and what were the authorities or influences on the other side which, in order that they might thus ignore monotheism, they were obliged to overcome?

On the former side, as an influence hostile to monotheism, Dr. McGiffert places the religions from which the converts had come. "While monotheism and polytheism," he says, "were both represented in the religious world of the period, the former was usually the affair of the philosopher, and it is improbable that the mass of the early Gentile converts, who were certainly not drawn from the philosophic schools, had any initial interest in monotheism or any understanding of it" (p. 41). "Had the Gentile Christians lived in a monotheistic world, they might have been expected to subordinate Christ to God as Christians of Jewish antecedents did. As it was, they needed no supreme God above and beyond Christ, and to suppose such a God central in their thought is to misinterpret their interest and attitude. Jewish Christianity was monotheistic and Gentile Christianity became monotheistic under influences to be referred to later, but there is no reason to suppose that the latter was monotheistic from the start. The Jews had won their monotheism only gradually and by many struggles;<sup>7</sup> to imagine that Jewish Christians could impose it without more ado upon converts to the new faith from the polytheistic civilization of the day is to overestimate their influence" (pp. 45 f.). "The saviour gods of the current mystery religions were not supreme gods—creators and rulers of the world—nor were they thought of by their votaries as the only gods. Initiation into this or that cult did not mean the

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<sup>7</sup> This is obviously not the place to discuss the view of the Old Testament which Dr. McGiffert here assumes.



denial of other deities; but only the special consecration of oneself to the service of a particular deity. This may well have been the situation of many early Christians. Their personal piety centred in the Lord Jesus Christ. In communion with him and in devotion to him they found their religious life. But they may not have felt it necessary to deny the existence of other deities or to accept the one God of Israel as their God" (pp. 46 f.).

It will not here be possible to examine in detail the questions of fact involved in this argument—particularly the question whether the Gentile converts in any considerable numbers had been adherents of the mystery religions. That question, we think, must be answered, for the early period, with an emphatic negative.<sup>8</sup> But the fundamental weakness of the argument is independent of all such questions, no matter how important the questions may be in themselves. The clearest defect of the argument is that it ignores one of the most outstanding features of early Christianity—namely its uncompromising exclusiveness. That was the characteristic which impressed itself most plainly even upon outsiders; that was the characteristic which gave the new religion all its offensiveness, but also all its power. If the early Christians had been what Dr. McGiffert represents them as being, if they had simply accepted Christ as *their* saviour without being concerned to deny the existence of other saviours, then there would have been no persecutions, but also there would have been no conquest of the world. The most obvious single feature of this religion was just the thing that Dr. McGiffert denies; the strange thing about these hated Christians, the thing which aroused the opposition of the world, was not that they accepted a new Saviour, but that they held Him to be the *only* Saviour and the *only* Lord. But to what was this exclusiveness of the early Church due? The answer is perfectly plain—it was due to the lofty, universalistic, uncompromising monotheism which runs all through the Old Testament and

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<sup>8</sup> See *The Origin of Paul's Religion*, 1921, p. 273, and the passage there cited from Oepke, *Die Missionspredigt des Apostels Paulus*, 1920, p. 26.

which appears in supreme glory in the teaching of Jesus Himself. Is Dr. McGiffert correct in representing the universalistic and exclusive monotheism of the Christian Church as being the cold invention of theological schemers who saw that without it the Church could not extend its dominion over the whole world? Surely not. Rather was it the thing for which plain men and women were willing, with a glad smile on their faces, to suffer and die.

Our author is making a great mistake in assuming that because monotheism has no place in *his* religious life, it had no place in the religious life of the early Church. And just the prevalent polytheism of that age, upon which this argument lays stress, placed in the very forefront of the disciples' mind and heart their belief in the one God the Father Almighty and the one Lord Jesus Christ.

Thus the previous polytheism of the Gentile disciples, far from making them indifferent to the apostolic teaching about God, had if anything exactly the opposite effect. Adherence to an exclusive monotheism was one of the things that acceptance of the new faith, in a polytheistic environment, most clearly meant. Nothing is to be said, therefore, in favor of the antitheistic influence which Dr. McGiffert finds in the previous beliefs of the early Gentile converts.

But what were the authorities on the other side?

In the first place there was the authority of the Apostle Paul. Dr. McGiffert tries to minimize its importance, but surely without success. It is true, the authority of Paul was called in question in the early days, in accordance with the information contained in the Epistles. But by whom was it called in question? It was called in question not by Gentiles who refused to accept the Jewish Christian teaching about God, but, quite the contrary, by Jews who appealed to the Jerusalem apostles and to the Old Testament. In their case Paul's authority was undermined not by a rejection of apostolic authority but by an appeal to one apostle against another. As a matter of fact the appeal was unsuccessful; Paul was in agreement even about the way of salvation with the original

apostles; and the Old Catholic Church was quite correct in appealing not to Peter alone or to Paul alone but to Peter and Paul together. But whatever may have been the differences of opinion in the early days about the way of salvation and the place of the Jewish law, there was at any rate full agreement among all the apostles about the God of Israel. Where Paul's authority was undermined, it was undermined not because of an objection to Judaism on the part of Gentile converts, but on the contrary because of an excessive readiness of Gentile converts to accept even the most burdensome parts of the Jewish ceremonial law. The receptiveness of the Galatian converts to the Judaizers would be very strange if Dr. McGiffert's picture of the polytheistic and anti-Jewish tendencies of the Gentile Christians were at all correct. At any rate, in the matter of monotheism all the early teachers of the Church, to say nothing of all the apostles, were fully agreed. If the Gentile disciples had not accepted this element of the apostolic preaching it is difficult to see how they could have accepted anything at all.

In the second place, there was on the same side the authority and influence of the Old Testament. This influence, again, Dr. McGiffert underestimates in a very extraordinary way. He does not of course deny altogether the use of the Old Testament. "I do not," he says, "mean, of course, to suggest that all the primitive Gentile Christians took Christ as their Lord and Saviour without taking his God and Father as their God. On the contrary, I have no doubt that many of them accepted the Jewish God and the Jewish Bible when they accepted Jesus Christ" (p. 49). But surely this admission, in its inadequacy, only sets in sharper light the gross underestimate of the influence of the Old Testament in the early Church which runs all through the book. To say that "many" of the Gentile converts accepted the "Jewish Bible" completely fails to do justice to the place which the "Jewish Bible" holds in all our accounts of the primitive Gentile mission. Is it not clear that one of the chief instruments in the missionary work of the church was just the appeal to this ancient

and authoritative book? The world of that day was seeking for ancient authority; no religion which represented itself as really new could have any chance of success. Even those Gnostics of the second century who rejected the Old Testament could not do without a Bible, but appealed to New Testament books or to sacred books of their own. Dr. McGiffert has therefore clearly failed to give due attention to the attitude of the converts, just as he has also failed to appreciate the attitude of the missionaries, when he represents the Old Testament as a piece of baggage which might easily be dropped by the way. There is evidence, moreover, that just that feature of Old Testament teaching which our author supposes to have been ignored was the feature which appealed especially to the Gentile world of that day; for the progress of the pre-Christian Jewish mission shows clearly that the pagan world was susceptible to monotheistic influences. It is true, that mission would never in itself have succeeded in conquering the world; but the reason for its failure was not unattractiveness in monotheism but the national exclusiveness of the Mosaic Law. Judaism could only have removed this limitation by rejecting the Old Testament, or at least by taking it "with a grain of salt." But to have done so would have destroyed all the power which the Jewish mission possessed. The Christian mission on the other hand because of its presentation of the epoch-making, dispensational significance of the coming of Christ offered all that Judaism had offered and yet offered it with a good conscience and with full retention of the authoritative Book which had been the chief strength of the previous missionary effort. Without the Old Testament Gentile Christianity would have been at best only one religion among many; an absolutely essential element in its world-conquering power was just the thing that Dr. McGiffert rejects.

A third authority in favor of monotheism in the early Gentile Church was the authority of Jesus. This authority Dr. McGiffert not merely minimizes, but almost ignores. The only reference to it seems to be as follows:

“There was no antecedent reason, indeed, why the Gentile Christians should accept the God of the Jews whom Jesus worshipped, any more than the Jewish ceremonial law which he observed and the Jewish practices in which he was brought up. The fact that Jesus himself and his personal disciples were Jews no more required the Gentile Christians to be Jews in their customs and beliefs than the fact that Adonis was a Syrian deity, Attis a Phrygian, and Isis and Serapis Egyptian deities required their adherents to become Syrians or Phrygians or Egyptians, and to accept the religious tenets of those peoples” (p. 47).

But surely this reference to the gods of various pagan cults only places in the sharper light the weakness of Dr. McGiffert's contention. Where is anything said in antiquity about the *teaching* of Adonis or Attis or Isis? Where is there any even pretended record of their words? It is no wonder that the worshippers of Adonis did not have to be Syrians and the worshippers of Attis did not have to be Phrygians; for nothing whatever about the personality of those deities was recorded. They were pale mythical figures, whose experiences, even if they were conceived as taking place at any definite time at all—rather than being merely repeated again and again in the cult—lay in the dim and distant past. But Jesus, the “Saviour God” of the Christians, was an historical personage who had lived and died but a short time before. And He was an historical personage whose words were recorded and treasured. Even Dr. McGiffert will not deny that fact; for he himself makes use of the tradition contained in the Synoptic Gospels as providing precious information about the real Jesus. But here, in defending his main thesis, he treats the tradition of the words of Jesus as though it did not exist; and his parallel between Jesus and the pagan cult-gods shows as clearly as anything possibly could do how far he is from doing justice to the real facts of primitive Christianity. The worshippers of Adonis were not bound by the teaching of their god; for no teaching of Adonis was handed down. But the worshippers of Jesus were worshippers of an historical character, whose words, as we know and as even Dr.



McGiffert admits, were carefully treasured among his followers. At this point our author has almost outdone the radicalism of Wrede. Wrede supposed (quite erroneously) that the Apostle Paul cared little about the words which Jesus uttered when He was on earth; but even Wrede would hardly have denied that the tradition of Jesus' words was carefully preserved in the primitive Gentile Church taken as a whole. But if the tradition of Jesus' words was treasured at all, then His teaching about God the Father could certainly not be ignored. It was quite impossible for disciples of Jesus to accept anything that Jesus said, and not accept this. But to suppose that the mass of Gentile Christians in the early period accepted nothing that Jesus said, not even this central part of His teaching, and treated Him merely as the worshippers of Adonis treated the mythical figure that was supposed to be connected with their cult—this is to exceed by far all bounds of historical possibility. If the mass of early Gentile Christianity had been what Dr. McGiffert supposes it to have been, then the memory of Jesus' words and deeds would probably have been lost and Christianity would probably long ago have taken its place among the half-forgotten cults of a decadent age. A primitive Gentile Christianity that cared nothing for Jesus' teaching about God is an historical monstrosity, which Dr. McGiffert's whole reconstruction indeed demands, but which a little reflection shows to be nothing short of absurd.

Historic Christianity as a whole has certainly retained the influence of Jesus' life; and Dr. McGiffert would probably maintain, with the current Modernism, that Jesus was the Founder of Christianity just because of the ethical and religious life that He lived. But does he not see that, in supposing the primitive Gentile Church, which as we shall observe, he makes the basis of the whole subsequent development of Christianity, to have been ignorant of the teaching of Jesus about God, which lay at the centre of Jesus' own religious life, he has placed an insurmountable barrier between the life of Jesus and the Christianity of which Jesus is thought to have been the Founder? Dr. McGiffert's primitive

Gentile Christians could have had no contact with Jesus' religious life; for if they had had contact with Jesus' religious life they could not possibly have ignored the thing that lay at the very heart of it. But if they had no contact with Jesus' religious life, then, since they formed the basis of the whole subsequent development, the religious life of Jesus could have exerted no central influence upon the historic Christian Church. That is absurd; but it is an absurdity which follows with relentless certainty from Dr. McGiffert's thesis. Shall the thesis be abandoned, or shall the Christian Church be regarded as having only a nominal and no essential connection with the real Jesus of Nazareth? The answer, we think, can hardly be uncertain.

Thus our author has failed to render his extraordinary thesis antecedently probable; he has entirely failed to put out of the world the overpowering weight of *prima facie* evidence that is against it. His non-theistic Gentile Christianity did not exist, for the simple reason that, in view of the whole character of the primitive Christian mission and in view of the authorities upon which that mission was based, it never *could* have existed. It is with much more brevity, therefore, that we can deal now with the positive arguments for the actuality, as distinguished from the antecedent possibility, of this reconstructed Gentile Christianity.

These arguments may apparently be placed under six heads (pp. 52-87).

(1) In the first place (pp. 52-64), Dr. McGiffert says, it is "beyond dispute that Christ was widely recognized as divine among the early Christians." That fact may certainly be admitted—indeed we do not understand why Dr. McGiffert does not say that Christ was *always* instead of only *widely* recognized as divine. But how does the recognition of the divinity of Christ prove that there ever was a time when God the Father was not also recognized? Paul, for example, as Dr. McGiffert himself insists, recognized Christ as divine; yet he also recognized the God of Jesus and of the Old Testament. The only answer which our author can give is that in

certain writers it cannot always be determined whether Christ or God the Father is being spoken of, whereas in Paul there is no such confusion. But surely this answer is quite inadequate. In Paul the same terms are sometimes used in referring to God the Father as those which are used in referring to Christ; and if confusion is avoided usually in his Epistles, surely that may be merely a matter of linguistic clearness as over against other writers, or at most a mere difference of the degree to which a certain phenomenon appears. Dr. McGiffert, under the same head, points to the frequency with which in certain quarters prayers were offered to Christ; but as he himself admits Paul also offers prayers to Christ, and the difference is again a difference not of principle, but of degree. The entire argument, therefore, clearly breaks down. Recognition of the divinity of Christ certainly does not indicate any denial or ignoring of God the Father; for Paul recognizes the divinity of Christ, yet his theism cannot be called in question.

Of course that simply raises the central question how it was that a strict monotheist like Paul could place the worship of a Jew, one of his contemporaries, alongside of the worship of Jehovah. With that question, in the present book, Dr. McGiffert does not attempt to deal. It is answered, of course, if the New Testament account of Jesus be true. But it has never been satisfactorily answered by any naturalistic reconstruction. Certainly no progress toward the answering of it has been made by Dr. McGiffert's addition to it of the other question how a primitive non-theistic belief in the divinity of Christ came to have added to it in the later history of the Church the belief in the one God the Father, Maker of heaven and earth. If our author could only maintain that there was (1) a Jewish Christian monotheism without the divinity of Christ and (2) a Gentile Christian belief in the divinity of Christ without monotheism, then he might explain the later belief of the Church by the conjunction of these two elements. But unfortunately this way is closed to him by the testimony of Paul. The whole problem therefore

remains in all its troublesomeness; belief in the divinity of Christ and worship of Him arose, unfortunately for all naturalistic reconstructions, not on Gentile Christian ground but among the monotheistic Jews.

(2) In the second place (pp. 64-67), Dr. McGiffert points to Marcion, the heresiarch of the second century, who "read Christianity solely in terms of salvation, and rejected the creating God, the God of the Jews." "The presence in the church of the second century of Marcion and his followers, as well as of their fellow heretics, the Gnostics, who also rejected the God of the Jews on grounds to be referred to later, goes to show that conversion to Christianity did not necessarily carry with it the acceptance of the God of the Jews. Had it done so, their attitude would have been difficult, not to say impossible. At any rate, if Jewish monotheism was an essential element in Christianity, and to be a Christian meant to believe in the Jewish God, they could not have regarded themselves in good faith as Christians."

This argument involves the customary use of the second-century heresies as witnesses to a primitive Christianity which is supposed to have been left behind, and so have come to be despised, by the main body of the Church. But the argument is extremely precarious. A living religion, such as the Christian religion was in the second century, is constantly assailed from within and from without by totally alien types of faith and life. So it was in the ancient period, and so it is also today. That Marcion and the Gnostics called themselves Christians is no more a proof that they really were Christians, than the fact that the disciples of Mrs. Eddy call themselves "Christian" Scientists is a proof that their acutely pagan teaching has any real affinity for the religion whose name they choose to bear. It is certainly very precarious, to say the least, to find any foothold for the dualism of Marcion or of the Gnostics in the piety of the apostolic age. Moreover, in the specific case of Marcion, it must be remembered that he did not venture to identify Jesus with the supreme "good God," as over against the "just God" of the Jews, but regarded

Jesus as having been sent by that good God. Thus he does not even plausibly attest the type of belief which our author attributes to primitive Gentile Christianity; but rather is a witness (if such witnesses were really needed) to the necessary connection in Christian thinking between Jesus and a Father who sent Him into the world.

(3) In the third place (pp. 67-75), Dr. McGiffert finds a polemic against, and so a testimony to the existence of, his primitive non-theistic Gentile Christianity in Polycarp, Ignatius, the First Epistle of John, and even in the Epistles of Paul—particularly in the Epistle to the Ephesians. The First Epistle of John, for example, is regarded by our author as being directed not, as has always been supposed, against those who made too little of Christ but against those who made too little of God. But this polemic—certainly the reference of it to non-theistic Gentile converts within the church—is found only by the most unnatural reading of the Epistle, and particularly by reading into the text what is not there. For example Dr. McGiffert quotes in support of his thesis 1 John iv. 2, 3: "Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh (and so was connected historically with the Jewish people) is of God; and every spirit that confesseth not Jesus is not of God." Here the only words which support Dr. McGiffert's thesis instead of actually telling against it are the words in parenthesis which Dr. McGiffert himself supplies. And so it is throughout the whole argument. Particularly unwarranted is the use of the Epistle to the Ephesians as a polemic against those in the Church who did not accept the God of the Jews. And any references of Paul to the evils of idolatry are surely explained quite adequately by the fact that Christianity was engaged in an active propaganda against the polytheism outside of the Church. In general the Pauline Epistles and all the other books to which Dr. McGiffert refers create the clear impression that monotheism did not need to be defended among Christians, but could always be assumed. This impression is dealt with by our author in a very extraordinary way. "It may be objected," he says, "that if



there were Gentile Christians who did not accept the God of the Jews, Paul would not have contented himself with references of so casual a sort, but would have denounced and condemned them in unsparing terms, as he did the Judaizers. It should be noticed, however, that such Christians as I have been speaking of accepted Jesus Christ as their saviour and were thus one with Paul in the chief matter." Here the last words simply beg the question. Were Christians who accepted Jesus Christ and ignored God the Father one with Paul [in Paul's view] "in the chief matter"? Indeed would Christians who "accepted Jesus Christ" in this manner have been regarded by the apostle as having accepted the real Jesus Christ at all?

(4) In the fourth place (pp. 76-78), "in support of the assumption that there were Christians in the primitive church whose God was Jesus Christ and Jesus Christ alone, attention may be called," Dr. McGiffert says, "to the continued use of the original formula of baptism in his name" [that is, baptism in the name of Christ alone instead of in the name of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost]. "Of course," Dr. McGiffert continues, "the use of the simple formula among the early Jewish disciples meant that they and their fellow countrymen already believed in God, and hence did not need to be baptized into his name. But in the Gentile world the situation was altogether different." Here our author weakens his own case by supposing that the formula which mentioned Christ alone was earlier than the triune formula of Matt. xxviii. 19. For if that simple formula was earlier, then the continuance of it even in the Gentile world could be easily explained by faithfulness to tradition. But in any case, the whole argument altogether fails to bear the weight that Dr. McGiffert rests upon it. No matter how firm and vital was the belief of the Gentile Church in God the Father, the brief designation of baptism simply as baptism in the name of Christ would be thoroughly natural. And Marcion's rejection of the triune formula must probably be regarded as simply connected with his system and (for the reasons mentioned above) as being

quite without significance for the facts of primitive Gentile Christianity.

(5) In the fifth place (pp. 78-80), Dr. McGiffert points to the wide prevalence in the second century of "Modalism, the belief, namely, that Christ is himself the supreme God, the Father of the world and of men." But surely this denial of the personal distinction between Father and Son is adequately to be explained simply as one of the unsuccessful attempts to set forth the mysterious teaching of the New Testament. The Modalist solution of the problem presented by the relation of God the Father and God the Son is rightly designated by Tertullian (quoted on p. 78) as belonging to "the simple"; but this (false) simplicity is to be explained—quite naturally, in view of human weakness—as an attempt of second-century Christians to interpret the New Testament, rather than as any survival of a primitive non-theistic Christianity.

(6) The last argument (pp. 80-87) is drawn from the "extraordinary lack of vivid and fervent piety" and indeed of devotional writings of any kind in "most of our early Christian literature, aside from the New Testament." But what is the bearing of that interesting fact—interesting if true—upon Dr. McGiffert's thesis? The bearing of it is certainly not obvious. "If such piety toward Christ" [as that which is discovered in Ignatius], Dr. McGiffert says, "found frequent expression in the literature of the early church, it would be easy to explain the situation on the ground that Christ was the real God of the early Christians and the Father God only a theological abstraction. But except in the writings of Ignatius piety toward Christ finds no larger and more vivid expression than piety toward God." The admission is certainly significant, and would seem to deprive the observation of all possible significance for the main thesis of the book. But Dr. McGiffert is not ready to surrender so easily. "In these circumstances," he says, "I can only suggest that the lack may have been due to the divided object of worship. The singleness of devotion felt by the Jews toward

Jehovah may have been difficult for a Christian whose real God was Jesus Christ, but who was compelled to subordinate him to another God, a theological or philosophical figure—as will appear in the next lecture—not at all calculated to arouse deep personal devotion.” Could there possibly be a weaker argument? If the real God of the Gentile Christians was Jesus and only Jesus, why did the fact that they were compelled to connect Him with God the Father prevent them from giving joyous expression to their devotion to Him any more than the voluntary connection of Jesus with God the Father on the part of Paul and the other New Testament writers prevented them from giving joyous expression to *their* devotion to both of these divine persons?

Thus the positive arguments for Dr. McGiffert's thesis break down as completely as do his attempts to establish an antecedent probability in its favor. Enough has been said, we are bold enough to think, not merely to show that the thesis is not proven, but to show positively that it is proven to be false. There never was a prevalent Gentile Christianity in the early Church that read Christianity only in terms of salvation and was not interested in the God whom Jesus taught His disciples to worship and love.

But if so, then the rest of the book can be treated very briefly. It is indeed full of interesting observations, but, despite the hope expressed at the conclusion of the lecture which has just been reviewed, the attentive reader can hardly say that it provides any “added reason” for positing the existence of “a Christianity whose God was Jesus Christ alone.”

“In the previous lecture” [that is, the one which has just been discussed], Dr. McGiffert says in summing up the subject of the latter part of his book, “I showed that the God of the primitive Gentile Christians, or, at any rate, of many of them [but he has really claimed far more than that], was Jesus Christ; that they began with him and only afterward associated him with the God of the Jews and worshipped two divine beings, Son and Father. In the present lecture I wish to trace this development and explain the addition of God the

Father to the original object of worship, the Lord Jesus Christ. Many writers have described the process by which Christ came to be associated with the God of the Jews, and to be thought of as the second person of the Trinity, subordinate only to God the Father, and I shall not repeat the story here. I am interested, rather, in the other problem and shall confine myself to that. So far as I am aware, it has hitherto escaped notice. How, then, did it come about that Christians who originally worshipped Jesus Christ alone were led to worship also the God of the Jews and even to subordinate Christ to him, as a son to a father?"

It is no wonder that this second problem has "hitherto escaped notice." It has escaped notice for the simple reason that its existence depends upon the existence of the primitive non-theistic Gentile Christianity which until the appearance of the present book was unknown. And since that condition has just been shown not to be satisfied, it is only with a qualified, though (because of Dr. McGiffert's mastery of details) still with a keen, interest that we turn to the solution of the problem which his hypothesis has raised.

How did Dr. McGiffert's Gentile Christianity whose only God was Jesus come to give place to the monotheism of the historic Christian Church? The answer which our author gives may be put almost in a word. The transition was due, not to religion, but to theology; it was due to the necessity of exhibiting a world-wide scope for the Christian religion. The simple Gentile Christians, it is supposed, were perfectly willing to accept Jesus as their Saviour without asking whether He stood in any relation to the whole world. In this respect, as in many other respects, they were the precursors of those who in the modern Church accept certain beliefs for themselves without being interested in the question whether those beliefs are accepted by others, and are perfectly willing to make common cause with men whose beliefs are diametrically opposite to their own. But this simple, non-theological, non-theistic, non-universalistic religion, it is supposed, would have been only one religion among many, and

the theologians and apologists were unwilling to be satisfied with any such position as that. They therefore had to show the connection of Jesus the God of the early Christians with a God who would require the devotion of all the dwellers on earth; in short they had to show the connection of Jesus with the one supreme God, Maker and Ruler of the world. There were unsuccessful attempts, it is supposed further, at attaining this result, notably Gnosticism; but after such errors had been overcome the result was the addition of the Jewish God to the Saviour-God Jesus and the connection between the two as Father and Son. "The Christianity that emerged from the [Gnostic] conflict was not a mere gospel of salvation, but a theology and a cosmology, a doctrine of God and a philosophy of the universe" (p. 107). But this connection of Jesus with God the Father "did not mean the displacement of the Saviour Jesus Christ . . . but the extension of his functions to include creation, providence, and judgment" (p. 194). "The association of the two was as close and the identification of the two as complete as philosophy would allow" (p. 195).

One thing that strikes the careful reader forcibly as he examines this hypothesis is the evident disregard by the author of the law of scientific parsimony: ingenious and far-fetched explanations are here sought for things of which a simple explanation lies ready to hand. Why is there all this labor to explain how God the Father came to be added to Jesus Christ as an object of worship in the Christian Church? Does He not appear as an object of worship, side by side with Christ, at the very beginning of the development, in all the New Testament and particularly in the Epistles of Paul? Does not Christ also appear in the New Testament as associated with the Father in creation and in judgment? Why then may not the appearance of exactly these same views in the later Church be due to the simple influence of the New Testament (to say nothing of the teaching of Jesus Himself) instead of to this elaborate theological and apologetic scheming of men who wanted by such means to extend the power of the



Church over the whole world? The question is unanswerable to the man who stations himself on the basis of the plain historical facts. But it is easily answerable on the basis of Dr. McGiffert's theory. The reason why if Dr. McGiffert's theory is correct the simple influence of the apostolic teaching and of the teaching of Jesus cannot at this point be made determinative is that if it is made determinative the entire hypothesis of a primitive non-theistic Gentile Christianity falls to the ground. Such a Christianity could have come to exist in the first place only if there was in the early days the most abysmal neglect of the teaching of Jesus and of the Jewish Christian apostles. But if there was such a neglect of the New Testament and of the teaching underlying it, then and then only does the final victory of the New Testament idea of God become a problem—a problem which must be solved in the extraordinarily ingenious and intricate way which Dr. McGiffert proposes.

The truth is that the primitive non-theistic Gentile Christianity of Dr. McGiffert is without beginning of days or end of life. It had no root in what preceded, and it left no real trace in what followed. All the labor of the latter part of the book—instructive and interesting though it is in detail—could have been spared if the problem had not been artificially created by the insertion into history of a phenomenon which is not attested in the sources, and which throws the whole development of the Church into a confusion from which even Dr. McGiffert's learning and skill have not succeeded in extricating it.

But another observation is more important still. The really important thing about this elaborate reconstruction of the history of the Church is not the historical improbability of it in detail, but the presupposition upon which it is based. We do not indeed demand that an historian should be without presuppositions. But the important question is whether the presuppositions are true or false. And in the case of Dr. McGiffert we think that they are false. The entire book is really based upon the pragmatist assumption that religion can be

separated from theology and that a man can obtain the values of the religious life apart from the particular intellectual conception which he forms of his God. This assumption leads in the first place to an artificial treatment of history, which altogether fails to do justice to the real complexity of human life; and it leads, in the second place, and in particular, to the reconstruction, contrary to all the evidence, of a primitive Gentile Christianity which shall exhibit just the type of non-theological religion which the modern pragmatist desires.

Dr. McGiffert is not able, it is true, to carry out his separation between theology and religion in a thoroughly consistent way. At one moment, for example, he tells us that "the Gnostic controversy . . . was a theological controversy pure and simple," and that "the Gnostics, as well as their opponents, believed in Christ and in salvation through him" (p. 107), and at another moment he implies that Gnosticism outraged traditional Christian piety (p. 108). And even Dr. McGiffert's non-theological Gentile Christians have at times attributed to them interests which never ought to have been theirs. Thus it is said that to have made Christ less and lower than God would have doomed the doctrine "with the great mass of pious Christians" (p. 99), and that the Gnostic degradation of Jesus to a mere place in a series of emanations "seemed particularly offensive to common Christian sentiment, as tending to degrade the Lord Jesus Christ and remove him from his place of pre-eminence" (p. 103). No doubt these observations are in themselves perfectly true. But the trouble is that they do not at all agree with the main thesis of the book. What did those simple-minded Gentile converts care about the pre-eminence of Christ, just so He was allowed to be still their Saviour? Our author has here attributed to the supposedly non-theological converts just that "theological" interest which it is the chief point of his book to keep separate from them.

Nevertheless, despite such inconsistencies, the anti-intellectualistic philosophy of our author does color and determine his conclusions throughout. Philosophy and theology

and religion are in this book kept rigidly separate; and where they are supposed to have combined in the production of any historical phenomenon, the proportion contributed by each of the ingredients is determined almost with the accuracy of a chemical analysis. Thus the book ends with this characteristic utterance: "Religion speaks in the historic doctrine of the deity of Christ; philosophy speaks in the Logos Christology which means the distinction of the Son from the Father, and that, too, even though both are declared to be equally divine" (p. 195). In Dr. McGiffert's treatment of history the pragmatist philosophy of the present day is fully as determinative as was the Hegelian philosophy in the Tübingen reconstruction of Baur and Zeller. And even far more plainly than in that former case the result is failure. The sources fail utterly to lend themselves to the attempted reconstruction; history refuses to be forced into the pragmatist mould; and all religious life—certainly all Christian life—is found to be based upon a doctrine of God.

The incorrectness of Dr. McGiffert's assumptions appear at many points. Particularly faulty is the separation of "salvation" from theism—a separation which appears again and again in the book. "That there were philosophical thinkers" he says, "who were attracted by the monotheism of the Jews and became Christians because of it is undoubtedly true, but they were vastly in the minority, and the Roman world was not won to Christianity by any such theological interest. On the contrary, faith in Christ and in his salvation converted the masses then, as it has converted multitudes in every age since" (pp. 44, 45). "Christianity ceased," he says again with evident disapprobation, "to be a mere religion of salvation—a mere saving cult—and Christ ceased to be a mere saviour. He was the creator, ruler, and judge of all the earth. This is really a very remarkable fact, not adequately accounted for in my opinion by the influence of Jewish tradition. I see no satisfactory explanation of it except the one I have suggested, the [theological and apologetic] desire to associate Christ with God in all the divine activities, and thus to make the

connection between the two as close as possible" (p. 191).

This distinction ignores the simple fact that there can be no salvation without something from which a man is saved. If Christ saves the Christians, *from what* does he save them? Dr. McGiffert never seems to raise that question. But the answer to it is abundantly plain, and it destroys the entire reconstruction which this book so brilliantly attempts. Is it not abundantly plain that Christ saves Christians from sin, and from the consequences which it brings at the judgment-seat of God? And is it not plain also that this was just the thing that appealed most strongly to simple people of the first century, as it appeals most strongly to many persons today? The truth is, it is quite impossible to think of Christ as Saviour without thinking of the thing from which he saves; the justice of God is everywhere the presupposition of the Saviourhood of Christ. No doubt modern men, especially in the circles where Dr. McGiffert moves, have lost the sense of sin and guilt and the fear of God's awful judgment-seat. But with this loss there goes the general abandonment even of the word "salvation," to say nothing of the idea. Without the sense of sin and the fear of hell, there may be the desire for improvement, "uplift," betterment. But desire for "salvation," properly speaking, there cannot be. Modernism does not really "read Christianity in terms of salvation," but reads salvation out of Christianity. It gives even the word "salvation" up. For salvation involves the awful wrath of a righteous God; in other words it involves just the thing which the antitheistic Modernism of Dr. McGiffert and others is most eager to reject. Very different was the situation in the early days of the Christian Church. Modern men have lost the sense of guilt and the fear of hell, but the early Gentile Christians had not. They accepted Christ as Saviour only because He could rescue them from the abyss and bring them into right relation to the Ruler and Judge of all the earth. The Saviourhood of Christ involved, then as always, the majesty and justice of God.

Even more radically at fault is another distinction which

is at the very root of Dr. McGiffert's thinking throughout—the distinction “between a god of moral and a god of physical power” (p. 154). This distinction underlies the “ethical theism” presented in *The Rise of Modern Religious Ideas*—an “ethical theism” which is really the most radical possible denial of everything that the word “theism” can properly be held to mean. In accordance with the distinction, Dr. McGiffert holds that it is or should be matter of indifference to Christians how the world came into being; the doctrine of creation belongs, he thinks, to a region of metaphysics with which religion need have nothing to do. Similar is really the case with respect to the doctrine of providence; the whole thought of the power as distinguished from goodness of God is, our author evidently thinks, quite separable from religion; we can, he thinks, revere God's goodness without fearing His power or relying upon His protection from physical ills. And that really means that we can cease thinking of God as personal at all.

Such skepticism may be true or may be false—with that great question we shall not now undertake to deal—but indifferent to religion it certainly is not. Give up the thought of a Maker and Ruler of the world; say, as Dr. McGiffert really means, that “the Great Companion is dead,” and you may still maintain something like religious fervor among a few philosophic souls. But the suffering mass of humanity, at any rate, will be left lost and hopeless in a strange and hostile world. And to represent these things as matters of religious indifference is to close one's eyes to the deepest things of the human heart. Is the doctrine of creation really a matter of no religious moment; may the religious man really revere God without asking the question how the world came into being and who it is that upholds it on its way? Is the modern scientist wrong, who, pursuing his researches into nature's laws, comes at length to a curtain that is never lifted and stands in humble awe before a mystery that rebukes all pride? Was Isaiah wrong when he turned his eyes to the starry heavens and said: “Lift up your eyes on high, and behold



who hath created these things, that bringeth out their host by number : he calleth them all by names by the greatness of his might, for that he is strong in power ; not one faileth"? Was Jesus wrong when He bade His disciples trust in Him who clothed the lilies of the field and said : "Fear not, little flock ; for it is your Father's good pleasure to give you the kingdom."

To these questions, philosophy may return this answer or that, but the answer of the Christian heart at any rate is clear. "Away with all pale abstractions," it cries, "away with all dualism, away with Marcion and his modern followers, away with those who speak of the goodness of God but deprive Him of His power. As for us Christians, we say still, as we contemplate that field gleaming in the sun and those dark forests touched with autumn brilliance and that blue vault of heaven above—we say still, despite all, that it is God's world, which He created by the fiat of His will, and that through Christ's grace we are safe forever in the arms of our heavenly Father."

But what have we left when according to Dr. McGiffert our heavenly Father is gone? The answer that he gives is plain : "We have goodness left," we are told in effect, "we do not know what brings out the stars in their courses, we do not know how the world came to exist, we do not know what will be our fate when we pass through the dark portals of death. But we can find a higher, disinterested worship—far higher, it would seem, than that of Jesus—in the reverence for goodness divested of the vulgar trappings of power."

It sounds noble at first. But consider it for a moment and its glory turns into ashes and leaves us in despair. What is meant by a goodness that has no physical power? Is not "goodness" in itself the merest abstraction? Is it not altogether without meaning except as belonging to a person? And does not the very notion of a person involve the power to act? Goodness altogether divorced from power is therefore no goodness at all. And if it were goodness, it would still mean nothing to us—included as we are in this physical uni-

verse which is capable apparently of destroying us in its relentless march. The truth is that overmuch abstraction has here destroyed even that which is intended to be conserved. Make God good only and not powerful, and both God and goodness have really been destroyed. The moral law will soon succumb unless it is grounded in the nature of a personal God.

Feeling, even if not fully understanding, this objection, feeling that goodness is a mere empty abstraction unless it inheres in good persons, many modern men have tried to give their reverence for goodness some sort of subsistence by symbolizing this "ethical" (and most clearly antitheistic) "theism" in the person of the man Jesus of Nazareth. They read Christianity only in terms of salvation and take the man Jesus as their only God. But who is this Jesus whom they make the embodiment of the goodness that they revere? He is certainly not the Jesus of the New Testament, for that Jesus insisted upon everything that these modern men reject. But He is not even the Jesus of modern reconstruction; for even that Jesus, as Dr. McGiffert has shown with devastating clearness, maintained the theism which these modern men are rejecting with such contempt. The truth is that it is impossible for such men to hold to Jesus even as the supreme man, even as the supreme embodiment of that abstract goodness which Modernism is endeavoring to revere. For the real Jesus placed at the very centre, not merely of His thinking but of His life, the heavenly Father, Maker and Ruler of the world.

Is then the antitheistic Modernism of our day, reading Christianity solely in terms of salvation and taking the man Jesus as its only God, to relinquish all thought of continuity with the early glories of the Christian Church? Dr. McGiffert here comes with a suggestion of hope. He abandons indeed the former answers to the question; he destroys without pity the complacency of those who have supposed that the early history of Christianity on naturalistic principles is all perfectly settled and plain; he throws the historical problem

again into a state of flux. Hence we welcome his brilliant and thought-provoking book. Such books, we believe, by their very radicalism, by their endeavor after ever new hypotheses, by the exhibition which they afford of the failure of all naturalistic reconstructions—especially their own—may ultimately lead to an abandonment of the whole weary effort, and a return to the simple grounding of Christian history upon a supernatural act of God.

But meanwhile Dr. McGiffert comes to the Modernist Church with a word of cheer. The continuity with primitive Christianity, he says in effect, does not need to be given up even by an antitheistic, non-theological Christianity which at first sight seems very non-primitive indeed.

It would be a great mistake, we think, to ignore this practical reference of the book. It is no doubt largely unconscious; Dr. McGiffert writes no doubt with the most earnest effort after scientific objectivity. But as we have said, no historian can be altogether without presuppositions, and the presupposition of the present author is that an antitheistic Christianity is the most natural thing in the world. And so, as many notable historians have done, he finds what he expects to find. Baur, on the basis of his Hegelian philosophy, with its "thesis, antithesis and synthesis," expected to find a conflict in the apostolic age with a gradual compromise and settlement. And so he found that phenomenon surely enough—in defiance of the sources, but in agreement with his philosophy. Similarly Dr. McGiffert, on the basis of his pragmatist skepticism, expects to find somewhere in the early Church a type of religious life similar to his own.

Why is it that despite our author's own admission of the precariousness of many of his arguments he yet "cannot resist the conclusion that there was such a primitive Christianity" as that which he has just described (p. 87)? The answer is plain. It is because Dr. McGiffert is seeking a precursor in early Christianity for the non-theistic Modernism which he himself holds. Others have found precursors for it in the New Testament—even in Paul. But Dr. McGiffert is far too good

a scholar to be satisfied with any such solution as that. Still others have found it in Jesus, and so have raised the cry "Back to Christ." But Dr. McGiffert has read the Gospels for himself, and knows full well how false is that appeal of the popular Modernist preachers to the words of the one whom they call "Master." Rejecting these obviously false appeals, our author is obliged to find what he seeks in the non-literary, inarticulate, and indeed unattested, piety of the early Gentile Christians. "There," he says in effect to his fellow-Modernists, "is *our* religion at last; there is to be found the spiritual ancestry of a religion that reads Christianity exclusively in terms of salvation and will have nothing to do with 'fiat creation' or the divine justice or heaven or hell or the living and holy God." And so for the cry, "Back to Christ"—upon which Dr. McGiffert has put, we trust, a final quietus—there is now apparently to be substituted the cry, "Back to the non-theistic Gentile Christians who read Christianity only in terms of salvation and were not interested in theology or in God." But if that really is to be the cry, the outlook is very sad. It is a sad thing if the continuity of Christianity can be saved only by an appeal to the non-theistic Gentile Christians. For those non-theistic Gentile Christians never really existed at all.

The truth is that the antitheistic religion of the present day—popularized by preachers like Dr. Fosdick and undergirded by scholars such as the author of the brilliant book which we have just attempted to review—the truth is that this anti-theistic Modernism, which, at least in one of its characteristic forms, takes the man Jesus of naturalistic reconstruction as its only God, will have to stand at last upon its own feet. With the historic Christian Church, at any rate, it plainly has little to do. For the Christian Church can never relinquish the heavenly Father whom Jesus taught His disciples to love.

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## SECULAR AND REGULAR CANONS DURING THE MIDDLE AGES

Whatever distinctions existed between monks and canons, and between regular and secular canons in the Middle Ages, were based fundamentally on the degree of withdrawal from the world. All religious movements have a greater or less degree of other-worldliness. Christianity had this other-world character, combined with a less common tendency, the propagandist spirit. The impulse and obligation to propagate itself in the world, made it difficult for Christians to withdraw completely from the world. There were groups of Christians at all stages of withdrawal, in every century, but the swing of the pendulum from less ideal and more efficient organization, to more ideal and less efficient organization is an interesting key to the why and wherefore of ecclesiastical policies and religious institutions during the Christian Era.

The tendency to interpret the apostolic teaching as to the separateness of the Christian from the world in terms of "world-flight" was a natural one and manifested itself very early in the history of the Church. Some early Christian groups, and the Jerusalem church in particular, may have realized with considerable success the ideal of separate Christian communities living according to the Christian faith. After the formal conversion of the Empire to Christianity this was impossible; consequently the life of withdrawal was practiced by the clergy only. The growing wealth of the Church, and the participation of the clergy in government as the imperial power declined, particularly in the West, made even this restricted application of the ideal an impossibility. Monasticism, the closest approach to the ideal, originated and grew up first outside the clerical group, and was later appropriated by the priestly class in self-defense.

Through the early centuries, the normal life of the priestly class was in the world; the monk's life was normally out of the world. The development of each group, however, indicates that such clean-cut lines of division were impossible. The monk could no more create a Christianity hermetically



sealed from the rest of the world, than the priest could conserve true religion while living the same life as the average man. The priest, particularly, was forever confronted with the difficult problem of "being in the world but not of it." For twelve centuries, priestly ideals struggled with practical necessities, for the clerics could not live and thrive in the world without taking on its characteristics, both good and bad. The path of evolution of the priesthood winds about from strict regulation to extreme secularization, from the idealistic to the practical, from regular to secular canonical life, till it strikes a compromise in Norbert's Premonstratensians; the path, however, is strewn with a bewildering array of attempted reform organizations, more or less regular and more or less secular. Often they defy definition or classification. It is interesting to note that the monastic life also had its ups and downs, its reforms and relaxations, its experimental evolution, and that finally in the mendicant orders, it, too, compromised with the world.

The word "canon" (*κανών*) was originally applied rather loosely to any member of a group of clerics consecrated to the service of a church, even to consecrated virgins.<sup>1</sup> In short, canons were the bishop's assistants.<sup>2</sup> Later, as the organization became more complicated, the term was restricted to those who were members of the chapter corporation, and possessed a vote and a seat in the choir.<sup>3</sup> Canons were distinguished from monks, in that they must be in holy orders—i.e., priests, deacons, or subdeacons—and therefore had for their function the "cure of souls." Monks might also take orders, and almost every monastery had members who had

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<sup>1</sup> Du Cange, *Glossarium* . . . (Paris, 1842), II, 100. According to the councils (Antioch, Chalcedon, etc.,) *canonici* were merely *clerici* who served churches. Catholic Encyclopedia, III, 288. Sometimes the word canon was applied to anyone living under a rule. Helyot, *Histoire des Ordres Religieux* (1714), II, 15.

<sup>2</sup> *Cath. Encyc.*, III, 288.

<sup>3</sup> Hinschius, Paul, *System des Katholischen Kirchenrechts* (Berlin, 1878), II, 62. This refers to the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

taken orders, but the aim of monastic life was self-salvation rather than "cure of souls."

The distinction between secular and regular canons became prominent during the eleventh and twelfth centuries when definite efforts to reform and systematize the clergy brought out differences. Till then, canons were theoretically of but one class;<sup>4</sup> i.e., regulars, living according to community ideals. The ideal was far from realized, and at times the regular canonical life was more honored in the breach than in the observance. In practice, then, secular canons were the norm. At just what point of relaxation of the ideal of community life, a cleric ceased to be a regular and became a secular canon, cannot be definitely determined. In general, we may say that canons were regular as long as they were living under a monastic *regula*. The *regula* might allow ownership of property, or even private residence in exceptional cases, yet its adherents were still regulars. When members of a community of canons ceased to eat and sleep at the common house, they may be said to have seceded from their chapter. When a chapter ceased to have this community life, in reality it ceased to be a regular chapter and became secular. During the ninth, tenth and eleventh centuries, most canons gradually ceased to live in common houses, whence arose the custom of distributing permanent sources of in-

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<sup>4</sup> According to a capitulary of Charlemagne's time, "Canonici secundum canones regulares secundum regulam vivunt." "Canons, according to canons; monks, according to a rule, live." Theoretically, therefore, canons must be of but one kind, those who lived according to *canones* or regulations. They were clerics and therefore not seculars in the sense of being laymen. Trithemius, in Chron. Hirsaug., says that a secular canon is like a white blackbird; i.e., "there ain't no such animal." Cf. Du Cange, II, 101; *Cath. Encyc.*, III, 288. Practically, however, and according to later nomenclature, the canons of the early centuries were seculars in that they did not actually live a regularly organized canonical life, such as the later canons called regulars did. Cf. Auberti Miraei Notae, Migne, vol. 105, 977. As early as the time of Charlemagne the distinction between canons who lived according to strict regulations and those living in the world like laymen, was certainly recognized, especially in the case of canonesses. Cf. Benedict of Aniane's Code, cap. 25, 29, Migne, vol. 103, 409, 411; also note 103 below.

come in place of clothing and food as needed. Thus prebends came into existence. The canons who still held to community life called these irregulars "secular canons."<sup>5</sup>

The evolution during the first three centuries, of the priestly functions in connection with the *Civitas-Church*, indicates the origin of canons in the ecclesiastical constitution. Till the third century, organization was probably subordinate to spiritual ideals. By that time, however, there was evidence of a distinct group of assistants and advisors to the bishop; i.e., the priests and deacons. The priests were confined more and more to the spiritual duty of ministering to the outlying parishes or carrying on the divine services in the bishop's church. The deacons and lower orders became predominantly the staff of temporal assistants. The canons came to consist principally of this latter class, plus the cathedral priests; to the exclusion of the parochial clergy, in the outlying churches.<sup>6</sup>

Whether these early groups of cathedral clergy or canons were regulars or seculars is a question that is much mooted. Some Catholic historians have claimed the existence of regular life for canons during the early centuries, citing Constantine's Basilica clergy at Rome under Sylvester, and others in Gaul, Germany, Spain, and Alexandria in Egypt.<sup>7</sup> The evidence is based largely on later papal decrees, and it is probable that there was little, if any, regular canonical life before the rising monastic movement forced it upon the priesthood.

The fourth century saw the high tide of monasticism flowing to the West. The Church, unable to repress the movement, was compelled to adapt the ascetic spirit to its needs. In 371, near Milan, Eusebius of Vercelli had a common

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<sup>5</sup> Werminghoff, J., *Verfassungsgeschichte der Deutsche Kirche* (Leipzig, 1913), 146. The Council of Trent recognized parochial clerics as seculars. Cf. *Cath. Encyc.*, III, 253, 289, 296.

<sup>6</sup> Hinschius, II, 49.

<sup>7</sup> Helyot, II, 11, gives the authorities for apostolic origin. Cf. *Cath. Encyc.*, III, 289, 293, for an account of Sylvester introducing canonical life into Constantine's Basilica at Rome.

house (*monasterium*) and table (*victus*) for his clergy.<sup>8</sup> Ambrose, doubtless in imitation, had a similar life for his Milan clergy.<sup>9</sup> Augustine, having seen the system in operation, established community of life for the priests of Hippo, living along with them himself.<sup>10</sup> His rule was severely monastic and apostolic in character (*regulam sanctis apostolis constitutam*); it provided for continence and prohibited individual property.<sup>11</sup> This latter rule of poverty was not to be stressed again in the case of canons, till the eleventh century revival. Whether Augustine merely followed the Italian example and restored an earlier apostolic life that had fallen into decay in Africa, or whether he created a new movement, is a problem of less import than the fact that there was at his time a distinct attempt, the first known in Christian history, to regularize the canonical clergy according to the prevalent monastic ideals. Augustine, Ambrose, and others, by their efforts, gave expression to the spirit of the age.

Italy and Africa were not the only lands that experienced the monastic impulse during Augustine's Age and the centuries previous to Charlemagne. St. Patrick's Celtic Church in Ireland and Scotland undoubtedly developed a more completely regular clergy than any other part of Western Europe. The churches in Ireland were certainly manned by clergy who lived "regular" lives; in fact the monastic organization dominated the entire priesthood. Irish priests were subject to the authority of the abbot, usually bishops were either monks, or subordinate to the monastery.<sup>12</sup> Whether Armagh was a monastery that dominated the churches of the region, or whether it was a chapter of regular canons, is largely a problem of over-lapping classification and terminology. Historically the original groups were probably monastic; the canonical functions being merely one of their activities;

<sup>8</sup> Hinschius, II, 50; *Cath. Encyc.*, III, 751.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, III, 289.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, III, 289; Hinschius, II, 50; Helyot, II, 1 ff; Giesebrecht, L., *Wendische Geschichte* (Berlin 1843), II, 232.

<sup>11</sup> Hinschius, II, 51.

<sup>12</sup> Hunt, William, *The English Church* (London, 1899), 78.

though there are scholars who claim that St. Patrick introduced his system from Rome, in imitation of the regular canons there.<sup>13</sup> Through Finnian and Columba, the Irish system was spread to Scotland, where it showed similar monastic tendencies.<sup>14</sup>

The early English missionaries were monastic regulars, like those of Ireland, except that they were of the Benedictine Order. About two centuries after Augustine of Hippo, his namesake established in his Canterbury household a common life, quite similar to the monasterium at Hippo. The Canterbury establishment contained his forty Benedictines and other non-monastic clergy.<sup>15</sup> As the faith was propagated from Canterbury northward, most of the new churches were manned by Benedictines, to whom were added other clerics, thus forming communities that may be viewed as monasteries sheltering priestly clerics, or as canonical chapters organized under the Benedictine Regular.<sup>16</sup> In the seventh century, the regulation of Theodore of Tarsus, provided that bishops must live with their clergy and monks.<sup>17</sup> England, like Ireland and Scotland, was manned by monastically regular clerics during the centuries before Charlemagne.

The continent showed much less evidence of the dominance of the *regula* among the canonical clergy. Community life, in various degrees, was prevalent at the Lateran Church in Rome by 440 A.D.,<sup>18</sup> at Tours, Bourges, and other Gallic centers;<sup>19</sup> but only in city churches, and by no means uni-

<sup>13</sup> Helyot, III, 140; *Cath. Encyc.*, III, 290 ff; Cf. claim that St. Patrick introduced regular canons into Ireland from Rome.

<sup>14</sup> Helyot II, 142 ff; *Cath. Encyc.*, III, 291. Note the organization of "Culdees." Hy and Derry were in existence as early as 565. In 1144 the Prior of St. Andrews Monastery wore the miter and performed the functions of a bishop. By 1500 the thirty-four establishments in Scotland were largely under the control of English Arosians and Premonstratensians.

<sup>15</sup> Hunt, 40; *Cath. Encyc.*, III, 292.

<sup>16</sup> Helyot, V, 79-80.

<sup>17</sup> LaGarde, *The Latin Church in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1915), 8; Hunt, 142.

<sup>18</sup> Hinschius, II, 51; Helyot, II, 13; *Cath. Encyc.*, III, 293.

<sup>19</sup> Hinschius, II, 51.



versally even in the larger ones.<sup>20</sup> There was, however, the sentiment often expressed, that all clergy ought to live "*regular*" lives. Councils at Tours in 567 and Toledo in 633 provided for common tables in the bishops' residences, and prohibited women from entering.<sup>21</sup> The Florentini Letters of 724 urged that all clergy should be under either an abbot or bishop.<sup>22</sup> The continental ideal was that of a regular clergy, even though its practice was secular.

The policy of the Carolingian dynasty, mayors and kings, led them to encourage and enforce any reform that tended to centralization of organization and regularization of existing institutions, civil or ecclesiastical. As early as 742, Pippin and Carlman, though perhaps with different motives, had urged reform of priests as well as monks.<sup>23</sup> The first noteworthy attempt at regularization of canons was that of Chrodegang of Metz, in 760.<sup>24</sup> His rule showed more of the spirit of Benedictine monasticism—he was a Benedictine monk—than of Augustine's canonical life. There was provision for common dormitories and refectories, daily chapters and prayers, reading, periods of silence, reciting of canonical hours, assisting the bishop, care for the poor and needy in a hospital, and some manual labor.<sup>25</sup> In two points this rule, as well as that of Aachen in 817, failed of the strictly regular canonical life of Augustine's rule in Hippo, of the eleventh century Augustinian rule and also of the monastic rules of England and the Celtic Church. First, certain canons were permitted to live in separate houses, near the church

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<sup>20</sup> LaGarde, 384.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 384-5.

<sup>22</sup> Hinschius, II, 51.

<sup>23</sup> LaGarde, 386.

<sup>24</sup> Krueger, G., *Handbuch der Kirchengeschichte* (Tübingen, 1900), II, 38. Heimbucher, M., *Orden und Congregationen der Katholischen Kirche* (Paderborn, 1907), II, 4-5; Giesebrecht, II 232; Helyot, II, 63 ff; Hinschius, II, 53.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 53-4; Heimbucher, II, 4-5; LaGarde 385; *Cath. Encyc.*, III, 289.

but *extra claustra*,<sup>26</sup> and second, there was no insistence on personal poverty for the canons.<sup>27</sup> In these two points there lay the tacit recognition of a loose *regula* that was sure to lead to the decay of community life, and therefore to legalized secular canons. The Chrodegang rule was never applied extensively, and even in Metz was not long in force.

Such regulated clerical life was in keeping with the civil and ecclesiastical policy of Charlemagne. He wanted all clerics to be either monks or canons, and ordered even abbesses to live the community life. After councils, in 782, 789, 802, and 813, his capitularies laid down regulations for regular monastic and canonical life, similar to that of Chrodegang, but applicable to the whole realm.<sup>28</sup> The 813 capitulary, typical of all of them, provided for common dormitories and refectories, daily chapter, canonical hours, and allotments of clothing and food from the bishop's income.<sup>30</sup>

Louis the Pious, for reasons quite in keeping with his name, and very unlike the motives of his father, made the last outstanding reform of Carolingian times in the line of the enforcement of "regular" life on canons. The Rule of 817,<sup>31</sup> comprising the results of the Aachen Synod of the previous year, doubtless was an indirect result of Chrodegang's rule and the political policy behind it, but it was certainly influenced also by the ascetic forces which Louis' nature set loose. Ansiegis of Wanduel has been credited with the formation of the rule.<sup>32</sup> A more prominent figure seems to have been the noted ascetic, Benedict of Aniane, who has been shown to have influenced the English reform laws of Ethelwald and Edgar. Comparative studies of the articles of the Aachen Rule with articles in the codes drawn up pre-

<sup>26</sup> LaGarde, 385; Hinschius, II, 59.

<sup>27</sup> Heimbucher, II, 6; Krueger, II, 38.

<sup>28</sup> Helyot, V, 52; *Cath. Encyc.*, III, 253, 289.

<sup>29</sup> Hinschius, II, 52; Helyot, II, 56 ff; LaGarde, 386.

<sup>30</sup> Hinschius, II, 52; *Cath. Encyc.*, III, 253, 289.

<sup>31</sup> Emerton, E., *Medieval Europe* (New York, 1894) 569; Krueger, II, 38; Heimbucher, II, 5-6; Hinschius, II, 52; Werminghoff, 145; Giesebrecht, II, 232.

<sup>32</sup> Krueger, II, 38.

vously for his southern monasteries, and further similarities between these codes of Benedict and earlier provisions of the monastic fathers, makes it seem probable that the Aachen rule, through Benedict, owed much to Isidore of Seville and the old Benedictine Rule.<sup>33</sup> The rule was similar to Chrodegang's rule in its general provision for common canonical life and its failure to demand absolute vows of poverty. There was also the provision for separate dwellings by special permission of the bishop.<sup>34</sup> It has been held that a distinction between secular and regular canons can be traced to this rule and the codes of Benedict of Aniane.<sup>35</sup>

Similar canonical regulations were promulgated as a result of councils held in the Rhineland and Gaul in 829, 836, 846, 847, and 868.<sup>36</sup> Such legislative attempts to hold back the current of ecclesiastical disintegration were vain. The same process of decentralization that was sweeping over the civil polity of Western Europe, was destined to break up the bishop's little empire, just as it had the great Carolingian Empire. Secularization of canonical life, and scattering of episcopal authority was inevitable. In 873, a Cologne synod established the canons of that region as corporate bodies, with full control of their members and property, with individual dwellings, and with prebends. By the end of the tenth century, secular canons, had replaced the regulars at Treves, Worms, Speyer, Mainz, and Cologne.<sup>37</sup> The Chrodegang foundation at Metz had decayed, and scarcely any clerics continued to live according to the rule.<sup>38</sup> At Treves, in 964, the canons were living in separate houses near the church, in 973 there was a distribution of prebends.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>33</sup> Thompson, J. W., "The Origin of the Word Goliardi," *Studies in Philology* (University of North Carolina, 1923) xx, 93-5.

<sup>34</sup> Hinschius, II, 54-6.

<sup>35</sup> Thompson, James W., "The Origin of the Word Goliardi," in *Studies in Philology*, XX, 87.

<sup>36</sup> LaGarde, 387.

<sup>37</sup> Hinschius, II, 56.

<sup>38</sup> Hauck, A., *Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands* (Leipzig, 1903), III, 353.

<sup>39</sup> Gieseler, J., *Text Book of Ecclesiastical History* (Philadelphia 1836), II, 156; Hinschius, II, 66-70.

The early feudal age, between Charlemagne and Hildebrand, was the period of secular canons, *par excellence*. The bishop's diocese became a miniature feudal estate, in which he was merely *primus inter pares*, in which personal contractual relations were stronger than ecclesiastical authority, and in which landed proprietorship carried spiritual prerogatives. The chapter of canons was to the bishop what the assembly of vassals was to the feudal lord. As with the feudal vassal, rights, privileges, and organized resistance to authority were prominent also in the life of the secular canons.

As already noted the secularized canons came to form a corporation, separate from the bishop, with separate duties, rights and income. In typical feudal style, the episcopal income was divided. Usually the civil power, the bishop, and the chapter each received a third of the ecclesiastical revenues. The chapter's third was divided into portions for the corporation as a whole, for the officers, and for allotments to the individual canons.<sup>40</sup> Prebends, like fiefs, were of many grades and kinds, and most canons held more than one, often with merely a short formal period of residence at the prebend locality, and with no service rendered save through a vicar.<sup>41</sup> Membership in the chapter gave, besides the emoluments, the right to vote in the chapter, to hold office, and to a seat in the choir.<sup>42</sup> As with feudal vassals, the rights and privileges of the canons were much more in evidence than their duties. Besides attending daily chapter and advising the bishop, they were supposed to chant the holy offices at canonical hours, to celebrate the daily conventual mass and the special feasts, and to aid the bishop in the regular services.<sup>43</sup> Each chapter had, besides the regular qualifications for membership, its own fees and ceremonies of initiation, and its celebrations, such as the famous "Feast of Fools."<sup>44</sup> The canons were

<sup>40</sup> Werminghoff, 145.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 146-8, 156; Hinschius, II, 74-7.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 71-2.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 59ff, 141 ff, 153 ff, 602 ff; Hauck, A., *Realencyclopädie* (Leipzig, 1904), X, 42.

<sup>44</sup> Heming, V., "Festum Stultorum," in *Nineteenth Century* (1905), LVII, 1000 ff; Hinschius, II, 66-70.

graded according to the holy orders they had taken; i.e., priest, deacon, and sub-deacon; besides the lower grades of *juniores*, *scholars*, "canons without seats", etc.<sup>45</sup> The chapter officers, elected by the corporation, were usually a *propst*, cantor, *scholasticus*, custodian, *cellerarius*, chamberlain, and porter.<sup>46</sup>

As the powers of the chapter tended to increase, in the later Middle Ages, it tended to become a closed corporation, independent of the bishop even to the extent of separate jurisdiction, and rights of excommunication, etc.<sup>47</sup> The popes favored this tendency toward a weakened episcopacy, even to the extent of making exempt chapters, like the Cluny Monasteries, and dividing with the chapters the right to provisorships.<sup>48</sup> The former duty of advising the bishop, during this process, became a factor in controlling him, since there were certain matters in which he, like the feudal lord, must have the consent of those under him.<sup>49</sup> In the course of the investiture struggle the chapter sometimes gained powers through the attempt of the pope to remove the selection from the laity to the clergy. Here, however, there was often a strong rival in the monks of the diocese who often demanded a voice.<sup>50</sup>

Much similar in form, organization, privileges, and constitution, were the non-cathedral chapters of *chorherren*, as distinguished from *domherren*. As early as the 816 Aachen Synod the existence of these Collegiate or *Stift*-chapters was recognized. The foundation of branches from the cathedral

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 62 ff; Werminghoff, 146; Hauck, *Realenc.*, X, 40 ff; DuCange, II, 102-3.

<sup>46</sup> Werminghoff, 148-9; Hinschius, II, 88 ff; Hauck, *Realenc.*, X, 40 ff.

<sup>47</sup> Schreiber, G., *Kurie und Kloster im XII Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 1910), I, 102; Werminghoff, 144, 150; Hinschius, II, 144-50. Cf. also Brewer, J.S., preface to *Giraldus Cambrensis, Opera*, Rolls series, I, p. xxiv ff, lvii ff; for an account of an archdeacon and chapter defying the bishop's authority and threatening counter excommunications against him.

<sup>48</sup> Hinschius, II, 641, 647; Schreiber, I, 185; Werminghoff, 147.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 149; Hinschius, II, 60, 143, 153-4.

<sup>50</sup> *E.g.*, Canterbury and the struggle with John. Hinschius, II, 59, 602-4.



church, of monastic churches, and particularly of *Eigenkirchen* or patronal churches in important and populous places led to such chapters of non-cathedral canons.<sup>51</sup>

Whether the organization was that of cathedral, collegiate, or monastic canons, the picture of the clerical force that manned the churches of the early feudal age reveals a predominantly secular, feudalized life. To condone or condemn this fact is not within the province of the historian. From the historical viewpoint, it was natural and inevitable that ecclesiastical life should follow, in the main, the same course as secular life in the transition period from ancient to modern civilization.

But the ideal of regular communal life for canons was by no means dead during these so-called "Dark Ages." During every century of the Christian era there have been protests against uncanonical clerical life and attempts at reform. However dominant practical policies have been, the Church has never lacked the consciousness of the need of spiritual ideals and the voice of protest against secularization.

In England, even, before the Norman Conquest, reform was brewing. Dunstan, the great Abbott of Glastonbury, in 946 ousted the "seculars" and began to train up young men in the regular life, preparing them to go out and serve the churches.<sup>52</sup> King Ethelred introduced regular canons at Winchester, and in 995 the new Archbishop was welcomed to Canterbury by a community of clerics.<sup>53</sup> The Norman Conquerors re-inforced the process of regularization, both from the motive of policy—for the Norman, wherever he went, was an organizer—and from pious impulses; it was not for naught that Normandy had the name of the most pious region of Western Europe. By the time of Richard's accession, fifty-four houses of regular canons had been established; either new foundations such as Colchester, Holy

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<sup>51</sup> Cf. Schreiber, II, 1-210 for "Eigenkloster" and "Eigenkirchen"; Werminghoff, 151.

<sup>52</sup> Helyot, V, 8506. Cf. brief mention in Terry, *England*, 94-5.

<sup>53</sup> *Cath. Encyc.*, III, 292.

Trinity, Wigmore, Haghmond, etc., or regular organizations, replacing seculars, as at Twynham, or seculars bowing to the inevitable and turning regular, as at Taunton.<sup>54</sup>

The Lorraine and Cluny reform movements on the Continent, during the same period, worked for the restoration of regular life in chapters as well as in the monasteries. Many chapters adopted or renewed the regular canonical life, at the insistence of bishops who were ambitious for a spiritual or political revival. Many collegiate and patronal chapters were taken over by reforming monks. In 914, a Lorraine layman named Gerard built a church and founded a chapter, then becoming a monk, introduced the regular life for his canons. From this start, came the foundation of other similar chapters, and the beginning of the great Lorraine or Gorzian movement, in which the Duke Giselbrecht cooperated.<sup>55</sup> In 973 the canons of an old foundation at Treves had restored the chapters of their locality.<sup>56</sup>

In spite of this wave of monastic reform, the opening of the eleventh century found the majority of chapters still untouched by the "*regula-mania*." Writers of the time spoke of the entire lack of common life among canons. The weeping prophet Damiani bitterly lamented the demoralization of the priesthood.<sup>57</sup> Such witnesses, however, suggest hopeful prospects for the future rather than absolutely accurate accounts of the clergy of their time.

It is toward the second half of the century that the great reform wave began to show results on both monastic and canonical clergy. The coming of the new monastic orders and the formation of the famous Augustian Rule for canons

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<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, III, 292; Helyot, V, 85.

<sup>55</sup> Hauch, *Kirchengeschichte*, III, 347-9. cf. Bouquet, *Recueil* . . . IX, 120, 513, 533, 543, for canons living community lives in the *Monasterium Sithiensi*, in a *Claustra* near Paris, in a *Compeigne coenobitas*, and *mansionibus canonicorum* at Tours. These were either branches of the Cluny and Lorraine movement, or earlier attempts at regularization during the first decades of the tenth century.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, III, 370.

<sup>57</sup> Hinschius, II, 57.

marks a distinct and rather significant change in the history of the Church organization. The movement culminated in reformed and expanded group organizations of superlative influence: the Cistercians in the monastic world, the Premonstratensians among the canonical clergy. The high-water mark of canonical reform came in the hundred years following the Lateran Council of 1059. During this period the pseudo-Augustinian rule was evolved, promulgated by Urban II, and vitalized by Norbert. It is noteworthy that this was also the age of the investiture struggle and the Crusades, two landmarks in the beginning of the mind of Modern Europe.

The so-called Augustinian Rule was not the actual work of Augustine, though it was the first complete revival of the spirit of his canonical manner of life. During the second half of the eleventh century, when reformed chapters were springing up in all parts of Western Europe, the rule was gradually worked out. It was the reform among monks and canons that gave the impulse for the rule, rather than the rule being the primary impulse for reform. The Augustinian Rule reflected, rather than started, the revival.

The 1059 Lateran Council of Nicholas II, with its general measures for regularizing the diocesan clergy and stamping out clerical marriage was the first prominent evidence of the revived Augustinian spirit. Peter Damiani and Hildebrand were prominent figures in the movement.<sup>58</sup> Damiani persuaded Nicholas to set an example by establishing regular canons from Lucca in the Lateran Church. The act caught the spirit of the times, and soon the affiliated branch foundations were organized into a congregation or order, probably the first congregation of regular canons in Italy.<sup>59</sup> Hildebrand's attempt in 1063, to force the adoption of a detailed set of regulations, similar to the old Aachen Rule, was not so successful.<sup>60</sup>

<sup>58</sup> Helyot, II, 16; Emerton, *Medieval Europe*, 222.

<sup>59</sup> At Pistoja, cf. Hinschius, II, 58; Helyot, II, 18; Heimbucher, II, 21; Bouquet, XI, 431, 652. In 1391 Boniface VIII replaced them with secular canons. *Cath. Encyc.*, III, 293-4; XII, 751.

<sup>60</sup> Heimbucher, II, 23; Helyot, II, 72 ff, 195 ff, 17, 69 ff.

In France, also, the many reforming chapters invited attempts at systematization. Before 1040 there were regular canons at St. Laurent in Dauphiné; while Montpellier, and Avignon had produced the rule of St. Rufus, later adopted by many other chapters in France.<sup>61</sup> In 1067 the Archbishops re-established regular canonical life at Paris and Rheims,<sup>62</sup> during the latter half of the century regular establishments flourished at Soissons,<sup>63</sup> Troyes,<sup>64</sup> Cahors,<sup>65</sup> Toul,<sup>66</sup> Vienne,<sup>67</sup> Beauvais, Arrouaise, and St. Quentin, where Ivo of Chartres set up his rule, also became prominent.<sup>68</sup>

Flanders had a regular chapter as early as 1066, at Cambray and St. Eloy.<sup>69</sup> Meanwhile, across the channel, the Normans were heading the crusade that was to result in a quickened and systematized reform in the British Isles.

The German part of the Empire, though ravished much of the time by the civil wars of Henry IV, was not lacking in evidence of clerical reform. In 1071, Archbishop Anno of Cologne started among his clergy a revival of regular canonical life, entirely independent of the Cluny and Hirschau movements that were sweeping through France, Italy and Southern Germany. Lambert of Hersfeld's account of the supplanting of Salefeldt seculars by regular canons, though clearly an exaggeration of the panic of the secular canons, reflects strongly the prevailing trend of canonical life in the Rhineland.<sup>70</sup> In 1075 Luke Welf founded the Rottenburch school of regulars, from which many a bishop went forth with strict

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<sup>61</sup> Lavissee, E., *Histoire de France* (Paris, 1901), II, pt. 2, 252; Helyot, II, 17; Bouquet, XI, 291, 496; X, 321.

<sup>62</sup> Helyot, II, 16; *Cath. Encyc.*, III, 253; Bouquet, XI, 605.

<sup>63</sup> Helyot, II, 84-7; in 1076.

<sup>64</sup> 1085. *Ibid.*, 67, 69; Heimbucher, II, 23.

<sup>65</sup> 1090. Hinschius, II, 58.

<sup>66</sup> 1091. *Ibid.*, II, 58; Bouquet, XI, 28.

<sup>67</sup> 1093. Helyot, II, 108.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 17 ff, 100 ff; Hinschius, II, 58; Lavissee, II, pt. 2, 254; Luchaire, A., *Manuel des Institutions Françaises* (Paris, 1892), 101; Bouquet, XI, 434.

<sup>69</sup> Hinschius, II, 58; Bouquet, XI, 129.

<sup>70</sup> Lambert of Hersfeldt, *Migne*, 146, 1116.

ideals of canonical life.<sup>71</sup> By 1091, according to Bernaldi, common life flourished in many places, not only among monks and clerics, but even among laymen.<sup>72</sup> It was during this period that Bernard Menton established the Hospice of regulars on the Great St. Bernard Pass; thence they later manned the Simplon Hospice and many parish churches of that locality.<sup>73</sup> Manegold of Lauterbach's congregation at Marbach,<sup>74</sup> and Altmann of Passau's four foundations<sup>75</sup> arose at about the same time.

The need for a more general and authoritative rule than either the Chrodegang or Aachen *Regula* became evident as the epidemic of regularization spread. By 1095 in France a collection of regulations had been formulated, based largely on the spirit and writings of St. Augustine of Hippo. This was promulgated and popularized as the Augustinian Rule by Urban II.<sup>76</sup> In twelve chapters, the rule provided for the strict form of common life *without* personal property and laid emphasis on high spiritual ideals rather than detailed practice.<sup>77</sup> Later popes confirmed, and added to the rule, until Benedict XII, in 1339 made it a congregation, with twenty-two provinces, visitors, provincial chapters, and other detailed organs of administration.<sup>78</sup> The separate chapters had the same general organization and detailed system as the monastic or secular corporations. The chief officer, sometimes bore the title abbot rather than *propst*, a term significant of the regular life; in dress there were minor distinctions, of more or less importance.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Heimbucher, II, 11.

<sup>72</sup> Hinschius, II, 57.

<sup>73</sup> Heimbucher, II, 46; *Cath. Encyc.*, III, 295.

<sup>74</sup> 1090. Helyot II, 105 ff; Heimbucher, II, 25; Bouquet, XI, 27.

<sup>75</sup> 1091. Hinschius, II, 58.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 57; Heimbucher, II, 7-8; Weminghoff, 176; *Monasticon Anglicanum* (ed. Dodsworth and Dugdale), VII, gives sources for England.

<sup>77</sup> Heimbucher, II, 8, 11; Clark, J., *Observances at Barnwell*. (Camb. 1897), 1 ff, lviii f.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 21; Helyot, II, 211 ff; Clark, pp. xxx1 ff, lxxiii.

<sup>79</sup> Schreiber, I, 100 ff; Heimbucher, II, 12; *Cath. Encyc.*, III, 293. The



The promulgation of the rule was justified by its almost universal adoption by the regular chapters that continued to spring up in all countries during the next few decades. There was, as yet, no Augustinian congregation, and consequently local variations from the rule gave rise to many congregations; all, were, however, Augustinian in character. Even the Premonstratensians, who were destined to eclipse the earlier regulars, originated and developed under the Augustinian rule.

Far and wide, the seed was scattered. Manifold activities came under the Augustinian mantle. In Italy, Peter de Honestis of Ravenna established the Congregation of the Mother of God, at about 1100.<sup>80</sup> In Portugal in 1132 the Congregation of the Holy Cross at Coimbra adopted the rule of St. Rufus of Avignon.<sup>81</sup> At about the same time in Spain, the canons of Pampeluna and the regular Hospitallers of Roncevalles united in a regular order,<sup>82</sup> while in 1170 the Canons of St. James of the Sword appeared.<sup>83</sup> The intrusion of the military spirit into the realm of regular canons had already appeared as an aftermath of the First Crusade and the Crusading Orders. In 1114 Godfrey of Bouillon imported Augustinian regulars into Palestine and established the Order of the Holy Sepulchre, for the service of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. The loss of Jerusalem drove the order back to the West, where it continued to control foundations in many countries.<sup>84</sup> All countries had their orders of crusading canons, as well as crusading monks; e.g., the Italian and Ger-

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congregation of Augustinian *canons* should not be confused with the congregation of Augustinian *friars* or mendicant monks, called Eremites, to which Luther belonged. In 1255-6 the order of friars was formed by the fusion of eight scattered monastic communities in Italy; under Alexander IV: *Cath. Encyc.*, VI, 281. Cf. also Charles Beard, *Martin Luther and the Reformation in Germany* (Greene, London, 1896), 148; Henry Jacobs, *Martin Luther* (Putnam 1898), 23 ff.

<sup>80</sup> *Cath. Encyc.*, III, 289, 293; Helyot, II, 43 ff; Heimbucher, II, 23.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 30; Helyot, II, 177.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 184 ff.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 256 ff.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 24; Helyot, 88, 114 ff; *Cath. Encyc.*, III, 289.

man Crusading Canons of 1169 and 1166, and the later canons of the Red Star in Bohemia, and canons of the Red Heart in Poland.

Significant of the coming age, was the appearance of social service organizations among the regular canons. Many bridge-building chapters, in imitation of the Avignon Pontificers of 1177 were established, primarily for the improvement of pilgrim travel.<sup>86</sup> The Hotel Dieu of St. John the Baptist at Beauvais became prominent in the service of the sick and needy.<sup>87</sup> At Soissons, in 1198, John of Matha founded a Hospitaller Order for the freeing of Christian slaves in Northern Africa; the later Trinitarians or Johannites.<sup>88</sup> The Montpellier Order of the Holy Spirit, and other organizations, adopted the Johannite Rule.<sup>89</sup>

While the Augustinian Rule was thus being applied to many activities, not strictly canonical, the regularization of cathedral and collegiate canons went on apace. Within the Empire, at St. Mauritius in the Swiss Valleys,<sup>90</sup> at Salzburg<sup>91</sup> at Breisach in the Black Forest,<sup>92</sup> at Springersbach,<sup>93</sup> Halle,<sup>94</sup> Cologne,<sup>95</sup> and many other smaller places, chapters took over the Rule. Often there was the incentive, no doubt, of gaining papal protection and exemption from episcopal authority.<sup>96</sup> In Northern France regular foundations appeared at Besançon and Auxerre in 1120, Soissons in 1131, and in Flanders at Ripen in 1138.<sup>97</sup> More notable, however, was the Paris

<sup>85</sup> Heimbucher, II, 34-7.

<sup>86</sup> Helyot, II, 281 ff.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 300 ff.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 310 ff; Heimbucher, II, 71-3.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, 31.

<sup>90</sup> 1124. *Ibid.*, II, 24; Helyot, II, 80 ff.

<sup>91</sup> 1100. Hinschius, II, 58.

<sup>92</sup> 1125. Adamczyk, P., *Die Stellung des Papstes Honorius II zu den Klöstern* (Greifswald, 1912), 48.

<sup>93</sup> 1128. *Ibid.*, 52; Hinschius, II, 58.

<sup>94</sup> 1128. Adamczyk, 50.

<sup>95</sup> 1180. Hinschius, II, 58.

<sup>96</sup> Cf. Honorius II particularly. Adamczyk, 48 ff.

<sup>97</sup> Hinschius, II, 58.

establishment of student canons in the monastery school of William of Champeaux, at St. Victor's in 1109. The chapter became the nucleus of the Victorian Order, under a mixed Benedictine-Augustinian rule.<sup>98</sup> The St. Genevieve foundation at Paris and the Xanten chapter of which Norbert was a member, were branches of the Victorians.<sup>99</sup> The introduction of the Victorians into Paris illustrates a rather unusual phase of the reform. The reformed canons did not always appreciate the favor that was bestowed on them, though in many cases they went over to the regular life in order to save their property.<sup>100</sup> The Paris clergy, with the encouragement of the King, Louis VI, resisted the regulars, and it took the influence of Bernard of Clairvaux to bring them to submission. The Victorians were, consequently, not as popular in and about Paris as were other clerics.<sup>101</sup>

The only order founded in Medieval England was that of Gilbert of Sempringham, a regular canon of Bridlington who became dissatisfied with the laxness of his chapter. In 1137 he established his dual foundation for both men and women. At the request of the menials who served them, he added groups of lay brothers and sisters. Because of its double-cloister life the Cistercians could not fuse with the order.<sup>102</sup> The monastic trend, typical of all English foundations, appears clearly in the following contemporary description of the order: "It is the chariot of Aminadab, that is, of a willing people, the voluntary poor of Christ. It has two sides, one of men, another of women; four wheels, two of men, cleric and lay, and two of women, lettered and unlettered. Two oxen draw the chariot, the clerkly and monastic

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<sup>98</sup> Luchaire, *Manuel*, 101; Helyot, II, 149 ff; Heimbucher, II, 12, 29; Giesebrecht, II, 232.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 231; Lavissee, II, pt. 2, 258; Hauck, *Kirchengeschichte*, IV, 353; Heimbucher, II, 26 ff, 49 ff; *Cath. Encyc.*, III, 294-6.

<sup>100</sup> Luchaire, 100-1.

<sup>101</sup> Lavissee, II, pt. 2, 257-8.

<sup>102</sup> Graham, R., *Saint Gilbert of Sempringham and the Gilbertines* (London, 1903), 11 ff, 50 ff; Helyot, II, 188 ff; Heimbucher, II, 31; *Cath. Encyc.*, III, 295.

discipline of the blessed Augustine and the holy Benedict. Father Gilbert guides the chariot....."<sup>103</sup> Perhaps this spirit of monastic and clerical cooperation, is a more significant factor in the evolution of regular canons than their divergences and contrasts. In the "most successful ministry since Paul the Apostle," we shall find such a complete rapprochement and fusion of monastic asceticism and clerical activity that the resulting order seems to be neither monastic nor priestly but a well nigh perfect combination of the two.

The crowning event of the eleventh and twelfth century reform of canonical life was the coming of the Premonstratensian Order. Norbert's vitalizing reorganization was to the life of the canons what Bernard and the Cistercians were to the monastic life; a respiritualizing, a practical systematization and a wider expansion of clerical life. The twelfth century clerical and monastic ideal and practice became more

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<sup>103</sup> *Monasticon Anglicanum*, VI, p. xiii. Translated in Graham, 15. Canonesses were not peculiar to the Gilbertines. Their existence parallels that of canons, both regular and secular, from early times. St. Patrick founded houses for women; the famous St. Bridget was a canoness (*Cath. Encyc.*, III, 296). In 983 the Archbishop of Metz put canonesses into a monastery at Epinal where they chanted the canonical hours. (Helyot, VII, 420 f). As with canons the ideal was that of regular life. Nevertheless, even as early as the Aachen Synod of 817 a rule drawn up for canonesses allowed personal property and maid servants to the members (Heimbucher, II, 78 ff). During the tenth and eleventh century the common table regulation was disregarded, though the common house was, for obvious reasons, usually kept up. (*Cath. Encyc.*, III, 296). At Cologne, during the eleventh century, there were in the same house some who kept the strict life, and others who did not. At Toul most of the canonesses broke away from the strict Benedictine Rule of earliest times. The noblewomen in such houses usually lived in a rather independent fashion; e.g., at Ratisbon, in Flanders (Helyot, VII, 420 ff). With the eleventh century revival, regular life came into fashion; e.g., Lateran. Victorian and Premonstratensian canonesses, Order of the Holy Spirit, Order of the Holy Sepulchre, Order of St. Creuze, at Coimbra, and other orders of "Lady Canons" in conjunction with regulars (Heimbucher, II, 78-84; Helyot, II, 120 ff). Of significance for the centuries immediately preceding the Reformation was the beginning, during the twelfth century in Flanders, of the Beguines, established by Marie de Oignies who left her husband and with other women settled near a monastery.

practically socialized than it had ever been. Norbert solved, more harmoniously than perhaps any man of the Middle Ages, the ever-present problem of the Church, i.e., how to maintain spiritual ideals and at the same time keep up an efficient working institution. His own early life was a struggle between apostolic ideals and ecclesiastical practice. At one point in his career he had the making of a first rate heretic. It will never be known, just how narrowly the Church escaped a Waldo before Waldo by Pope Gelasius' licensing of the preacher vagrant at St. Giles in 1118,<sup>104</sup> nor how close Norbert came to the experience of Henry of Lausanne, before he submitted to Calixtus' decision, a year later, ceased his "wander-preaching" and joined a congregation.<sup>105</sup> The personal experience of Norbert in solving the problem of adjusting apostolic ideals to ecclesiastical authority and practice, is parallel to the general development of canonical life and its culmination in the Premonstratensian compromise between priestly and monastic life.

Norbert, originally a member of an Augustinian chapter at Xanten, like Gilbert of Sempringham in England, became dissatisfied with the life of the average canon and determined to seek a higher ideal combined with a more practical service to mankind. In spite of his friendship with Bernard, he refused to join the Cistercians, because of his determination to hold to the secular activities of the parish.<sup>106</sup> He therefore took over the Augustinian Rule but modified it so as to retain a more monastic life combined with more secular activities.<sup>107</sup> The Premonstratensians were, strictly speaking,

<sup>104</sup> Heimbucher, II, 53; Giesebrecht, II, 235. Bernheim, E., "Norbert von Premontre und Magdeburg," in *Hist. Zeitsch.*, 35: 8. Bernhardt, W., *Lothar von Supplinburg* (Leipzig, 1879, Jahrbücher), 95.

<sup>105</sup> Bernheim, 8; Giesebrecht, II, 236; Hauck, *Kirchengeschichte*, IV, 354-5; Nitzsch, K., *Geschichte des Deutschen Volkes im Elften und Zwölften Jahrhundert* (Leipzig, 1892), II, 182.

<sup>106</sup> Vancandard, E., *Vie de St. Bernard* (Paris, 1910), I, 201-2; Hauck, *Kirchengeschichte*, IV, 353-6; Bernheim, 7; Giesebrecht, II, 238.

<sup>107</sup> Reidel, A., *Codex Diplomaticus Brandenburg, Geschichte der Mark Brandenburg* (Berlin, 1847), III, 80-1, 330; XIII, 107, 483; XXIV, 322.



neither monks nor seculars, but a mixed order. Their novitiate, tonsure, discipline, vows, dress, and officers corresponded closely to those of St. Benedict, Cluny, or Citeaux. Poverty was strictly enforced, even though other apostolic practices were given over. Solemn oaths of poverty, chastity, obedience, silence, love for God and fellow man were exacted. The insistence on daily confession, fasting, severe penance, and the strict regulations as to meat and wine, indicate the ascetic spirit of the rule.<sup>108</sup> As branch houses sprang up through Northern France and Germany, there appeared other evidences of a monastic nature; e.g., "Mary" churches and *klosters*, the title "abbot" in place of "*propst*," etc.<sup>109</sup> In their parish work or *Seelsorge*, (*cura animarum*) the followers of Norbert were like neither canons nor monks. The aim of the order was to train canons to do practical parish work with high ideals and strict living, in order that they might take over and serve sacramentless communities or parishes inefficiently manned. These Premonstratensian "home missionaries" worked under the control of the bishop but were still subject to their order.<sup>110</sup>

The rapid spread of the order through the lower Rhineland was accompanied by a gradual expansion of the machinery of administration. Eventually the organization took the centralized-monarchy form of Cluny rather than the federal Cistercian form. The branch houses were organized into circles or provinces under *circatores* or generals. The heads of the houses were usually elective, subject to the consent of the "fathers of the order", i.e., the abbots of Premontre, Floreffe, and Laon. These three formed a veritable triumvirate, visiting all foundations periodically, thus keeping them in close touch with the central administration. A chap-

<sup>108</sup> Dannenberg, W., *Entwicklungsgeschichte des Regulierten Premonstratenser Domkapitel von Brandenburg* (Greifswald, 1912), 140; Reidel, III, 91 ff, 10 ff; Hauck, *Realencyclopädie*, XV, 610; Schreiber, *passim*; Giesebrecht, II, 239; Luchaire, 102-3.

<sup>109</sup> Schreiber, I, 162; Dannenberg, 44 ff.

<sup>110</sup> Luchaire, 92, 103, 117; Schreiber, I, 103 ff.

ter general of abbots was held annually at Premontre, until the division into two regions with centers at Premontre and Magdeburg.<sup>111</sup> Thus, amid the needs of a vigorous expanding work, Norbert and the Premonstratensians developed among canons a wide international congregation, such as had not existed heretofore save among monks.

In 1126 Norbert gained a new confirmation of his expanded order or congregation in the charter granted by Honorius II.<sup>112</sup> This formal recognition was followed by the election of Norbert to the see of Magdeburg and the consequent expansion of the movement eastward into the frontierland of Germany, where, with the Cistercians, it became a powerful pioneer force in the christianization and germanization of Slavland. In this region, the "Wild West" of Medieval Europe, the new monastic-canonical spirit found full and free expression. The Premonstratensians and Cistercians were Calebs and Joshuas, eager to go in and possess the land. They were the forward looking, onward marching, ecclesiastical forces of a new age. In them the Church, reacting to the new conditions that were becoming evident in business, education, and government, as well as in religion, began to make use of collective social impulses in a larger way than ever dreamed of before.

The evolution of canons during the Middle Ages works toward the eleventh-twelfth century revival as a climax, and there we may leave detailed consideration of its development, for there were no further changes of fundamental importance till the Council of Trent. The general reform movement, to be sure, continued, and monastic development reached its full bloom in the Franciscans, Dominicans, Carmelites and the Augustinian Eremites to which order Luther belonged; but the mendicant was distinctly monastic rather than canon-

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<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 147-8; Hauck, *Kirchengeschichte*, IV, 356-63; *Realencyclopädie*, XV, 610; Fisher, H., *The Medieval Empire* (London, 1898), II, 102; Luchaire, 110; Heimbucher, II, 61.

<sup>112</sup> Bernhardi, 98; Hauck, *Realencyclopädie*, XV, 609; *Kirchengeschichte*, IV, 356.

ical in origin, and therefore comes outside the scope of our survey.

As a result of the eleventh and twelfth century revival, the distinction between regular and secular canons—if ever it was a worthy differentiation—became an anachronism to the earnest churchman. No true canon could be anything but a regular. On the other hand, the distinction between regular canons and monks seemed to be fading away. A monk who failed to serve humankind was not a true monk, and a canon who was not regular in life and ascetic in spirit was, like Trithemius' *albus niger*, a white blackbird. Monks and canons seemed to have become one; monks served churches everywhere, and canons commonly lived in cloisters under abbots. The monk had turned to the world of practical affairs, to a life of social service; the canon had turned to the separated life of the cloister as a dynamo for spirituality. Regular and secular clergy were meeting on common ground and adapting themselves to the needs of the age. Bernard, the mystic, and Norbert, the organizing archbishop, could well meet and cooperate on this common plane of human welfare, even though their followers were sometimes bitter rivals.

During this stirring Pre-Reformation Period, the Church found in Norbert's Premonstratensians, Bernard's Cistercians, and St. Francis' Mendicant Friars, an apparently successful solution for its ever-present problem of reconciling ideals and practice, as well as a wonderful expression of that peculiar genius of the Catholic Church, i.e., its practical conservatism. The Medieval Christian Church, not unlike other religious institutions, was a stabilizer of society; its function, that of the balance wheel. It was an inspirer and preacher of high ideals; at the same time it stood for repression of fanatical enthusiasts. It was the sponsor of intellectual life among the Universities and the Schoolmen; yet it crushed Abelards and Arnolds for their too-advanced ideas. The Church steered a middle course, avoiding both fanaticism and skepticism. Its attitude reflected the normally prevailing ideas and conditions of society. Just so, inside the clerical group, the tend-

ency of canonical life—more or less regular, as the case might be—revealed the general state of mind and spirit among the clergy. Often the Church seems to have been merely a barometer of social conditions, and the canonical life a mere thermometer to register the warmth of spiritual life among the clergy. At times, however, when opportunity presented itself and needs impelled, individuals like Norbert became the mouthpiece of the Church and through clerical group organizations, there were started within the Church dynamic movements that spread to the very ends of the earth and quickened the social mass.

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## MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS OF SPACE IN RELATION TO OMNIPRESENCE

The doctrine of the infinite attributes of divine immensity and omnipresence<sup>1</sup> has persisted in a quite well-defined formulation through well-nigh six centuries. Both the Scholastic<sup>2</sup> and the Protestant<sup>3</sup> theologians fairly agree in their mode of statement on this point. And both hark back to the Church Fathers for their conception. The doctrine as formulated by the Fathers in turn, rested upon no metaphysical subtleties or abstruse speculation as to the nature of space. The common sense or, as some might say, the naïve notion of the nature of space was unhesitatingly assumed as the true one. Resting on this assumption the immensity of God was defined, for example by Augustine, as a being "ubique totus et nusquam locorum."<sup>4</sup> God was thought of as in all space but not included by it; nor, on the other hand, was he excluded by it.<sup>5</sup> As Thomas Aquinas well put it later, God's omnipresence is *per potentiam*, *per praesentiam* (i.e. all things are open and naked before him) and *per essentiam*<sup>6</sup> in all space.

Anything but a superficial acquaintance with modern philosophy, mathematics, psychology and physics, however, will serve to evince that this wording and conception do not find the hospitable reception in twentieth century thought that they had in the fifteenth. This is not necessarily due to an altered view of the nature of God, particularly of his infinity and omnipresence. Nor is it due to a distaste or disrespect for

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<sup>1</sup> By the term "omnipresence" the ubiquity of God particularly in relation to his creatures is usually meant: and by "immensity" His presence in relation to space in the abstract.

<sup>2</sup> Anselm, *Monol.* c. 20-23; *Th. Aquinas, Summa Theologia*, I, 8, 3; Peter Lombard, *Sent.* I.

<sup>3</sup> Polanus, *Synt.* IV, c. 12; Zanchius, *Op.* II, co. 90ff; Gerhard, *Loci*, I; c. 8., Sec. 8.

<sup>4</sup> *Confessions*, VI: 3 and *De Civitate Dei*, VII—30.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Hermas, Clement of Alexandria, Athanasius, Irenaeus, and Origen.

<sup>6</sup> *Summa Theologica*, I. 8, 3.



the discipline of theology<sup>7</sup> as such. It is due to the notion of space implied. It is due to the fact that the traditional doctrine of omnipresence and immensity presupposes the unanalyzed or simple and common-sense view of space. More precisely, it is due to the metaphysical analysis and speculative exploitation of modern philosophy in this field.

Further, theoretical mathematics and speculative<sup>8</sup> physics have, due to recent rapid progress, laid claim to the prerogative of a vote on the matter with their theorems particularly of space-time, of four-dimensional or *n*-dimensional space, and of a finite and curved or globular-shaped space made so conspicuous of late by Einstein.

The early Church view of space is challenged by those who deny its very reality, as Zeno<sup>9</sup> in Greek philosophy, Kant in modern, and A. E. Taylor and Bradley in recent philosophy: it is skeptically frowned upon by others who assert that it is not an entity, but merely a relation, as Sir William Hamilton, Saisset and Calderwood; or it is asserted that space is but another name for vacuum or emptiness; others assert it is a *plenum*, a "somethingness," explained in terms of ether, or some very tenuous medium; others carry this further, as Plato and Haeckel, and deem space to be a substance; others like Girardeau, Sir Isaac Newton and Samuel Clarke conceive of space as an attribute of the divine nature; S. Alexander and others from the physical view-point have recently originated the conception that space is identical with time; others regard space as merely a generalization from experience; still others like Jas. McCosh after defining a few predicates proclaim that the ultimate nature of space

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<sup>7</sup> Vide *The New Infinite and the Old Theology*, by Professor C. Keyser, Preface p. III.

<sup>8</sup> For example an instructive paragraph may be cited from the lecture of H. Minkowski delivered at the 80th Congress of Naturalists at Cologne in 1908: "The conceptions of time and space which I wish to develop have arisen on the basis of experimental physics. Their tendency is radical. From now on space-in-itself and time-in-itself are destined to be reduced to shadows, and only a sort of union of the two will retain an independent existence." Compare the recent work of S. Alexander on *Space, Time and Deity*.

<sup>9</sup> Though Zeno's position on the matter is disputed.

can be found neither here nor there, but that it must be pronounced essentially inscrutable. Some say that space is finite; others say it is infinite; others, paralyzed by the Kantian antinomies hold it is neither finite nor infinite. These do not exhaust the views on the matter.<sup>10</sup> They merely typify the teeming Pandora's box full of opinions on the subject.

It is true that many of these represent more or less analytic refinements upon, or variations of the Augustinian doctrines of space, and in so far may not be regarded as unfavorable to, or at least preclusive of the theological doctrine of divine omnipresence and immensity. But others of these views are quite seriously inimical to, if not destructive of the traditionally received conception. If not subversive of this particular doctrine, they inevitably bring along with them a retinue of necessarily associated philosophical tenets which effectively negate theistic principles. If for this reason alone, a searching inspection of the notion of space, traditional and metaphysical is warranted, if not imperative. The latest work from the press on the *Idea of God*, by C. A. Beckwith, attributes the modern theology, especially finitist theology, to the reconstructed space notion among others. Not only is this inspection warranted for polemic but for constructive purposes. For it is not an easy matter to conceive of the divine relationship to space expressed in the terms immensity and omnipresence, when the notion of space itself and its extent is indeterminate. A clear, consistent concept of space is an invaluable aid to wholesome doctrinal thought and affords a means of constructing a positive theistic *Weltanschauung* in general. Only in so far as our notion of the nature and extent of space is clear and well-defined can we expect to satisfactorily conceive the relationship of God to space.

For the sake of clearness, four different ways of viewing space must be distinguished at the outset, the popular, the metaphysical, the mathematical, and the metamathematical.

<sup>10</sup> Vide Eisler's *Wörterbuch der Philosophischen Begriffe*, under word "Raum" for an exhaustive survey.

For different results are attained in accordance with whichever mode of viewing space is assumed.

The popular view is that unreflected and undeliberated view of most plain folk who regard the space of this work-a-day world as a great, dimly defined, all-enveloping receptacle. It is contrasted with body and hence has associated with it the notion of emptiness—an emptiness in which motion and body find place. Space at large is simply an extension of the visible terrestrial space if not infinitely, at least indefinitely. Often vague and intellectually unrefined associations are attached to the notion and naïve assumptions are made which only become consciously realized by the plain man after he is closely questioned. He uncritically and spontaneously acts on the assumption of the real external existence of space. He is unshakably sure that space is not an unreal phantasmagoria “of such stuff as dreams are made of.” He is confident that it is, in technical phrase, three dimensional and infinitely divisible and that it is homogeneous. But when closely interrogated he will be found to vacillate on the question of its nature. Is it a thing? Is it material? or nothing and non-material? If it is neither a thing or no-thing is it a *tertium quid*, somewhere between the two? semimaterial? Can it be directly tuited? and if not wherein consists its reality? If all extension, that is extended bodies, were annihilated would space still remain? To these questions he can frame no definite reply.

The metaphysician's view of space differs from this popular view in that he probes so deeply into the problem of space that he perceives what constitutes the perplexing problems of the same space that the plain man merely cognizes and enjoys life in. The task of the metaphysician is to purify the common sense judgments concerning the world of space of all naïve or unanalyzed elements, to sift out the contributions of the personal equation in the conception of space, and to critically investigate the notion from the angle of the empirical engendering of it in the mind. But as will be seen later, the plain man's view is essentially sound and constitutes

a safe foundation stone for the metaphysician to begin his structure upon. There is a superiority in the plain man's view, that should never be forgotten. It is realistic and remains closely attached to fact and experience. It is not prone to drift from the moorings of objective verity. On the other hand, for his expert insight and gifted intellectual grasp of the subject, the metaphysician dearly pays with his exposure to speculative aberration. Thrown into the teeth of Kantian antinomies and idealistic logic the metaphysician often feels forced upward into the tenuous atmosphere of speculation for escape. He is less stable than the plain man with his realism.

No less does the metaphysician's view differ from the mathematician's or geometrician's view of space. Metaphysical space is the real world-space; mathematical space is an abstraction from this real space. Metaphysical space is experienced; mathematical space is ideal and unreal.<sup>11</sup> Metaphysical space is actual, mathematical is theoretical and symbolic of the actual space. Mathematical space is derived from the existent space by process of abstraction. It is derived by exclusion of all the qualities and predicates of real space which do not pertain to its purpose, and do not lend themselves to purely mathematical relationships. For example, a point in metaphysical space has parts; but a point in mathematical space is entirely ideal; it has no parts and no magnitude but merely position. A geometrical line has no magnitude of breadth nor thickness; it is merely the abstract quality of length. In a geometrical surface we attend to its length and breadth to the exclusion of its depth. Mathematical points, lines, surfaces and divisions are only provis-

<sup>11</sup> "Geometry is indifferent.....to the question whether there exist (in the strict sense) such entities as its premises define," B. Russell, *Principles of Mathematics*, p. 372. "Pure mathematics has no concern with the question whether the axioms and propositions of Euclid hold of actual space or not; this is a question for applied mathematics, to be decided, as far as any decision is possible, by experiment and observation. What pure mathematics asserts is merely that the Euclidian propositions follow from the Euclidian axioms,—i.e., it asserts an implication" (p. 5).

ional or tentative entities, whose *raison d'être* is greatly their convenience as instruments of conceiving and controlling the various relations of the world space they symbolize.

Though mathematical space is thus an abstract construction it corresponds to metaphysical space in that it is a *continuum*, having the quality, that is, of expansion or extension, in which geometrical *loci*, or points, can be assigned. It corresponds to real space in the more important circumstance that its axioms and theorems express the conditions of our existence, and when put to the test of experience and experiment can return actual and practical results. Though not in themselves entities or relations in the world of sense and experience, they can influence that world. The great justification of the Euclidian geometry over other possible systems lies in the fact that it so corresponds to real space that its results are more practically applicable in the existing world. From these remarks the matter may be summed up as follows: mathematical space differs from real space in that it is an abstraction from it; it resembles real space in that it corresponds with it sufficiently to make it practicable as an applied science, and useful as the basis of scientific truths. Since geometry, as Prof. Bertrand Russell defines it, is a "pure *a priori* science," and not the study of actual space, which latter study he terms an "experimental science," the task set to the metaphysician and the mathematician differs *toto coelo*. "Geometry no longer throws any direct light on the nature of actual space."<sup>12</sup> The metaphysician's problem of the nature of space would remain less confused if this difference were always respectfully recognized by mathematicians.

The difference between the two types of space may be somewhat differently seen in the question of the infinity of space. For the metaphysician this is plenitude of extension. Space is conceived as having no relation to its extremities or to itself. For the mathematician, however, spatial in-

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<sup>12</sup> Vide Bertrand Russell's *Principles of Mathematics*, vol. I, p. 374.



finity does not involve the relation of space to itself so much as it does the question of possible limits to the intellect. Whatever exceeds the limits which the human intellect is able to assign it is mathematically infinite. Hence mathematical infinity is defined and distinguished by something extrinsic to the nature of space itself, viz: the inadequacy of the human intellect.

Lastly, metaphysical space is to be distinguished from metamathematical space. But occasionally modern mathematics tends, if not to identify, at least to closely relate the two. "It is the philosophical bearing of metageometry alone that constitutes its real importance," states Prof. Bertrand Russell.<sup>13</sup> He elsewhere, indeed, quite correctly states that "geometry no longer throws any direct light on the nature of actual space." But qualifying this in the next sentence he says, "But indirectly the increased analysis and knowledge of possibilities, resulting from modern geometry, has thrown immense light upon our actual space."<sup>14</sup> Reference is here made to non-Euclidian geometry and to the metamathematical theory of 4, 5, or  $n$  dimensional space originated by Cayley, Grassmann, Riemann and Clifford. The light thrown on the nature of metaphysical space by metamathematics consists, it is maintained, (1) in the disproof it affords of the pure subjectivity and *a priori* nature of space. Kant argued that the geometrical axioms of Euclid were apodictic and self-evident in their truth, and that therefore space was an original, *a priori*, subjective datum of consciousness. But metageometry maintains that the axiom of two parallel lines and hence the Euclidian space (i.e. three dimensional space) which underlies the axiom can be disproved. And it was on these fundamental assumptions that Kant rested both his metaphysical and mathematical notions of space. By denying the axiom of parallels, Lobatchewski, Bolyai, and Riemann constructed perfectly self-consistent systems upon other axioms which discarded the Euclidian postulate of a straight line. Because

<sup>13</sup> *Foundations of Geometry*, p. 97.

<sup>14</sup> *Principles of Mathematics*, Vol. 1, p. 374.

of their logical success Professor Russell concludes that the *a priori* subjective nature of space is invalidated, the Euclidian axioms being no longer apodictic or self-evident.<sup>15</sup> But it is to be observed that while Professor Russell denies the intuitive nature of Euclidian geometrical truths by the use of this one particular type of argument, represented by Kant, he does not employ mathematics to invalidate the *a priori* intuition of *real* space directly; he resorts immediately to philosophy. He attempts to show that the "*a priori* synthetic truths" are *both* analytic and synthetic according to modern idealistic logic. It is really by philosophy and logic and not metamathematics that the disproof is attained. But philosophy is forbidden ground to mathematicians. Further, Professor Russell concedes that metageometry can not *prove* positively that Euclidian geometry has *not* apodictic certainty: metageometry only makes it difficult if not impossible to confidently affirm this certainty—which are two quite different propositions. Still further, in order to completely disprove the axioms of Euclidian geometry by the axioms of metageometry it would be necessary to evince the intuitive and self-evident nature of these latter displacing axioms. But Professor Russell elsewhere admits that we cannot "frame an intuition of non-Euclidian spaces."<sup>16</sup> Finally, it is subject to question whether the Kantian argument for the *a priori* nature of the space idea is the best one. If not, its demolition is not of serious consequence. It is certainly not the only argument. Our conclusion then must be that the correction of the metaphysician's notion of the subjective nature of the space idea by metageometry is not as serious or far-reaching as supposed.

One may even grant that Euclidian space as defined by Kant may be termed a concept and not an intuition, as Professor Russell insists, and yet the ultimately *a priori* nature

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<sup>15</sup> "The apodictic certainty of the axiom of parallels shrinks to an unmotivated subjective conviction, and vanishes altogether in those who entertain non-Euclidian doubts." *Foundations of Geometry*, p. 97.

<sup>16</sup> *Foundations of Geometry*, p. 56.

of metaphysical space in the large, or space as such, may stand untouched by criticism. It may without undue anticipation safely be affirmed that the Euclidian concept of space is sanctioned by a majority of the modern mathematicians, at least till more evidence of its sphericity, pseudo-sphericity and multiple dimensions is forthcoming. The belief in its intuitive, and in the correct sense, *a priori* nature is not therefore irrational.

But (2) the light thought to be thrown by metamathematics on actual space consists in more than mere refutation or revision of the statement of its *a priori* nature. This psychological problem is but the counterpart or consequence of what is thought by some to be a new interpretation of real space. By means of mathematical analysis the fact of a space not of three dimensions perpendicular to each other, but of four or an indefinite number of dimensions is thought to have been established; and also of a curved and a non-homogeneous space. This has been termed non-Euclidian space.<sup>17</sup> Kant, Caird,<sup>18</sup> and Lotze<sup>19</sup> have contended that space must necessarily be limited to three dimensions and be homogeneous. Bertrand Russell, C. D. Broad and others, following the lead of Gauss, Lobatchewsky, Bolyai and others upheld the new theory as mathematicians, denying the ability of philosophers as such to cope with the mathematical evidence. Helmholtz even regards non-Euclidian or pseudo-spherical space

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<sup>17</sup> The *n*-dimensional space may be conceived as either Euclidian or non-Euclidian.

<sup>18</sup> *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, Vol. I, p. 165.

<sup>19</sup> *Metaphysics*, Bk. II, Chap. II, p. 135. Lotze's strictures on the theory are practically all of a mathematical nature. He makes what mathematicians and logicians would deem an egregious fallacy in beginning with the assumption that metageometry conceives its space as built up out of straight lines and angles like Euclid. His desired objective, i.e., the proof that space is three dimensional of course logically follows without dispute. His intrepid plowing with the mathematical heifer as a philosopher has merited the just criticism of mathematicians. (Vide B. Russell, *Foundations of Geometry*, Sec. 90, 95 and 101 where he asserts that "Lotze's mathematical strictures could all be refuted by a better acquaintance with metageometry"). Lotze himself feels some guilty doubt as to the cogency of his reasoning.

as not only thinkable ("denkbar") but as perceivable ("vorstellbar"). And Zollner and others regard the fourth dimension as so certain that they give it a spiritualistic interpretation (*Abhandlungen*, 1878). The theory has been claimed as a postulate of the "practical reason," and even Bertrand Russell affirms that it is as empirically or pragmatically justified as the Kantian three dimensional geometry.

The consensus of opinion among mathematicians seems to favor the Euclidian or common sense view of space, at least as far as observation carries them. Even those who have done most to further the non-Euclidian geometry, as Bolyai, Clifford and Helmholtz, have held the realistic view of space. If anything is to be considered, on the alleged evidence of the measurement of stellar triangles and parallaxes, if Euclidian space is to be denied as absolute in its accuracy, only the slight sphericity or pseudo-sphericity of space is admitted.<sup>20</sup> There are some mathematicians such as Clifford and Delboef who, still more conservative, and holding the plain realistic view of space, eschew speculation on possibilities and all purely intellectual analysis and deny that the nature of space can be ascertained at all, for want of adequate evidence.

As to the question of the truth of these theories of curved space and of four or more dimensions,<sup>21</sup> the teeth would be extracted from them immediately for metaphysics if the following considerations were duly reflected upon: (1) we recall the distinction above drawn (in point three) between mathematical space, terms, relations and entities, and world-space on the other hand. Not only were the former found to be abstractions, but the science of mathematics as a whole was regarded by good modern authority as detached *in toto* from world-space and concerned only with the logical relations or implications of propositions and axioms. What thus holds true of mathematical propositions and entities would

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<sup>20</sup> Vide *Foundations of Geometry*, p. 97.

<sup>21</sup> The non-Euclidian geometries do not imply necessarily the reality of the fourth dimension, and the notion of a fourth dimension does not involve necessarily the non-Euclidian geometries, it is to be recalled.

*a fortiori* hold true of the more theoretical and abstract metamathematical constructions. (2) In the next place, what has just been affirmed of mathematics in general is at least equally true of metamathematics or non-Euclidian geometries, i.e. they are only systems of implication and logical deduction wherein every axiom and proposition are mutually consistent. Herein they precisely resemble Euclidian geometry excepting the circumstance that different initial postulates are chosen. Hence the non-Euclidian geometry is no more and no less valid than the Euclidian. They are both true. For they are both intrinsically consistent systems within themselves. We are not forced then to decide between these two systems as pure mathematical systems. (3) It follows further that the difficulties raised against non-Euclidian geometry and space ensue from the confusion in thought between the space of this "pure mathematics" and the space of our perceptual world, between the space of pure mathematics and of applied mathematics, to employ Professor Russell's distinction; or again between the space of purely intellectual analysis and speculation on the one hand and the non-mathematical phenomenal space presented to the senses on the other; or, to use E. G. Husserl's distinction, the space of "categorical theory forms" ("rein kategorialer Theorienformen") and the space of the world of appearance.<sup>22</sup> Elliptical and hyperbolic geometry and the fourth dimension are logical possi-

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<sup>22</sup> *Logische Untersuchungen*, Vol. I, p. 251. Husserl well elucidates the matter as follows: "Es wäre leicht nachzuweisen, dass durch die Erkenntniss der wahren Intention solcher Theorien, als rein Kategorialer Theorienformen, aller metaphysische Nebel und alle Mystik aus den einschlägigen mathematischen Untersuchungen verbannt wird. Nennen wir Raum die bekannte Ordnungsform der Erscheinungswelt so ist natürlich die Rede von Raumen, für welche, z.b. das Parallel-axiom nicht gilt, ein Widersinn. Ebenso die Rede von verschiedenen Geometrien, sofern Geometrie eben die Wissenschaft von Räume der Erscheinungswelt genannt wird. . . realisirt die Lehre von den, n-dimensionalen Raumen ein theoretisch geschlossenes Stück der Theorienlehre in dem oben definirten Sinn. Die theorie der Euklidischen Mannigfaltigkeit von drei Dimensionen ist eine letzte ideale Einzelheit in dieser gesetzlich zusammenhangenden Reihe apriorischen und rein Kategorialer Theorienformen (formaler deductiver Systeme)."



bilities and not ontological realities. The question, "does non-Euclidian space exist?" refers to an abstract logical possibility, not to an actually curved or multiple dimensional space. And when we bring this question down out of the world of speculative mathematics in which it was born, into the concrete world of actual space the question has no propriety or meaning. The term "exist" may be a logical existence, predicated of purely logical realities; or it may be defined as an actual phenomenal existence or empirical reality. The question "does non-Euclidian, or four dimensional, space exist?" can only be properly and affirmatively answered when the former, i.e. logical, type of existence is presupposed in the question.<sup>23</sup> The unfortunate impetus toward the popular reifying the fourth dimension was greatly given to the lay world of thought by the spiritualistic constructions emanating from the Leipsic mathematician, Zollner, who regarded the fourth dimension as an actual abode or region whither departed spirits took their flight. As Prof. Hermann Schubert of Hamburg states, the mathematicians who originally projected the mathematical theory then "had no idea of requiring people to imagine four dimensional things and worlds, and they were even still less remote from requiring them to believe in the real existence of a four dimensional space. In the hands of mathematicians this extension of the notion of space was a mere means devised for the discovery and expression, by shorter and more convenient ways, of truths applicable to common geometry, and to algebra operating with more than three unknown quantities."<sup>24</sup> (4) In the fourth place, as the last sentence suggests, the question is to be envisaged from the point of view of the intention of those who elaborated the hypothesis.<sup>25</sup> This intention was merely that of creating mathematical definitions and constructions which would be of value as means of in-

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<sup>23</sup> Cf. Poincare in his *Science et Methode*, p. 160; also Josiah Royce in *World and the Individual, Supplementary Essay*, p. 511, footnote 1.

<sup>24</sup> *Mathematical Essays and Recreations*, p. 64.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. also Husserl in the opening sentence of footnote 22 preceding.

vestigation, and would aid the advance of science. The creation of point-aggregates of more than three dimensions serves mathematicians in precisely the same way that the creation of such postulates as "ether" and the "atom" serve physicists. The physicist possesses no sensory knowledge or experience of "ether." It is postulated by the imagination only as a means of investigation. It enables him to rationally explain the phenomena of light and heat waves, of gravitation and electricity. Without some such supposable medium or matter which fills all space and which can conduct motion by undulations, these phenomena would remain inscrutable. But because the assumption of a tenuous material called ether aids in giving a conceptual unity or a *rationale* to these phenomena, the assumed entity is not therefore to be hypostatized. Just as well might Raphael stand enraptured over his brush as over the Madonna which it was an instrument of producing. Ether is in itself more of an enigma than that which it helps to explain. The fourth dimension, then, possesses no more right to be made real. It is another question as to whether the postulate of a fourth dimension does actually aid investigation, bring results, and advance science.<sup>26</sup> "Whether a four-dimensional space really exists or not is a question whose insolubility can not prevent research from making use of the idea."<sup>27</sup> What is our reply then to the question "does non-Euclidian and multiple dimensional space actually exist?" In light of the preceding points it now becomes the question, can this purely conceptual or hypothetical

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<sup>26</sup> Schubert states that this is however the case. It is of great service to algebra where more than three unknown quantities exist. Yet it is not indispensable. For the comprehension of geometry it is both "serviceable and necessary." "As soon as we are fully implicated in the task of accurately investigating the properties of three dimensional aggregates of points, we find ourselves forced to regard such aggregates as component elements of a manifoldness of more than three dimensions. In this way the exact criticism of even ordinary geometry leads us to the abstract assumption of a space of more than three dimensions," p. 85. It is of similar definite value to theoretical chemistry according to Cranz.

<sup>27</sup> Schubert, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

space of mathematics be a real aspect of the perceived world space? Can it be as real as the three dimensional and straight line space of the plain man's world? First, as to the theory of curved or spherical space. C. D. Broad<sup>28</sup> regards it as a worthy possibility that Euclidian points may be found to be certain logical functions of hyperbolic (or non-Euclidian geometric) lines in which case our world-space may be viewed indifferently as either hyperbolic and elliptic or Euclidian. On slightly different grounds Professor Alliot<sup>29</sup> also regards these as not mutually incompatible. The more advanced view has a certain negative logic in its favor in that the failure of any or every mathematician to prove the existence of non-Euclidian space does not argue that this existence is not possible. Further even if Euclidian space is decisively proved, this will not prove that real space may not also, at the same time in some sense be non-Euclidian.<sup>30</sup>

Having now, by the foregoing definitions, narrowed the scope of the present investigation to metaphysical space, the following questions propose themselves in view of the above indicated divergency of philosophic opinion. 1. Is space real? 2. If real, is it extension or non-extension? 3. If real, is it finite or infinite? 4. Is it a vacuum or a plenum, an entity or non-entity? 5. Is it a relation between objects? 6. Is it an attribute of the divine substance? 7. Or is space in itself so inscrutable that it may be said with Hamilton, *Qui non scit ignorare, ignorat scire*? Upon the answer returned from these several questions hangs the doctrine of divine omnipresence and immensity.

Attacking now the first question, we shall ask "is space real?" This is equivalent to asking, is space objective? Or on the other hand, is space merely a mental "construct" (an *ens rationale* as opposed to an *ens reale*)? The type of views which deny the reality of space are those which maintain the pure subjectivity of space. Space is regarded as

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<sup>28</sup> *Mind*, Vol. 24, 1915, art., "Is Our Space Euclidian?" p. 480.

<sup>29</sup> Vide his *The Idealistic Reaction against Science*.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Professor Alliot and C. D. Broad as above cited.

merely an inner form of thought which conditions and determines the outer world of sense perception. It is, to borrow C. L. Morgan's term, a mental "construct," or in Kant's terminology, an "*a priori* form" which is called into active exercise by the experiencing of sensations,—a view which Stumpf dubs "the psychic stimulus view," and which W. James characteristically styles the "intellectual machine shop" theory.<sup>31</sup> Space originates and exists merely as a mental reality and mode of viewing the outer world.<sup>32</sup> The system of philosophy which holds this view of the nature of space, viz; the idealistic, usually views also time, causality, substance, and the world of phenomena, as purely subjective

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<sup>31</sup> Schopenhauer expresses the view most vigorously: "A man must be forsaken by all the gods to dream that the world we see outside of us, filling space in three dimensions . . . governed by Causality's invariable law at each step . . . , that such a world should stand there outside of us, quite objectively real, with no complicity of ours, and thereupon by a subsequent act, through the instrumentality of mere sensation, that it should enter our head and reconstruct a duplicate of itself as it was outside. For what a poverty-stricken thing is this mere sensation! Even in the noblest organs of sense it is nothing more than a local and specific feeling, susceptible within its kind of a few variations, but always strictly subjective, and containing in itself nothing objective, nothing resembling a perception. For sensation of every sort is and remains a process in the organism itself. As such it is limited to the territory inside the skin, and can never, accordingly, contain anything that lies outside the skin or outside ourselves. . . . Thus the understanding must first create the objective world: never let the latter, already complete *in se*, simply promenade into our heads thru the senses and organic apertures. For the senses yield us nothing of her than the raw material which must first be elaborated into the objective conception of an orderly physical world-system by means of the (aforesaid) simple forms of space, time, causality, etc. . . . Our intellect, antecedently to all experience, must bear in itself the intuitions of space and time . . . ." To perceive a spatial world is "only possible through space. . . . being preformed in the intellect itself from whence it follows again that the perception of the external world is essentially an intellectual process, a work of the Understanding, to which sensation furnishes merely the occasion, and the data to be interpreted in each particular case" (*Vierfache Wurzeln des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde*, pp. 52-57).

<sup>32</sup> Wundt divides all views, psychologically speaking, into (1) the nativistic, and (2) the genetic. It is in the former rubric that the present view to be considered falls.

in their nature. This type of view most vitally affects the doctrine of divine omnipresence. It naturally denies omnipresence since the objectivity, i.e., reality, of space is usually assumed as underlying this doctrine.

The propositions alleged to support this view, are as follows: first, what may be termed the argument from intellectual paralysis known as the Kantian antinomies. Kant asserted on the one hand that space and time could be proved to be infinite. For if space were finite, then there must be, as a necessity of thought, some all-embracing infinite space beyond this finite space. In this case we would have to regard infinite space as *by the side of things*, and we could then speak of the universe of finite things or finite space as standing in relation to infinite space. But space is a non-entity, that is not a *thing*; and therefore it cannot, being mere emptiness, stand related to things. Only things can be related to things. Space itself cannot come into any relation. It is only that *in* which things are related. Therefore space *must* be infinite.

On the other hand, he asserts, the contradictory thesis may be proved, i.e. that space is finite. For, if space were infinite, it would be composed of an infinite number of parts. And to know and prove the infinity of space would require the successive cognizing or apprehending of each part: and this would require infinite time: and as infinite time has not elapsed, the infinity of space cannot be proved, and space is infinite.

Standing between these two contradictions, and unable to adopt either, like the proverbial mule between the haystacks, Kant succumbs by deciding that space is neither finite nor infinite, because it does not exist.

The coerciveness of this dilemma has not, on the whole, been taken seriously by the history of philosophy. Aristotle centuries before, had made these objections a commonplace. Kant's argumentation also must be discounted because he was motivated by the ulterior purpose of invalidating the-oretic reason. If he has agnostic intentions in proving these antinomies he can only secure agnostic results. It is for these



ulterior results then, that these arguments may be regarded as implements.

Some, as Jas. McCosh,<sup>33</sup> meet Kant's reasoning by positing the infinity of objective space as a fundamental intuition of the intellect, which easily removes the matter from the sphere of dialectic battle to the impregnable interior of the castle of intuition where the logic of disproof carries no destruction, for intuitions can be neither demonstrated nor refuted. One cannot, as the Electress of Brandenburg did with Leibnitz, ask the *why* of the *why*. This is as decisive a way of cutting the Gordian knot as Kant's. But many theologians and philosophers are not willing to so easily admit infinity of space into the confines of the castle of infallible intuitive truths as it would endanger the standing of other more recognized such truths.

Others have disputed the contradictoriness of Kant's propositions because they assume only one particular view as to the real nature of the space discussed, i.e. that it is emptiness.

Others writing *ad hominem*, like Lotze,<sup>34</sup> find the identical or at least similar contradictions in Kant's own reconstructed theory.

Others hold that the apparent conflict is due to the lack of proper formulation of the propositions.<sup>35</sup> While others, like Wundt,<sup>36</sup> call the whole dilemma, stated as it is, only a "Scheingefecht," i.e. an illusory antithesis.

Still others recognize "contrarys" in thought in the statement, but not "contradictories." That is, there is only the difficulty of reconciling propositions in a problem not fully understood, not that of harmonizing positive inconsistencies.

Some, recognizing an inconsistency take the attitude of Tertullian, "credo quia absurdum," rather than adopt Kant's skeptical solution.

Mathematicians solve the paradox by assuming as a fact

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<sup>33</sup> *Intuitions of the Mind*, p. 380 ff.

<sup>34</sup> *Metaphysics*, §. 106 ff.

<sup>35</sup> Calkins, *Persistent Problems of Philosophy*, p. 525.

<sup>36</sup> *System der Philosophie*, p. 352 ff.

the infinity of space, and then setting to work to clear away the difficulties their assumption involves.<sup>37</sup> The infinity of space can be clearly proved and known they say, when we consider that knowing it involves not a successive inventory of spaces *ad infinitum*, but only a grasp of the *series* of terms as a series. We may not be able to mentally attend to each point in the class of points that go to constitute a mathematical line. But we know the series of points, which, synthetically taken, constitute an easily and clearly apprehended line. In this way we may conceive infinity of space.

Further, Kant is found laboring under a confusion of terms and notions. He apparently is speaking of space in the empirical sense in his thesis that space is bounded or finite, for it is true that perceived space has parts so small that nothing smaller can be perceived: and these simple indivisibles may be said to be "parts," and space be said to be divisible into parts. But in the antithesis, or the statement of the infinity of space, he is speaking of conceptual or mathematical space, not empirical space. Each proposition is true when taken in the proper reference (i.e., either empirical or conceptual). Hence the antinomy dispels itself.<sup>38</sup>

There is no reason for asserting the subjectivity of space then, from supposed antinomies involved in its objectivity.

Secondly, is space then subjective because of its *a priori* nature? This is the only argument for its subjectivity given in Kant's Transcendental Aesthetik. "Space," he says, "represents no attribute of things in themselves . . . which would remain if all subjective conditions of perception were abstracted from. For neither absolute nor relative conditions of things can be perceived *a priori* . . ., in other words, before the existence of the things to which they belong." But, let it be marked, Kant only argues and proves that absolute and relative conditions of things cannot be perceived before the space-form to which they belong. What he actually proves is, that the space-consciousness is *not later* than the conscious-

<sup>37</sup> Vide R. B. Perry, *Present Tendencies of Philosophy*, p. 103.

<sup>38</sup> Vide Calkins, *op. cit.*, p. 522.

ness of perceived objects in space. He does not even prove the *priority* of the space-consciousness. Yet he seemed to argue from the priority of space-consciousness to the consciousness of the things perceived; and he *intends* and *desires* to argue from the *a priori* of the space-consciousness, from the necessity, universality and self-evidence of the space notion, to its subjectivity. He would have made a stronger case for himself had he argued directly from the *a priori* nature of the space-consciousness to its purely subjective nature,<sup>39</sup> as he apparently intended.

Thirdly, is space subjective, then, because of the apodictic (i.e. demonstrative) nature of geometrical propositions? From this assumed fact Kant argued to the *a priori* nature and thence to the pure subjectivity of the space notion. To this it is to be replied that (1) Kant seems to create Siamese twins out of his major premise and conclusion by making the conclusion the premise and the premise a conclusion at a certain point. That is, he argues from the *a priori* nature of the space-notion to the apodictic certainty of Euclidean geometrical axioms. His logic makes a round trip, going both ways at once. (2) Also it has been seen above that modern geometricians successfully deny the apodictic certainty of the Euclidian geometry on which Kant rests his reasoning. The finality of the axiom of parallel lines has been pronounced indemonstrable. It is therefore a fallacy to argue today from the apodictic nature of Euclidian axioms to the *a priori* nature and thence to the pure subjectivity of space.

Fourthly, is space *a priori*, and therefore purely subjective because we cannot conceive of the annihilation of space in our mind's eye while we can conceive the annihilation of bodies?<sup>40</sup> For those who are sufficiently sophisticated to attempt it the statement may prove to be true. When we sit in the dark and think body and then space away what is

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<sup>39</sup> Vide Miss Calkins, *op. cit.*, p. 521.

<sup>40</sup> "We can never represent to ourselves the non-existence of space, although we can easily conceive that there are no objects in space," *Trans. Aesthetik*, Chap. 2.

actually done is to first annihilate all bodies from space; and then we undertake to annihilate space itself. But if we are alert we will catch our trustless imaginations introducing another greater space from which we annihilate space. We annihilate space from space—called by Fullerton,<sup>41</sup> “the philosophic fallacy, *par excellence*.” To make this attempt is fatuous. But to erect a definite theory over the failure to accomplish the task we set ourselves is to do some logical skating on some very thin ice. Does the mere incapacity of our imaginative and conceptual power prove that the existence of space is a strict *necessity* of thought? Or, viewing the matter from the Spencerian empirical view point, is this impotence of thought not due to the fact that we have actually seen spatially extended bodies annihilated, for example, by burning or evaporation, but have never experienced the same of world-space? Careful reflection may confirm this surmise very definitely.

Further, if this reasoning makes space an *a priori* and therefore subjective form only, we might in the same fashion, assuming that space is subjective, imagine all human beings, including the one imagining, annihilated. But it would be inconceivable that all space was *eo ipso* annihilated simply because all space-containing human beings were annihilated. We irresistibly think of a containing space as left. So irresistible is it, in fact, that we can erect the conviction of the objectivity of space into the same status of necessary truth that Kant contends for the subjectivity of space.

Fifthly, a consideration *ad hominem* may be urged in the inconsistency displayed by Kant in refusing to regard the subjective space-notion as pointing to objective reality, when he regards the subjective notion of normal oughtness as pointing irresistibly to an objective source and reality. Moral “oughtness” is regarded as a fundamental and spontaneous conviction. No less fundamental and irresistible is the conviction of the reality of space, of time, and of cause. If ultimateness be an earmark of intuitions certainly the

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<sup>41</sup> *System of Metaphysics*, p. 167.

moral intuition has no handicap advantage over the latter three. Why Kant advances the moral intuition into the unique prerogative of possessing objective validity and denies this most natural right to its fellow intuitions of space and time is inscrutable.

Sixthly, a further *ad hominem* criticism may be preferred. *Ex hypothesi* space is all embracing: there is only one space, not many spaces: and space includes all external phenomenal objects.<sup>42</sup> But space also is alleged to be merely a subjective form of intuition. The absurd conclusion appears to be that all external objects are contained in the mental space-form of each human mind. The absurdity grows apace when it is further reflected that there are as many phenomenal worlds as human beings. And, *mirabile dictu*, as other human beings are phenomenal to my mind, my mind contains in itself all the universes which all the men present to my perception contain, as well as the phenomenal men themselves. And every man who perceives me contains in his own mind my space-world. To make this representation more consistent, Fichte gave relief by declaring all phenomena to be subjective also—a complete egoism or subjective idealism.

But Kant, could he speak for himself, would likely repudiate these conclusions by asserting that the reality of the phenomenal world was only a perceptual reality, not a reality in the sense of being an external, independent existence. Taking Kant's new representation then, nothing but thorough idealistic conclusions such as Berkley supported, can be drawn from them. If phenomenal existence is not real but subjective, then, it follows, were the race of thinking beings annihilated, the real world, and with it real space, would vanish. And our mental constitution would be for us an engine of deceit and falsehood.

Thus whether phenomenal space is regarded as real or as

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<sup>42</sup> "We can imagine one space only, and if we speak of many spaces, we mean parts only of one and the same space. Nor can these parts be considered as antecedent to the one and all embracing space," he says. Vide Girardeau, *op. cit.*, p. 509.



subjective, Kant leads himself into either contradictions or skepticism, or into both at once.

Seventhly, Herbert Spencer formulated another *reductio ad absurdum* which it would do well to represent here: "The subjectivity of (time and) space being irresistible as an inference, he (i.e. Kant) says, he then asserts it as a fact. But to receive it as a fact involves two impossibilities, the forming concepts of time and space as subjective forms, and the abolition of the concepts as objective realities. Kant's proposition is both unthinkable in itself and immediately involves an unthinkable consequence . . . . . Think of space, the thing, and think of self, that which is conscious. Having clearly realized them, put the two together, and conceive the one as property of the other. What results? Nothing but a conflict of two thoughts that cannot be united. It would be as practicable to imagine a round square."

Eightly, a forceful argument against Kant may be made from the *tendency* of his representations. For those who are led to believe in the pure *a priori* and subjectivity of space it is a very natural and even logical step to go one further and assert the subjectivity of all that which space contains—for after all, space and space-filling objects are not so widely dissociated. When space is made subjective in toto, says Trendelenburg, "the whole world-view dissipates itself into phenomenon, and phenomenon (*Erscheinung*) is not far removed from illusion (*Schein*)."<sup>43</sup> "To call in question," rightly says Dugald Stewart, "the proposition that space is necessarily existent and its annihilation is impossible, is to open a door to universal skepticism."<sup>44</sup>

<sup>43</sup> *Dissertations*, p. 597. Trendelenburg continues: "Wenn Zeit und Raum nur ausschliessend Subjectives sind, so drängt sich allenthalben diese Zuthat ein. Wie die Luftschicht zwischen den Augen und dem Gegenstande, wirft sie auf alles eine fremde Trübung, denn alles erscheint in Raum und Zeit die nur aus uns geboren sind. Wir erkennen nun nichts an sich; denn die Verstandesbegriffe haben (nach Kant) nur anwendung durch diese Formen der Anschauung und die Vernunftbegriffe suchen wieder nur eine Einheit für die Verstandeserkenntniss. Wie wollen wir uns von dem Zauberkreise lösen." *Logische Untersuchungen* b. I. c. V.

<sup>44</sup> McCosh, *Intuitions of the Human Mind*, p. 204, note.

Viewing the matter yet more generally, the space-intuition may be asserted, even as Kant believed, to be but one of a number of others imbedded radically in our nature. They all force themselves upon us as necessary and irresistible beliefs. Upon the objective certainty of these intuitions, upon the fundamentum of necessary truths, all deductive reasoning, all certainty of inference, all logic of any form, depend. Without the criterion of necessary beliefs for reasoning, intellectual life would be a flux of percepts and images, merely a "stream of consciousness" (to use an apt expression of James) within which there would exist no order or priority of ideas and no inference be possible, except of a tentative or hypothetical nature. If reasoning were possible at all, it would be a reasoning from "particulars to particulars" (as Mill calls it.) All problems of logic and epistemology would be solved not by ratiocination, but by the "*solvitur ambulando*" method. This is precisely the world-view of pyrrhonic skeptics, of utilitarians, and pragmatists. It is also a fruitful state for subjective idealism, and solipsism to flourish in. That denial of the space-intuition invites skepticism and destroys the foundations of logic follows from the fact that if one clearly fundamental intuition of our nature is repudiated, there is no justification for maintaining the other equally self-evident ones. Causality, time, a righteous Being, oughtness, and all other truths must go by the board with the space-form. The intuitional chain is no stronger than its weakest link.<sup>45</sup> To invalidate the space-intuition is but to anticipate the disintegration of the whole psychological structure of "first and fundamental truths."

Ninthly, Kant overlooks the fact that though space may be regarded as subjective and *a priori* it may be considered at one and the same time as objective. His proof of the subjectivity of space may be deemed valid. But this does not *disprove* the possibility of its being at the same time an objective reality of which the mental notion is only a subjective

<sup>45</sup> As Hodgson, *time and Space*, p. 123.

<sup>46</sup> Vide Baldwin's Dictionary, and McCosh, *Intuitions*, p. 205, note.

counterpart. It is true that Kant conceded that space was objective in the sense that the notion was valid of objects of possible experience. But this is merely a circumlocution. If space as something independent of experience is intended by the term then Kant repudiated it. Sir Wm. Hamilton believes that he corrects Kant in asserting the subjective-objective validity of space.<sup>47</sup> McCosh and Trendelenburg<sup>48</sup> contend for the same view. Unless our natural intuitive perceptions are a mere phantasmagoria this view of the matter must be asserted as the true one.

A difficult and more recent view of the subjectivity of space is that of Prof. B. P. Bowne. Of this the following issue will treat.

*Princeton.*

F. D. JENKINS.

*(To be continued)*

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<sup>47</sup> Only it is rather ambiguously defined: "We have a twofold cognition of space: (a) an *a priori* or native imagination of it in general, . . . and (b) under that an *a posteriori* or adventitious percept of it, in particular, as contingently apprehended in this or that complexus of sensations." "In this I venture a step . . . beyond Kant." (Reid's Works, p. 882.)

<sup>48</sup> In his controversy with Kuno Fischer. Vide Baldwin, *op. cit.*

## THE GENERAL ASSEMBLIES OF SCOTLAND

### OBSERVATIONS AND IMPRESSIONS

It was the privilege of the writer last May to attend for several days the sessions of the three General Assemblies of Scotland. These all synchronize, and meet annually in Edinburgh. By long usage, the opening of the Assemblies coincides with the "Victoria Holiday." The aspect of the city, therefore, with shops all closed and the suggestion of Sunday calm gives a fitting setting to the great event. Everybody, including laborers, beggars and children, knows that the General Assemblies are in session, and the stranger in the city is never disappointed when he asks man, woman or child, the shortest way to "where the tribes go up." The proximity of the two Assembly Halls makes it possible for a visitor to oscillate from one to the other so conveniently that he is able to keep in close touch with the proceedings of each. He only needs to scan the Agenda and Bulletins published daily to check up such subjects and debates as may interest or concern him. Benches are reserved for foreign representatives and at the Moderators' Dinners, somewhat formal functions, "distinguished visitors" find themselves by special invitation in the seats of the mighty. Generous provision is made in the Agenda for the "Reception of Delegates," and the good sense of visitors is the only limitation placed upon their responses to the Moderators' greetings.

### CHURCH OF SCOTLAND

There was a quickening of popular interest in the Assembly of the Church of Scotland this year. This was due to the fact that for the first time in modern history a commoner, a Labor Member of Parliament, who had been a working miner, was Lord High Commissioner of His Majesty. There was a novelty and piquancy in the situation that awakened curiosity. But it did more, for here was indication of the fact that in Great Britain "the old order changeth." Sir James Brown discharged his important duties

with marked dignity and felicity. The pomp and pageantry always attending the spectacular departure of the Lord High Commissioner from Holyrood Palace, and the triumphal procession along High Street to St. Giles, were not lacking in any details. This plain kirk ruling elder from Ayrshire, and his peasant wife (pictured in the newspapers as carrying a milk pail from the cow barn), must have chuckled to themselves at the trappings of royalty in which they had been caught by a sudden turn of the wheel of fortune. "From log cabin to White House" was as nothing to this.

There was not a single change in the time-honored services in St. Giles, nor in the opening ceremonies of the Assembly. The Assembly Hall was crowded, the galleries packed, and many were standing, when James Brown entered, and ascended the "Throne." For the first time in history, arrangements were effected to broadcast the proceedings, and microphones were in position at various strategic points in the Hall. Thus, so to speak, the walls were broken away, and tens of thousands of devout constituents in all parts of Scotland were enabled to "listen in."

The Lord High Commissioner brought the Greetings of the Crown, conveying the assurance of His Majesty of love for the old Kirk, and his determination to maintain the Presbyterian Church as the church of the people of Scotland. He conveyed as a token of royal interest in the missionary work of the Assembly a donation of two thousand pounds. Mr. Brown captured the Assembly the moment he began to speak. His words glowed with deep conviction and spiritual emotion. He revealed a surprising grasp of present conditions and needs in the church. He referred to changes too manifest to be overlooked or ignored; some of them for the better, many of them for the worse. He thought that "change and decay" need not be linked together, and that change and growth were better. There have been great changes in science, in methods of conducting business, in social service, in politics, and there is a feeling that there may be greater changes still. In certain moods we shrink



from change, in other moods we welcome it. I quote a few of his words in substance: "Fathers and brethren, have you ever considered that changes in time give new opportunities, that new occasions teach new duties? I refuse to believe that you of the Kirk of Scotland, the successors of Knox and Melville, and the spiritual inheritors of that long line of great churchmen and saints who fought for and won spiritual, political and social freedom, will shrink from the work that lies before you, or will fail to take occasion by the hand and prove yourselves worthy of your spiritual ancestry." He said further that he dared hope that there are gleams of a better day on the horizon. After many months, throughout a world of despair, confidence is slowly but surely gaining ground. "We in this great Assembly," he said, "can increase that confidence; and in that work I want the Church as a whole, but especially do I want that important section of her, the Kirk of Scotland, to take her rightful place. You can help in many directions. Believe me, your influence is still powerful. Step boldly forward and proclaim your faith and you will be the most powerful factor in bringing about the conditions that will give contentment and peace to a world that is longing and sighing for both." He went on urging his beloved church to realize their high calling in bringing to the world the only cure for all its ills. He closed by saying, "I have found for myself in the church my greatest happiness and best service."

The presence of James Brown in the Assembly was a new experience for him only so far as his position as Lord High Commissioner gave him a unique status. Often before had he been a member of the body, contributing to its deliberations the wisdom of a wide experience and the gifts of effective speech. He was, therefore, the more cordially welcomed, not only because he was a fellow countryman, deeply and intimately identified with the daily life and interests of the Scotch people, but also, and chiefly, because he had been for many years a faithful ruling elder of the church.

The Moderator, Dr. Cathels, in responding to the eloquent

address from the "Throne," said in effect, that he believed profoundly that there never had been a time when the call to the Christian church was more imperative than it is today, or when the message of the Gospel was a more urgent necessity for all men. Personal, social, political and industrial problems were dependent for their solution upon the Church, the Body of Christ. It should incarnate the spirit of the Saviour and make concrete to the world our Lord's love and and grace and power to save from sin, not only the individual but also the nation and the world.

The two things that most engaged the Assembly, and enlisted the deepest concern, were those of Foreign Missions or World Evangelization, and of Union of all the Scottish Presbyterian Churches. Dr. Ogilvie, the Convener of the Committee on Foreign Missions, pointed out that it was just one hundred years on this very date that the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, after long wavering, decided to "hoist the standard of the Lord, and to march forward under His flag to the furthest points of the earth." He asked the Assembly to be true to the memories this day brought, to be true to their fathers, and to do for this world today what the fathers had the courage to do for theirs. Foreign Missions, he urged, are not a scheme of the church; on the contrary they are the very spirit of Christ, the only hope of the world, its very life; and only as the church lost her life in such loyalty to the risen Lord and Saviour could she save herself. There was one sobering aspect in the report among many that were exalting in the widest sense. The last Assembly had asked for more doctors, teachers, professors. They had got doctors, teachers, professors, but they were still waiting for ministers. It seemed alarmingly evident that among students for the ministry there were lacking the consciousness of the great challenging needs of the world, and the driving force within of deep conviction of the fundamentals of the Christian faith.

In regard to the burning question of Union, under discussion since 1908, it can be said that there seemed to be in the

Assembly a unanimous and hearty approval of the steps already taken toward the goal. For many years Dr. John White of Glasgow has devoted himself, time and talents, to this arduous and delicate task, as Convener of the Committee. His report was adopted without a dissenting voice, the whole Assembly rising in enthusiastic applause.

The terms of the Agreement will enable the Bill dealing with the temporalities of the church to be treated by Parliament as an agreed measure so far as the Committee on Property and Endowments and the "heritors" are concerned. In the ecclesiastical history of Scotland, this is an event of the first magnitude, and the State has reason to congratulate the Church on the wisdom and good will which have guided their counsels. The problem of reconciling the conflicting interests was one of the most difficult and baffling which has ever emerged in the history of the Church of Scotland. The Agreement reached is a triumph of patience and prayer. The details involved are of such a technical nature that Presbyterians on this side of the ocean are not likely either to appreciate or understand them. The United Free Church from the beginning of negotiations has demanded as an absolute condition of reunion, that the Church of Scotland must consent to hold its property on the same tenure as the United Free Church. It is not of much concern whether the funds are held, in the adjustment with the State, in consols or in feu-duties, or in bonds. It is vital, however, that the Church of Scotland be as free to deal with its funds as the United Free Church is. It is in order to meet this requirement that the Teinds Court, under the pending Agreement, will straightway cease to function; the unexhausted teinds will be dealt with automatically, and many difficult and perplexing questions will be thus swept out of the way. It should be said, before dismissing the matter here, that the United Free Church has throughout the history of this agitation refused to intermeddle with the terms that the Church of Scotland might make with the State. It has pursued a plain and consistent policy of laying down and maintaining certain in-

flexible principles that have been consistently held since the Disruption in 1843. If and when these vital principles upon which the United Free Church has stood from the beginning are recognized and safeguarded, a Union will probably be consummated. In the debate in the United Free Church Assembly, there was difference of opinion as to whether the law now proposed will meet these unalterable conditions; but resolutions continuing their Committee on Church Union, and approving the action so far taken were adopted by an overwhelming majority.

An interesting episode in the sessions of the Assembly was an address by Field-Marshal Earl Haig, a ruling elder in St. Colomba's, Pont Street, London. He came to the Assembly as a representative of the Church of Scotland in England. It has been said that Scottish Churches in England are "like oases in a howling wilderness." Field-Marshal Haig spoke with marked modesty but with much earnestness. He stood before the Assembly dressed in civilian's clothes and with nothing to mark his military prestige. He referred to the difficulty of the Scotch Church of England in holding true to their faith Scottish men and women who come to live in London and other parts of England. With absence from Scotland, the passionate devotion of the Scotchman for the simple and noble forms of the home church was in danger of abatement. The Marshal said he thanked God for St. Colomba's in London. Here he had worshiped as opportunity allowed during the period when he was serving his country in a post of peculiar honor and responsibility. It was his great joy from time to time to leave the front long enough to spend a Sunday in London and worship in the place which was to him the very gate of heaven. Here more than elsewhere he could find strength for duty. Since the close of the war a private life allowed him to give more time and endeavor to the church which he loved. The Assembly rose to its feet and greeted the Field-Marshal with loud and prolonged applause.

## UNITED FREE CHURCH

At the impressive services connected with the opening, the Assembly Hall was crowded to the doors. The area was filled with members, while the galleries were packed to overflowing by visitors. A goodly number were content to stand throughout the proceedings. The retiring Moderator, Principal Cairns, preached a sermon which struck the keynote of the Assembly. He stressed the need in the modern world of faith—the consciousness of God. To many in our land, perhaps not a few in our churches, it would make no serious, not to say vital, difference, if God were finally shown to have no real existence, no sovereign right or power. Men and nations are living just as if God did not exist, and personal, social, economic and national degeneration has been the result. A world without God must be a world filled with fear and hate. The birth in the world today of a new faith is the one thing that can restore sanity, order and love. The gospel message is the panacea. Here is eternal truth, based it is true on historic facts, but pulsating only through the power of a living faith in eternal verities. Every other remedy has failed. There is but one cure and we are, too many of us, diluting or declining to apply the remedy.

It is customary for the retiring Moderator to nominate his successor, and Principal Cairns seemed to voice the unanimous desire of the Assembly when he submitted the name of Dr. Alexander S. Inch, of Dunbarton. He characterized Dr. Inch as a man of large heart, much experience and wisdom. In the dark days of the war he had risen to a great emergency and, though himself sorely wounded, had given healing to the wounds of others. The election was by acclamation.

Upon taking the chair, Dr. Inch declared that he was not conscious of possessing a solitary qualification for so exalted an office. He had no distinction in learning, no ecclesiastical skill, no social prestige; he was just an ordinary working minister who had never pretended to be anything else. He took it for granted that he was made Moderator because the Assembly wished in this way to express their good will not



to him personally, but to the class which he represented—the rank and file of the ministry, the army of toilers, spending their lives, year in and year out, in rural parishes, provincial towns and villages, or in industrial centers, with nothing to take them out of the wear and tear of hard work. These men were faithfully fulfilling what was after all the church's main function—the cure of souls. No work could be greater or nobler.

It was reassuring to hear Dr. Inch say in another connection, that his close intimacy and long experience with the working classes had convinced him that those are mistaken who suppose that the ranks of manual laborers are "mostly Red," in the sense of being extreme, violent and unreasonable. There is undoubtedly "a good deal of wild-fire about," but the bulk of the laboring people are "white, pure white." He thought that the heart of the working classes is sound and loyal. Some expressed afterwards privately the opinion that the statements of Dr. Inch on this subject should be taken with certain reservations and qualifications. It was said that so-called laboring people, like many others, have not recovered mental and economic balance since the war. There is still much "shell-shock."

The College Committee's Report makes interesting reading. There are 110 students in the three Colleges (Theological Seminaries) of the church, in the proportion of 55 at Glasgow, 41 at Edinburgh and 14 at Aberdeen. This is still far behind the numbers before the war, and barely provides for the filling up of vacancies in the home ministry, without leaving a margin for the vast and expanding missionary obligations of the church, or for the increasing demand in the Dominions. The quality is high, it was never so high, but the quantity is far below the urgent needs of the church. A sad note in the report was the announcement of Dr. Stalker's resignation of his chair of Church History in Aberdeen. His distinguished service stretches over a period of fifty years, and extends to almost every sphere of Christian activity. He will be followed in his retirement by the rev-

erent and grateful admiration of his students. Dr. A. F. Findlay, Linlithgow, was elected to succeed Dr. Stalker in the chair of Church History.

Foreign Missions held as large a place in this Assembly as in that of the Church of Scotland. The Report of the Convener of the Committee, Dr. Forgan of Edinburgh, revealed the fact (though no comparison was made) that the United Free Church raises a budget for World Evangelization that more than doubles that of the Church of Scotland. It is evident that the business of going into all the world to preach the Gospel is considered by this church not only as a part of its work but as indeed what is most essential and vital in its obedience to the risen Christ. The church evidently begins to realize that it is preeminently a missionary society. The sessions of the Assembly in which the subject was considered were crowded to capacity, and the evening mass meeting, a new feature, packed the Assembly Hall, making it necessary to hold an overflow meeting in an adjacent church. What was once regarded as the dullest of routine business in the Assembly, now holds the first place in importance and magnetic drawing power. A thrilling feature of these meetings were the addresses by returned missionaries, who were listened to with rapt attention. These men and women from the foreign field showed themselves "masters of assemblies." Every address was short, timely, pungent, informing and inspiring. Rev. Frank Ashcroft, a member of the Committee, recently returned from a tour of the African Missions, startled the audience when he said, "that the greatest movement in the world is the unmistakable trend toward Christianity on the part of the African tribes. It is extraordinary to find town after town, and village after village, dominated by Christianity. It is no longer 'darkest Africa,' but 'brightest Africa,' and we have not long to wait to see great Christian communities covering that land."

It is a custom in the Assembly that the Moderator give an address as the closing event of the session—a practice well worth imitation in our own Assembly. It is a summing up of

the work accomplished and a summons to put into effect the information and inspiration received. Dr. Inch discharged this function admirably well. After briefly reviewing the findings of the Assembly and urging loyalty and union in entering upon the new year, he intimated that it might be truly said of the Assembly that their conclusions were "what seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us." He referred especially to the action taken looking to union of the great Churches of Scotland, saying, "We have taken another step towards union; it is a glorious vision that beckons us on—a Church in Scotland united, national, free." Of this consummation he declared that Professor Rainy long before had caught the inspiration when he said of it, "It is something to make the heart leap."

In closing words, the Moderator urged the duty of pastoral evangelism as the present need of the church. He disparaged the custom of bringing in professional evangelists. He said, however, there was one signal exception to this in the case of Mr. Moody. It is now fifty years since the great revival in Scotland, in which Moody and Sankey had been used by the Spirit of God as honored instruments. He could recall even in this moment the tone of Sankey's voice in "Jesus of Nazareth Passeth By." That revival was a new Pentecost to Scotland and could be only the work of the Holy Ghost. There was nothing meretricious in Moody's preaching, no exhibition of logical ability, no sensationalism; there was only the power of God. Moody's words were the words of God and of an undiluted Gospel. He added, "I sometimes think that it is a real loss to the present generation that they have never passed through a movement like that. Nothing gives edge to spiritual experience like a genuine revival of pure and undefiled religion. For such a coming of the Holy Ghost, let us all pray and wait and work."

#### THE FREE CHURCH

This is the Assembly of the Church popularly known as "The Wee Free." It is constituted of about fifty ministers

and elders, representing twelve Presbyteries and a constituency of less than one hundred thousand souls. There is a group of not more than one hundred pastors in the denomination. This Assembly is composed of that contingent of the Free Church that refused to merge when, in 1900, that Church and the United Presbyterian Church became one under the name of "The United Free Church." A considerable share of the endowment of the old Free Church was allotted, by order of the civil courts, to this body, constituting only a minute remnant of those who still held to the Revolution Settlement formula of 1711 and to the Free Church Declaration of 1846. Both of these instruments pledged the subscribers to the Confession of Faith. The Free Church now claims to be the only legitimate successor of the noble army of covenanters who wrote their names in blood to the Covenant. They believe that the Christian church should be modeled after the Apostolic church, and that the Bible is the only charter of a true organization. They believe the Bible to be the infallible and errorless authority in all matters of faith and practice. They accept without reservation the system of faith enshrined in the Confession of Faith, which they hold to be the framework of the teaching of Holy Scripture.

Among the prominent men representing the Free Church in the Assembly were Rev. Professor D. Maclean and Rev. Professor J. R. Mackay, both of Edinburgh; Rev. John Macleod of Inverness; and among the elders, Sir James Simpson, Mr. Smith Donald and W. R. P. Sinclair of Edinburgh, and John McDonald and Archibald McLage of Glasgow.

At the opening of the Assembly, a stirring sermon was delivered by the retiring Moderator, Dr. George Mackay, Fearn, from the text, Micah v. 7, "And the remnant of Jacob shall be in the midst of many people as a dew from the Lord." "Though the church is a remnant or a small body among the people of the earth, it is," he said, "able to exercise a great influence. It is for the members to consider the importance of the position of the church and to strive with

all their power that it may have larger and richer supplies of grace and be increasingly the light of the world and the salt of the earth. It is for the church to go forth to the great work of conquering the world for Christ."

After the sermon, the retiring Moderator announced that he had great pleasure in nominating to the highest honor in the Free Church the Rev. Kenneth Cameron, the minister of Stornoway, whom he commended to the Assembly as a man whose preaching was of the type which had become almost extinct; yet his scholarly accuracy and freshness of message appealed to a twentieth century audience. In the councils of the church his independent mind and well-balanced judgment rendered him a tower of strength. The election was by acclamation.

The new Moderator addressed the Assembly on "Our Age, Its Needs, and Our Duty as a Church Thereto." His grasp of present-day problems revealed that the words in which Dr. Mackay had introduced him had not exaggerated the intellectual and spiritual qualities of Mr. Cameron.

The Committee on the Welfare of Youth and Publication, the Rev. R. M. Knox, St. Colomba, Edinburgh, Convener, reported that it was a proof of the remarkable vigor and vitality of the Free Church that it possessed a great and growing constituency of intelligent and eager young life. The magazines of the church continued to maintain their fine spiritual tone and high level of efficiency. He emphasized the need for religious instruction in the schools throughout the country.

The Sustentation, Foreign Missions, and Training for the Ministry Committees all reported a gratifying increase in gifts to the several causes represented in the reports. The congregations had done splendidly during the year, despite the unemployment that had prevailed. The average stipend of their ministers amounts now to £246, only a little short of the goal of £300 which had been set. It was hoped that the full standard would be attained the current year.

The report on the Alliance of Reformed Churches through-



out the World holding the Presbyterian System was listened to with marked interest, and the Assembly voted to continue its connection with the Alliance and to send its quota of representatives to the next meeting in Cardiff, Wales.

The Committee on the Training of Ministers reported that thirty-nine students were now undergoing training for the ministry. This year five young men had finished their course in the Divinity Hall. It was indicated as a subject for congratulation that the church was to have among its students next session a young man from Czechoslovakia for whom a bursary had been provided. It was deemed a peculiar honor to have a representative from the land of John Huss.

The Committee on Public Questions and Claim Rights, Rev. John MacLeod, Inverness, Convener, stated that public questions had been placed in the report in three divisions—The Lambeth Policy, Socialism and The League of Nations. Dr. MacLeod referred to "the significance of the intrigue which had come to light between Canterbury and Rome." The ideal state of things is not that there should be "a big roof over a divided family. A divided family is not a happy thing. While it is true that the Church of God is not in a normal condition when deep-seated division separates its members from one another, and while unity in the faith is the ideal state of things, yet it should not be forgotten that the unity that is to be sought after by earnest prayer and every possible effort is a unity in the knowledge of the truth, its maintenance and proclamation; that no goal short of that should satisfy the endeavor of those who have learned to sit at the footstool of Christ Jesus and His Apostles. The truth proclaimed should be the full-orbed truth to which the witness of the Apostles has brought them face to face."

In the course of discussion on Claim of Rights, Rev. John Calder, Perth and Scone, said: "The church is established and entitled to enjoy its emoluments only so long as it is not detached from the Act of 1690. The Confession of Faith, the public and avowed confession of the church, is the stand-

ard of faith. The Free Church stands by the Claim of Rights and maintains itself as the heir of the Church of the Revolution and the Disruption. It is the legitimate heir in law to all that the claim of continuity carries with it and this was certified by the judgment of the House of Lords in 1904. Numbers do not matter. The Free Church, he admitted, had been indeed a small minority, but its strength lay in the fact that it had never resiled from the terms of the historic statutes. That is where it stands today. It is not composed of dissenters, and revolutionaries. It is patriotic, it loves its testimony, it loves the ancient church of Scotland. It could never renounce its heritage. It dare not prove faithless to the trust handed down to it by the mighty dead. It dare not transmit to the generation coming afterwards anything less than the whole unbroken truth of God.

In the usual closing address, the Moderator after reviewing the findings of the Assembly said that the past year has brought the assurance that their labors have not been in vain in the Lord. Accessions have been large beyond all their hopes. The professors of the college are men devoted to duty and loyal to the Word of God. Activities in the foreign field have increased, and their home mission operations have been extended. He hoped that the Church would not be elated by this progress, but remember that there was yet much land to be possessed. In any advance they had been allowed to make the past year, they were but true to the glowing traditions of the Free Church since 1843. Another ground for gratitude was mentioned in the fact that their Church stood without equivocation for the whole Bible, its inspiration and inerrancy. The position of their Church in this respect was being vindicated more and more. The canons of higher criticism were being discredited, and the age was growing weary of uncertainty, and longing for what was stable, healthy and definite, rather than the miasma of doubt and lack of solidity that formerly had passed muster. Who could calculate the harm that the findings of the higher critics have done at home and abroad? We were paying a heavy penalty for the

place German thoughts and ways had taken us to. The patient labors of explorers and excavators who had been working among the ruins of what had once been great eastern cities of antiquity were bringing to light much that was stabilizing. Tablets and monuments were testifying to the truth which the Church had held from the beginning. He believed that the old paths that had been so full of blessing in other days would be found again by those who had wandered far afield. They were no longer regarded as once they were, antiquated and fossilized. What was needed was unflinching faith in the infallibility of God's Word, for scholarship would inevitably confirm the faith of their fathers and the faith which they themselves lived and for which they were ready to die.

The closing portion of the address was devoted to a discussion of present day conditions. Factious expedients, he said, were being tried to bring the people into the churches. These methods instead of gripping and satisfying had a soporific effect, and left a greater void. The days to come would test the Free Church and put it on its mettle. Courage, grace and discrimination would be needed to withstand the blandishments and glamour of this popular union movement. The Free Church must keep steady during the rush of enthusiasm for amalgamation and absorption. The triumphant shout of their opponents would declare the Free Church delinquent in not joining the procession. Days would come of agonizing experiences for all who loved the Word and believed it. Too often church movements had been political rather than religious, the methods of the world, rather than those of the Word. In the present impulse there was no steadiness of outlook, no loyal and tender regard for what the fathers deemed so vital, and no purpose or desire to conserve what had given stability and security for so many generations. He expressed the conviction that since their Church was giving united expression to the things that could not be moved, they would not be open to the demands of the majority where even the irreducible minimum of truth would be held with the greatest laxity, and almost anyone, be his creed

what it might, could find a resting place within the folds of other Presbyterian churches.

### IMPRESSIONS

It would seem to the writer a mistake to close these observations without making a clear and distinct reference to the theological status of these three units in Scotch Presbyterianism.

In the two larger Assemblies, nothing emerged in the course of business or discussion, so far as is known to the writer, to indicate the fact that the Church of Christ throughout the world is facing an issue which should not and cannot be ignored. A line is distinctly drawn today between those who believe in a supernatural and authoritative revelation in Holy Scripture, and those who deny this. Conversations with leaders in the two greater Churches of Scotland gave the impression that there is in these bodies at present the disposition, and perhaps the purpose, to laugh out of court all theological differences, if not indeed to register a verdict in favor of the rationalistic or radical critic. At all events, subordinating questions of doctrine or definition, the demand is clamant for "life and work." Such a position, so far as it implies emphasis upon Christian experience and propaganda, does not present a line of cleavage between the conservative and the liberal. The most resolute defenders of the supernatural deposit of faith are in fullest accord with those who urge that "life and work" should be stressed. Vital religion will always concern itself with living and working, and this has in no sense or degree been overlooked or minimized by those who have been called Fundamentalists—a term which has acquired a misleading connotation. The difference between the two parties in the church has nothing to do with "life and work," both of which manifestations of true Christianity must hold a prominent place in the witness and service of the Church of Christ. The question at issue is this: "Have we, or have we not, a religion founded on facts; is there, or is there not, a norm of infallible authority in the written

Word of God?" The Presbyterian Church is Protestant, and has from the beginning registered its protest against rationalism, falsely so called, quite as much as against the Papacy. In a true and important sense, Protestantism in general, and the Presbyterian Church of Scotland in particular, has always not only maintained but defended the position that there is an essential place for reason in religion. The fact that education, higher education, the highest education, has been the handmaid of this Church is a sufficient answer to those who affirm that thinking and scholarly criticism are receiving no hospitality in the conservative Presbyterian Church. But there is a limit to what reason can do in the sphere of faith. If the church has an immediate and infallibly inspired revelation from God, it will, in the nature of the case, transcend reason. "The wisdom of this world is foolishness with God," and the verities of faith are "hidden from the wise and prudent, and revealed unto babes." Christian "life and work" will not survive the fall of supernaturalism. Take away the note of supernaturalism from the church and the whole superstructure must fall. We have, or have not, a Gospel which is "good news." The Gospel rests upon the basis of the facts revealed in the Bible. The central fact is the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ, His miraculous birth, His supernatural life and works, His supernatural vicarious atonement for sin. Has this "good news" a historic basis or not? Are the Gospels reliable records, or are they fictitious so far as they reveal a supernatural Christ? The church cannot ignore or subordinate a question so vital, and dry rot will inevitably result from ceasing to remonstrate against prevalent rationalism in the church. The triumph of so-called Modernism will certainly mean the cutting of the tap root of initiative and power in spreading the Gospel.

It was, therefore, refreshing and reassuring to find that one unit in the Scotch Church is quite conscious of the fact that Christianity stands at the parting of the ways. The Free Church's utterances rang true to what is vital in our holy religion. Though small in numbers and feeble in resources,



this noble body of Christian believers maintains the historic position and stands for the continuity of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland by witnessing to the unchanging truth of God as revealed in Holy Scripture. Here are found those who still believe in a supernatural Christianity and all of us who stand for this have in them loyal and steadfast allies. In the reports respecting the several lines of Christian activity in the Free Church, there was evident no failure to stress "life and work;" but there was on all sides indicated an inflexible purpose to maintain steadfastly the faith of their fathers, "the faith once delivered to the saints."

In conclusion the writer is glad to note the fact that his observations and impressions during a recent visit to many Reformed Churches of Europe brought the cheering assurance that these Churches are almost without exception standing steadfastly by the evangelical faith of their illustrious and saintly founders. Particularly noticeable was this in the case of Hungary, Greece and Czechoslovakia, not to mention others. In these noble bodies of Reformed Christians there stand out in prominence great leaders who are holding fast to the moorings of their historic faith, unmoved by the tide of rationalism that once threatened to submerge the churches of eastern and southeastern Europe. There can be no doubt in the mind of the writer that a similar reaction must soon become general throughout the Christian world. Based on the "Rock of Ages," the supernatural religion of our infallible Bible will stand against all the assaults of unbelief.

*Princeton.*

SYLVESTER WOODBRIDGE BEACH.

# REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

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## PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE

*The Psychology of Christian Life and Behaviour.* By W. S. BRUCE, D.D.  
Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1923.

This book is written to help parents, teachers, Christian workers and preachers in their daily duties by explaining the bearings of the "newer" Psychology upon "all" sides of the Christian life. In twenty-five chapters it discusses the topics usually treated by present day treatises on the psychology of religion—definition and history of the term; the religion of primitive races, of children, and of adolescents; the psychology of conversion, crowds, prayer, saints, faith, religious emotions, religious types, sects, religious training, genius, evangelism, auto-suggestion, industry, and the future life. The style is good, and the book is not only interesting and instructive in content, but easy and pleasant to read, since the numbered paragraphs into which each chapter is divided form units each complete in itself, so that even the busy man who reads books by dipping in here and there may do so in the volume before us and find his reward. All things considered Dr. Bruce has given us a treatise that will serve beginners as a stimulating and entertaining introduction to the fascinating and difficult study of religious psychology.

Nevertheless, the student who is ready to go beyond the rudiments of the science will not, in our opinion, find here any very thoroughgoing and painstaking original contribution to psychology of religion. The author writes as one who has read widely on the subject and who can confirm the greater facts by his own unsystematized personal observation and experience, but not as one who has devoted to his topic the minute and systematic analysis needed if original contributions are to be made to the store of what men know already about the psychology of religious experience. There are to be sure many well phrased explanations, many exceedingly apt quotations (cf. pp. 102, 112, 132, 141, 166, and 298), and many felicitous illustrations, but there is little penetrating investigation of the various kinds of religious situations, and there is much selection and compilation of what others have already discovered—and expressed better. We do not think that the author distinguishes clearly enough the object treated by the psychology of religion, and for this reason he gives us much material that is properly speaking not psychological at all. If he had made the proper distinction, he would not have attempted to find in religious psychology the test of religious truth (p. 184), nor would he have asserted that the goal of the Christian life is a unified experience of intellect, emotion and will, which makes us independent of external authority, nor would he have fallen into the mistake of implying that psychology is a cure for all the ills that man's flesh and spirit are heir to. The truth is that the field of psychology of religion is the

subjective side of our experience, that its main function is descriptive, and that as such it cannot establish norms of validity in any sphere.

Lincoln University, Pa.

GEORGE JOHNSON.

*Outlines of a Philosophy of Life.* By ALBAN G. WIDGERY, M.A., Lecturer in the Philosophy of Religion in the University of Cambridge; formerly Professor of Philosophy, Baroda. London: Williams and Norgate. 1923. Pp. xxiv, 318.

It is said that Plato was once invited to Syracuse to discuss philosophy with the tyrants, Dion and Dionysius the younger. His visit was short, and the surmise is that what he sought to impart was not to the liking of his royal hosts. Professor Widgery's experience has been more fortunate. The Maharajah Gaekwar of Baroda invited our author to converse with him on philosophy. It was soon found that like Dion and Dionysius his Highness was not interested in the technical problems of metaphysics, but in the philosophical consideration of general culture and practical life. Unlike Plato who abandoned the task and returned to Athens to write the *Meno*, Professor Widgery yielded to the Maharajah's desires and then returned to write these *Outlines of a Philosophy of Life*.

Assuming as valid the definition of the "good" life accepted by enlightened Western commonsense, our author enumerates the various kinds of values which such a life should include and some of the relations between them. "Goods" are experiences which attract, and which we would undoubtedly preserve, repeat or continue. "Bads" are experiences that repel, which we would undoubtedly get rid of and not repeat. The thought at once arises in connection with such definitions, "whose" are the experiences here mentioned, and who are the "we" our author has in mind? The answer might conceivably have an important bearing on the definition of "goods" and "bads," but none is given, and the discussion proceeds at once to the consideration of values, which are all goods and bads, and which divide into intrinsic values, or those which are good or bad in themselves considered, and extrinsic, which are good or bad by reason of their relation to the intrinsic. Further, there are five more or less clearly marked sides of life, and this gives a five-fold division of values: Physical, Intellectual, Aesthetic, Moral, and Religious, to each of which a chapter is devoted.

Professor Widgery's book is readable and interesting. Yet it is open to question whether the method adopted is adapted to the needs of the Occidental reader. The Maharajah doubtless wanted an exposition of average enlightened Western opinion concerning life's values, and the author has done admirably what was expected of him. But we men of the West, even the dullest of us, wish more than this. If we are to be helped, we must have, not a statement that assumes the truth of what the average man thinks, but an analysis and a criticism in the light of some ideal with a view to betterment. It is this that is lacking in Professor Widgery's volume. By way of illustration consider his discussion of religious values. All religious goods and bads are states of conscious-

ness, and therefore are only to be known by experiencing them. Since they are the experiences of a particular person at a particular time, they are unique, positive, and deeply personal. When analyzed they are found to have a cognitive, emotional and volitional element. All this is very psychological, and very much in the fashion of a prevailing English *nuance* in philosophy, but—where does it get us? Would not Professor Widgery have done better by following Plato and insisting on a little more metaphysics even though his Highness had demurred more strongly than he did?

*Lincoln University, Pa.*

GEORGE JOHNSON.

*Imperialistic Religion and the Religion of Democracy: A Study in Social Psychology.* By WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN, PH.D., D.D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1923. Pp. 218, Preface, and Index.

The substance of this book was delivered as the Martha Upton Lectures in Religion for 1922 at Manchester College, Oxford. It deals with the problem of classification in religion. In the course of his work as professor of systematic theology in Union Theological Seminary (New York), supplemented by his experience in connection with the Great War—in which it was his task to try to get many different kinds of Christians to work together—Dr. Brown has come to the conclusion that, both from the viewpoint of scientific accuracy and practical efficiency, a new classification of religion is urgently needed.

Dr. Brown, while holding that the problem of Revelation is central to the problem of all religion inasmuch as all religion assumes that "God has revealed himself in a permanent and authoritative way," rejects not only the evolutionary or rather Hegelian explanation of religious differences, according to which the different religions are steps in the development of one all-embracing religion, but also the older and more widely accepted explanation that explains religious differences by the contrast between true and false religion. He also rejects the more recent classification of religions proposed by Harnack, Sabatier and Troeltsch on the ground that they take their departure too exclusively from historic Christianity which they seek to interpret. "We need," he says, "a principle of classification which shall deal with religion as a whole, not simply with individual aspects or manifestations of religion,—a principle which shall interpret to us the permanent and recurrent types of *social* religion which not only cut across the historic religions, but persist within each historical religion,—a principle, finally, which will help us to account for existing differences and deal with them intelligently." Dr. Brown finds this principle not in history but in psychology, more particularly in the various attitudes that men assume towards organized society. And inasmuch as there are but three possible attitudes toward organized society—accept it, reject it, or try to improve it—there are three distinctive types of religious experience that give rise to institutions appropriate to their genius. "They are all social forms of religion, wholes, not parts; religions, not simply types of religious experience. They recur in every age and cut across the great complexes

we call the historic religions. They have as yet no recognized names. For the purpose of this discussion we shall call them *imperialism*, *individualism*, and *democracy*. By imperialism we shall understand a type of religion, the representatives of which believe that they serve God best when they submit to the control of some existing institution whose supremacy in the world they identify with the triumph of God's will. By individualism we shall understand a type of religion whose representatives despair of satisfaction through any existing institution, and find solace in immediate communion of the soul and God. By democracy we shall understand a type of religion the representatives of which are convinced that they serve God best when they discover His presence in other persons and unite with them in the progressive realization of the ideal social order which it is God's purpose to establish on earth through the free coöperation of men" (pp. 27-28).

While Dr. Brown finds his principle of classification in man's attitude toward some existing institution we are not to suppose that this institution is necessarily a Church. Hence not only Islamism and Roman Catholicism but the religion of the State as illustrated by modern Japan and Germany and Revolutionary Socialism are cited as examples of imperialistic religion. Hence also we are told not only that democratic religion finds illustration within the Churches—in the new theology, the modern conception of missions, and in the movement for Christian unity—but also in the fields of science, education, philanthropy, industry, and politics outside the Churches. None the less Dr. Brown is concerned primarily with men's attitudes towards religious organizations, and in one place he tells us that "imperialism, individualism, and democracy are either forms of churchly religion, or can only be understood as a protest against it" (p. 55).

Dr. Brown believes that God is and that God speaks to men. We are glad to note also that, while he advocates a democratic religion he is not the advocate of a finite God. "The God of democracy," he writes, "is in a true sense comrade, entering by sympathy into each human life, and helping it to its appropriate goal; but He is a comrade who is adequate to every changing need, and who asks of those to whom His help is daily extended this only, that they in their turn should become helpers of others." It is his desire to do justice to the conception of divine revelation, perhaps, as much as anything else that separates Dr. Brown's study of social psychology from that of Prof. A. B. Wolfe in *Conservatism, Radicalism and Scientific Method*. Both deal with the attitude of men to society and the institutions it creates; both group mankind according to the attitudes they assume toward these institutions; but while the former treats God as an objective reality who makes known His purposes to men, the latter treats the whole God-idea as mere illusion. Apart from this fundamental difference there is a marked similarity between the two books. The conception or revelation plays a large part in Dr. Brown's classification. The imperialist believes that God speaks through some existing institution; the individualist believes that He speaks di-



rectly to the individual; the democrat believes that He speaks to other individuals as well and that the totality of His message can be obtained only by taking into consideration what He says to men generally. "All democrats," we are told, "believe that the way to know God is to understand men, and the way to understand men is to trust the best that is in them." The following passage indicates the place Dr. Brown assigns to divine revelation in his classification of religions—"The imperialist does not expect to receive anything helpful from those who are outside the Church because of his conviction that in matters affecting man's salvation God has chosen to speak only through the Church. The individualist expects no help from men of differing experience because he is convinced that the message he has received is God's final word to him. But the consistent democrat believes that it is God's nature to impart Himself freely to all kinds of people, and he expects messages from God to come through uncongenial or unpromising people, whose insight differs from his own" (p. 150). In this connection it may be noted that according to Dr. Brown the recognition of external authority is one of the distinctive marks of the imperialist.

It does not seem to us that Dr. Brown's proposed classification has much to commend it either as an explanation of the differences between the historic religions or of the differences within these religions. No doubt there is a real difference between the imperialist, individualist, and democrat, but the difference is relative rather than absolute. To use Dr. Brown's own words, "there is something of the imperialist in each one of us, something of the individualist, something of the democrat." This is true, it seems to us, of every Christian. It is particularly true, it seems to us, of every Calvinist, so that, if Dr. Brown only took seriously the Creed that he publicly confesses, we are sure he would never have supposed that a man must choose between being an imperialist, individualist or democrat. At the best this new classification does not seem to us any more discriminating or illuminating than the familiar one between rational, mystical, and ethical religions. Moreover, it seems to us, that in the nature of the case psychology is incapable of furnishing a solution of the problem of classifying religions. It fails to provide us with a standard by which we may intelligently discriminate between the different religions. Dr. Brown finds such a standard in the capacity of a religion to "enlarge and enrich the life of those who embrace it without limiting the possibility of a similar enlargement and enrichment of life in other persons." Men are by no means agreed, however, as to what constitutes the most desirable kind of life. Shall we agree with Christ or with Nietzsche? Psychology of itself can give no final answer to the question. As Bavinck says, "Pragmatism, which only takes into account empirical phenomena, is nominalistic in principle and becomes relativistic in result."

The fatal defect of Dr. Brown's classification of religions, from a Christian point of view, is that it erases the dividing-lines between Christianity and other religions. Dr. Brown no doubt believes in the superiority of Christianity to other religions, that it has a creative ele-

ment in the personality of its founder of unequaled significance, that it releases the creative energies of men in an unsurpassed way, and that of all existing religions it has the most to give the democrat; but he is far from looking upon Christianity as the final and absolute religion. He explicitly affirms that religions, including Christianity, differ "not as true and false, but as more or less true," and having the different religions in mind he says that "given the same consecration and sincerity each road may lead to the Father's House," and he implies that beneath the differences of form there is a common piety. It seems clear that Dr. Brown holds lightly, if he does not altogether reject, the distinctive facts and doctrines of the Christian religion; and, unless we are mistaken, he would think more highly of a democratic Buddhist than he would of an imperialistic Christian. Dr. Brown to the contrary notwithstanding we believe that the distinction between true and false religions is a valid one, and that only those who have broken with historical Christianity will look upon his classification of religions as even a possible one.

We may go further and say that Dr. Brown erases the dividing lines between religious and non-religious phenomena. He is aware that his classification is open to this criticism and tries to show that the type of social attitude that lies at its basis is properly called religious, but it does not seem to us that any large measure of success has attended his efforts. A definition of religion that leads one to say that a man whose ideals are necessities is religious while a man whose ideals are luxuries is irreligious and to speak of God as "the name we give to our realized ideal" is too vague and indefinite to afford us any real help in distinguishing between religious and non-religious phenomena. And until we can distinguish between religious and non-religious phenomena no great value will attach to our classification of religions.

*Princeton.*

S. G. CRAIG.

## HISTORICAL THEOLOGY

*The Monastic Chronicler and the Early School of St. Albans.* A Lecture.

By CLAUDE JENKINS, Professor of Ecclesiastical History, King's College, London; Lambeth Librarian and Chaplain to the Archbishop of Canterbury. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. New York and Toronto: The Macmillan Co. 1922.

A brief and somewhat critical account of the monastic chroniclers of the earlier English history, particularly the school of historical writers associated with the old Abbey of St. Albans, northwest of London. Among these are Adam the Cellarer, Abbot John de Cella, Walter of St. Albans, William of Malmesbury, Thomas Walsingham's *Gesta Abbatum*, Roger of Wendover, and Matthew Paris and his *Vitae Abbatum*. More attention is given to the last two historians, and most to Matthew Paris, "the first important chronicler of the St. Albans School."

Professor Jenkins has given here a concise and careful study of a field

of old English history in which unfortunately so much of our knowledge has to be more or less conjectural.

Lancaster, Ohio.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST.

*Fergus Ferguson, D.D., His Theology and Heresy Trial.* A Chapter in Scottish Church History. By J. H. LECKIE, D.D., Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1923. Pp. xx, 316.

Dr. Fergus Ferguson was one of those restless spirits in the Scottish Church whose theological bent was not that of the church in which he labored. Such spirits sooner or later encounter difficulty. It always happens, too, that they have their friends and defenders. In Dr. Leckie, the author of this book, Dr. Ferguson has a zealous champion, and one also who, as Ferguson's assistant and friend had ample opportunity for giving Dr. Ferguson's side of this memorable case. In a brief way the background of Scotch heresy trials is given, especially in the cases of MacLeod Campbell and Robertson Smith. Ferguson's stormy career is sketched, also his growing distaste for the more angular truths of the Westminster Confession, and his philosophical system and theology, issuing in his trial of 1877-1878. Appealed from Presbytery to Synod, he was not convicted of heresy, although he was "affectionately and solemnly admonished," and allowed to retain his position in the Church.

Nowhere does the author conceal his great admiration for Dr. Ferguson or his sympathy with the attitude which brought the latter into open conflict with his brethren. Here and there Ferguson is gently criticized for his unfortunate terminology and explanations (pp. 15-16, 62, 79, 147). The author's bias betrays him (fortunately not often) into utterances not especially fraternal or wise; as when he speaks of "the watch-dogs of orthodoxy," or when he expresses regret at the Presbyterial treatment of the wild vagaries of Edward Irving, or when he refers derogatively to an orderly appointed committee as a "familiar refuge in every time of trouble" (pp. 10, 32, 176). This is not the sagacity that we expect in a careful historian. And although such expressions are few, this same spirit is more evident than one could wish.

In his zeal for the side which he espouses, Dr. Leckie goes on to an extreme that at best is open to serious question. He says that Ferguson saw that "the custom of requiring the clergy to subscribe to the Westminster Confession meant, and would increasingly mean, an intolerable bondage for honest minds" (p. 90). As if a definite creedal commitment were incompatible with intellectual or moral honesty! Indeed, Dr. Leckie himself has difficulty in reaching a clear idea as to what Dr. Ferguson really was. He says he was fundamentally Christian, yet holding "a type of transcendental philosophy"; he was a Hegelian, a mystic, a Realist, and finally "a rational mystic," whatever that is (pp. 117-118, 124; cf. pp. 280-281, etc.). Why did Dr. Leckie not think of the word "eclectic"? That covers a multitude of theological sins. A man can believe almost anything he wants and be a first-class eclectic. Of one thing the author is sure: Ferguson was wholly anti-Calvinistic (pp. 283-284). The wonder

then is, that he still wished to remain in a church that was so pronouncedly Calvinistic as the Scottish Church.

An instance, in passing, of Dr. Leckie's reasoning is found on page 209. He is speaking of Ferguson's view of the atonement, and he distinguishes between Ferguson's belief in the atonement and his speculative theory of it. "With that theory," he adds, "we have nothing to do; it is Mr. Ferguson's affair. So long as he believes and teaches that all men are saved through the sacrifice of Christ he remains entirely orthodox, whatever may be his metaphysical theory as to the matter." This is a dangerous position to take. Can it be that our author does not see how futile such artifice is? The question is: Did Mr. Ferguson believe and teach his theory? Does it not sometimes, indeed, very often these days, happen that a man's explanation, his theory, contradicts his former affirmation? Which are we to accept: his affirmation or his theory? If a man says that he believes that you speak the truth, and then proceeds to indulge in a kind of explanation that casts a shadow over your veracity, how are you to understand him? Is your reputation safe in his hands, no matter what his statement about it formerly was? This resort is, to say the least, scarcely profound. In a cross-examination before a civil court, if a witness' subsequent explanation belies his previous profession, it is the profession that is thrown out. You must believe what you know and know what you believe.

Dr. Leckie indulges, further, in some ill-chosen remarks on the Presbyterian method of judicial procedure (pp. 190-195). He thinks that the Anglican system is a more just way of dealing with alleged heresy. This turns, however, on the real aim of authority and the old question of the value of popular government. A man who is not willing to be judged by his fellows, both clerical and lay, is doubtless too much of an individualist to want to be judged at all. Nor are we sure that the comparison with Episcopacy is as favorable as Dr. Leckie would fain believe. But the strange thing is that the author heralds the Presbyterian Synod's final decision in this case as a "famous victory" for Ferguson (p. 261). And this is said of a system of justice which he has just criticized as unfair and inefficient. Was this Synod's decision in favor of Ferguson a just one? Perhaps not.

From this book it is plain that Dr. Ferguson was altogether too much out of intellectual harmony with the Presbyterian creed to be at home in that church. He had a theory of the atonement that overstressed the intercessory activity of Christ at the expense of the full moral value of the sacrifice on the cross. He espoused a virtual trichotomy (pp. 139, 155, 172), and he constantly fell into mystical aberrations from which the clear-cut Calvinism of the Westminster Confession is singularly free. To have revised or restated that Confession after the type of mind of Dr. Ferguson would have eviscerated its Calvinistic gospel or at all events made it unrecognizable as a Calvinistic document. That would be Hamlet with Hamlet left out. A dog does not eat oats. But why deny oats to the animal that does relish it? Calvinism is doubtless a rock of

offense to some persons. Very well. There are other creeds for them. The Westminster Confession is especially for those who take to the Calvinistic construction of history and doctrine. Of these folk there are still considerable numbers in the world.

Lancaster, Ohio.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST.

*Religion Since the Reformation.* Eight Lectures Preached before the University of Oxford in the year 1922, on the Foundation of the Rev. John Bampton, M.A., Canon of Salisbury. By LEIGHTON PULLAN, D.D., Fellow and Tutor of St. John Baptist's College, Oxford. Oxford University Press, American Branch, New York. 1923. Pp. xvi, 291.

These Bampton lectures for 1922 comprise a series of passing observations on the four centuries of Christian history since the Reformation. They cover a very broad field in which the author is well-informed. They are written from the view-point of Anglican episcopacy, a fact which, we fear, has influenced some of the author's findings more than it should. The Continental Reformation, under Luther and Calvin, is branded as extreme, while in England the Reformation in 1550 is regarded as "essentially complete" (p. 34). Apparently Dr. Pullan's idea of a "complete" reformation is something different from that of Lutherans and Calvinists. High Anglican testimony with regard to Calvinism and especially the Calvinism of the Puritans should always be open to rigid cross-examination, particularly when the New England Unitarianism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is laid at the door of the Puritan Calvinists.

Very often some of the value of estimations of ecclesiastical currents lies in the sententious way in which these great movements are put before the reader, who has doubtless gone over the same ground many times before. Dr. Pullan has this art. To illustrate, we get the kernel of Romanticism in the epigram: "The men of the Romantic movement burnt what their teachers had worshiped and worshiped what their teachers had burnt" (p. 227). Wesley's undervaluation of the steady work of the settled pastor is thus thrown into vivid contrast with the position of some of his fellow-clergymen: "While Wesley looked upon the world as his parish, these Evangelicals looked upon their parish as the world" (p. 147). The critical attempt to regard Christianity as a post-apostolic creation is to "make the second century responsible for the first" (p. 241). The author stands for a middle path between the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, and says, with splendid frankness: "Our relation to Rome and our relation to Geneva and Berlin are not dead questions of the seventeenth century; they affect our own intellectual and religious life and our whole attitude towards the reunion of Christendom" (p. 249).

A whole chapter (VII.) is devoted to the Eastern Orthodox Church, and the difficulties in the way of the union of this Church with the Church of England are considered.

Naturally, in a review covering so much ground, and arriving at the



present state of the Church, the question of "Modernism" could not be left untouched. The author very vigorously attacks Modernism, using the word to denote (as he forewarns in the Preface) those who feel justified in repeating the Church creeds and prayers while at the same time repudiating the meaning of important phrases therein. He thinks that a church that retains the original Gospels, even with an Italian Pope, "provides us with an infinitely better religion than a school which offers us selections from a New Testament expurgated by mutually hostile professors"; and he prefers the meanest Roman chapel to the finest temple where they preach a "sham German Jesus" (p. 190). The Modernism of France and England, in seeking to meet the difficulties of faith, "endeavors to disarm doubt by dissolving truth" (p. 250). Modernists would of course reply to Dr. Pullan that he is in a frame of mind altogether too conciliatory to Rome, and he would have here some important matters to explain to his critics. The solution is not in a backward drift to Rome to keep immune from the poisonous effects of Modernism, but in remaining fundamentally loyal to fundamental Protestantism. But in case such a choice ever had to be made, we feel that the content of essential Christianity would be far safer in the hands of such as Dr. Pullan and his kind than with those who change their philosophy and theology with the setting of each day's sun.

*Laurel, Ohio.*

BENJAMIN F. PAIST.

## EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

*Jesus of Nazareth. A Biography.* By GEORGE A. BARTON, Ph.D., LL.D., Professor of Semitic Languages in the University of Pennsylvania, and Professor of New Testament Literature and Language in the Divinity School of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Philadelphia; sometime Professor of Biblical Literature and Semitic Languages in Bryn Mawr College. In "Great Leaders Series" edited by E. Hershey Sneath, Ph.D., LL.D., Yale University. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922. pp. xvii, 396.

The inclusion of a biography of Jesus of Nazareth in a "Great Leaders Series" will seem to the thoughtful Christian man to be a far greater blasphemy than the ordinary profanity of the street could possibly be. But it must be confessed that the contribution of Dr. Barton fits in well in such a series; for in this book, despite the pantheizing use of the term "deity" as applied to our Lord, Jesus is presented as a great religious leader and nothing more. The only incongruity appears in the use of the adjective "great." The truth is that the majestic Person presented in the Gospels is here reduced by a process of rationalizing of His life and evisceration of His words to such triviality that it is difficult to see how anyone could possibly call the resulting figure "great."

Dr. Barton is inclined to accept the extremely early dating of the Synoptic Gospels which would place the Gospel of Luke at 58-60 A. D., and the Gospel of Mark perhaps even at 39-41; and he accepts as having

an historical base a larger part of the Gospel material than is usual among Modernist writers. Even the Gospel of John, he believes, is founded on genuine historical tradition, not merely in its account of events but even in its report of Jesus' words. But these comparatively conservative conclusions in the sphere of literary criticism result, not in any sympathy toward the great elements in the Gospel narrative, but in a curious return to the rationalizing method which was in vogue in the early years of the nineteenth century before the days of Strauss. The miracle narratives in accordance with that method are explained as incorrect supernaturalistic interpretations of actual, though purely natural, events. Thus the "lepers" of the Gospels (even ten of them at once), according to Dr. Barton, were cured of eczema or some other comparatively trifling skin disease; and beside "leprosy" not only nervous disorders in the narrower sense but also lameness and blindness and the long-continued trouble of the woman mentioned in Luke xiii. 11-13 yielded to the "radiant, magnetic life" of Jesus or His "unique psychic or magnetic power." And both the son of the widow of Nain and Lazarus were resuscitated from a "comatose state" by the same method. Scarcely anything in the gospels is exempt from this rationalizing treatment; and even the feeding of the five thousand is subjected to it. That incident does not indeed yield to the treatment. It must have an historical basis if Dr. Barton's theory of the Gospels is right, but what that basis is and how it came to be distorted into the present narrative our author, after an elaborate discussion, is unable to say.

The same minimizing treatment as is thus applied to the narrative element in the Gospels is also applied to the record of the words of Jesus. The discourses contained in all four of the Gospels are regarded as to a considerable extent authentic, but are deprived of their offense by a modernizing interpretation. Of the features of the present book, this feature to our mind is the saddest of all. It is unutterably sad to see the most gracious evangelical utterances, especially in a book intended for young people, deprived of all their significance and made into trivial assertions of general moral or religious principles. Particularly in the sphere of sin and grace does this lack of comprehension appear with pathetic clearness. Dr. Barton actually wrestles at considerable length with the question how Jesus knew that the man borne of four was a sinner (as though He did not know that all men were sinners); and of course the parable of the laborers in the vineyard with its wonderful presentation of the grace of God (see for example the fine treatment by Father Huntington, *The Bargainers and the Beggars*) is regarded as presenting serious difficulty to the "modern mind." As for Jesus' teaching about heaven and hell, which really is at the very center of everything that He said—that is apparently regarded as presenting such difficulty to the modern mind or as so distasteful to the author of our book that it is altogether or almost altogether ignored.

The treatment of the Messianic consciousness is not especially distinctive. Dr. Barton believes, after the fashion of the older Liberalism, that Jesus was conscious of standing in a unique relation to God, and

that this uniqueness of His relation to God found expression in the category of Messiahship which he accepted for Himself at the baptism, but at first kept secret and designated enigmatically by the use of the term "Son of Man," until the category was applied to Him definitely by Peter at Caesarea Philippi. But if in such matters the book is not distinctive, the extreme lengths to which it carries both the rationalizing method in dealing with the miracles and the minimizing exegesis of Jesus' recorded words make it (in view of the author's well-known gifts of thought and expression) an interesting representative of certain tendencies of the present day. It looks as though the circle were being completed—as though the naturalistic "quest of the historical Jesus" were returning to the rationalizing method which so aroused the scorn of Strauss and the great exponents of the mythical theory. Another tendency is also manifest in the present book—namely the anti-historical and anti-intellectual trend of Modernism, especially in America. Dr. Barton says, in connection with the question of miracles (p. 34):

"It is all important that each one form in his or her mind an image of Jesus against a background that will make him seem most real. It is only thus that his life—the most holy and powerful life for good that has ever been lived in the world—can have real influence upon us. As we live at a time when one theory of the world is passing away and another is taking its place, each one must make his mental picture in accordance with what seems to him reality. Only so can he find Jesus a real Saviour—One who is able to help him in the actual difficulties in which he finds himself."

Here we have subjectivism and pragmatism in an extreme form. Jesus is to be pictured, according to Dr. Barton, not as He is, but as He will seem most real to us, and be most in accord with our theory of the world and our notion of what will give us help! Our protest against such pragmatism is two-fold. In the first place, we are opposed to it for its own sake—we do not believe that the search for objective truth ought to be given up. And in the second place we are opposed to it because it does not even accomplish the end toward which it strives. The truth is that pragmatism is a very impractical thing. If we fashion a Jesus in accordance with our preconceived ideas and our notions of what is good for us, such a Jesus can give us only what we have already; He is a Jesus that we make for ourselves. Very different is the Jesus of the New Testament. We believe that Jesus of Nazareth ought to be brought near to the "modern mind." But there are two ways of accomplishing that result. Dr. Barton seeks to accomplish it by conforming Jesus to the modern mind. But might not another method be chosen—might not the modern mind be conformed to Jesus?

*Princeton.*

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

*The Character of Paul.* By CHARLES EDWARD JEFFERSON, Pastor of Broadway Tabernacle, New York City. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923. pp. viii, 381.

The distinguished pastor of Broadway Tabernacle is an admirer of

the Apostle Paul; but it may be doubted whether he has ever come into sympathetic contact with the things which Paul himself regarded as most important: he admires Paul but rejects Paul's message. "It is the personality of Paul," says Dr. Jefferson, "and not his theology with which we in these chapters have to do. What Jesus said to men when he faced them in his highest mood was not 'Believe this' or 'Accept that,' but 'Follow me!' And Paul when he was at his highest, did not press upon men a theory of the fall of man, or an exposition of the death of Jesus, but poured out his soul in the fervent exhortation, 'I beseech you be ye imitators of me.' 'Be ye imitators of me, even as also I am of Christ.'" This passage occurs at the beginning of Dr. Jefferson's book (pp. 3 f.), and it gives the keynote for all the rest. The book is not without value as showing the impression made by Paul's character even upon one who does not love the things that Paul loved most. But it is sadly marred by sentimentality. It views the Apostle from the outside without ever penetrating to his heart; it enumerates his virtues without ever delving to their root.

"What the world most needs is not Paulinism, but Paul" (p. 256). This is really the main thesis of Dr. Jefferson's book; it is at the root of the repeated contrasts between Paul's doctrine and his life, between his theory of the meaning of the Cross and his love; it is at the root of the passionate outbursts against critical and exegetical scholarship. But is the thesis true? Is it true that "what the world most needs is not Paulinism, but Paul"? Certainly Paul himself did not think so; certainly Paul never allowed his own personality to cause men to neglect his message. "Was Paul crucified for you?"—these words which characterize Paul's attitude from beginning to end, are an unequivocal repudiation of sentimental admiration both ancient and modern. And they blow down the construction in Dr. Jefferson's book as a breeze from the outer air blows down a house of cards.

"Was Paul crucified for you?" According to Dr. Jefferson, in a sense, he was. According to Dr. Jefferson, in other words, Paul is valuable because of his character and not because of his doctrine—because of what he was and not because of what he said. But very different was the attitude of Paul himself; the true Paul was a man with a message; the true Paul had a message which he held to be true and which alone, he believed, could give salvation to men. Until that fact is rediscovered, it is quite useless for the student to read "everything of importance" published on the question of the genuineness of the Pastoral Epistles within the last fifty years (p. 24); it is quite useless for him to live with Paul almost constantly for thirty years (as Dr. Jefferson says that he has done, p. v.); it is quite useless for him to make one of the Pauline Epistles a special study every summer for thirteen summers (*loc. cit.*). Such diligent study will no doubt bring to light interesting facts about Paul; it will no doubt reveal, as it has revealed to Dr. Jefferson, many noble traits of Paul's character. But it will leave Paul himself forever unknown, until the central fact is discovered that Paul's whole life was based upon his message—upon



that message of the Cross which Dr. Jefferson rejects. Yet how can a man help discovering that fact? How can one read the first chapter of Ephesians or the eighth chapter of Romans and then say, as Dr. Jefferson says, that "the Paul who serenely discourses on 'Predestination' and 'Foreordination' is like a God seated in a philosophical Olympus" to whom we cannot come near (p. 99); how can one possibly read the second chapter of Galatians or the fifth chapter of II Corinthians and then say that "it is the man Paul, and not his interpretation of the fall of man, or the death of Jesus, who is to give us strength and hope in wrestling with our problems and fighting our battles" (p. 68)? We confess that it is a mystery to us. Even despite the passionate anti-intellectual bias of modern pragmatist skepticism, even despite the lamentable intellectual decadence of our age, we have difficulty in understanding how men can read so much and understand so little. Paul has poured out his very heart before us; he has made himself a living voice in the proclamation of his mighty doctrine. Yet men indulge in sentimental admiration of the messenger, and despise the message; they admire the apostle, and ignore the gospel of salvation which was entrusted to him by his Lord.

It is not worth while to point out what we hold to be the errors of Dr. Jefferson in detail; since that one root error explains and makes inevitable all the rest. At one point Dr. Jefferson says that "it is a mistaken notion that Paul's fundamental doctrine is the doctrine of justification by faith. His cardinal doctrine is the doctrine of salvation by love. . . . Love is deeper than faith and mightier, for love works through faith" (pp. 323 f.). These utterances follow naturally from Dr. Jefferson's real though not explicit rejection of the Pauline gospel; but of course the slightest historical study, whether carried on by friend or by foe of Paulinism, will show that as expository of Paul they are nothing short of absurd. Similar is the error by which "trustfulness" is substituted for "faith" as the heading of one of the chapters (p. 293); that substitution illustrates very well the difference between Modernism and the religion of Paul. Modernism regards faith (falsely equated with "trustfulness") as a quality of man; Paul regarded it as the channel by which the gift of God is received: Modernism is interested in faith itself as an ethical or psychological phenomenon; Paul was interested in the great object of faith, the crucified and risen Lord.

Dr. Jefferson says that "religion is the one hope of the world" (p. 351). But he is wrong. The true hope of the world is not religion but Christianity; the true hope of the world is found not in what Paul was, not even in what Jesus was, but in what Jesus did; not in some quality of "religiousness" (p. 339) in man, but in the redeeming work of Christ which is set forth in the gospel—in the despised "theology"—of Paul.

We are not without admiration for Dr. Jefferson's distinguished ability as a preacher. But we are obliged to say plainly that in our judgment he has here published a very unsatisfactory book. It is not merely that we disagree with him. We disagree also with Wrede and with Bousset and with Johannes Weiss. Indeed we disagree with them



at many points at which we agree heartily with Dr. Jefferson—for example with regard to the genuineness of the Pastoral Epistles and the Lucan authorship of the Book of Acts. But they have at least made a serious effort (however unsuccessful) at an objective treatment of the Epistles of Paul; they have at least tried earnestly to separate the question what they could have wished Paul to be from the question what he actually was, and the question what they would have said from the question what Paul actually said. Hence we have read their works with real stimulation and profit. But in the present book of Dr. Jefferson Paul is modernized and sentimentalized to such an extent that contact with the real Paul seems almost to be lost. The apostle has been treated in many ways—with passionate hostility as well as with the profoundest reverence. But the way of treatment which does him least honor of all is, we are almost constrained to think, the way of sentimental admiration of which the present book of Dr. Jefferson, despite the author's distinguished gifts, is a most distressing example. In this book Dr. Jefferson is typical of his age. But the age is disquieting both to the historian and to the Christian. When will the true Paul be discovered? When will men see what is really so plain? When will the gospel of Paul again be discovered? We cannot say. But when that time comes, men will love the deep things that they now despise, and life will be founded not upon the example of good men—whether Paul or a reconstructed human Jesus—but upon the grace of God made known to men in the blessed "theology" that deals with the Cross.

Princeton.

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

*Let Us Go On: The Secret of Christian Progress in the Epistle of the Hebrews.* By the REV. W. H. GRIFFITH THOMAS, M.A., D.D. Chicago: The Bible Institute Colportage Association. Pp. 195.

The book contains "the amplification of Lectures and Readings" given at Oxford, England, and at Moody and several other Bible Institutes as well as Bible Conferences in America. After a short opening chapter dealing with questions of introduction to Hebrews, the author gives us in forty chapters a survey of the contents of the epistle. The aim is not to give us another commentary, but "to concentrate on one of the main themes (if not *the* main theme) of Hebrews, the necessity and conditions of spiritual progress." The author endeavors to show that the "teachings, exhortations and warnings" of Hebrews, which have the purpose of "inciting to possess and enjoy the fullest and highest Christian life" are applicable alike to "the Christian Jews" to whom it was originally addressed and to the believers of today.

The manifest intention of the author is not to give a critical analysis but rather to enable lay Bible students to obtain a working knowledge of the contents of Hebrews. The excellent way in which the work accomplishes this task may be called its main virtue. It supplies the student with a wealth of information. The information is given in such a form that it prompts the student to selfactivity rather than to do all the thinking for him. The plan makes it easy to follow the trend of thought in

Hebrews. Each of the forty chapters suggests in the title the main idea of the corresponding section of the epistle. Each chapter is again subdivided into brief paragraphs also with a heading to designate the main idea. Any lay Bible reader who chooses to make a study of the book of Hebrews with the help of Dr. Thomas' work will find his knowledge of that important book greatly enriched.

In a work of this kind we would hardly expect nor do we find a critical discussion of many problems with which we are confronted in Hebrews. Nothing is said for instance about the alleged dependance of Hebrews upon Philo. No attempt is made to inform the reader of the various views held on such matters as: Christ's relationship as High Priest to Melchizedek and Aaron; when His High Priesthood began; whether the immediate results of His sacrifice lay in the judicial or ethical sphere; whether His offering in heaven is to be thought of as continuous or repeated or once for all, etc., etc. Dr. Thomas contents himself with the mere statement of his opinion with his grounds for it, with an incidental reference now and then to a dissenting view. Dr. Thomas emphasizes the essential deity of Christ, the prophetic Revealer of God. Christ the Priest is to him only and eternally a Priest after Melchizedek's order, functioning as Priest both in His work on earth and in heaven. His sacrifice bore the nature of penal substitution for sinful man. His offering for sin was made once for all and forms the basis of His continual intercession.

In a few passages Dr. Thomas finds an indication that Hebrews expects a future millennial reign of Christ. Or perhaps it is more exact to say that in his opinion some statements in Hebrews do not contradict the idea of a future millennium, in which Christ shall reign. For the statements referring to the millennium are very mild (cf. pp. 20, 27, 83, 84, 124). The most pronounced of these statements is made in explanation of Hebrews vii. 1-3 (pp. 83, 84) where the remark is made: "Christ is not yet literally King, nor will He be until He comes again and occupies His own Throne. The Epistle clearly indicates that at present He is not on His own Throne, but 'sitteth on the right hand of the Majesty on high' (i. 3, viii. 1)." But is the fact that Christ sitteth on the right hand of Majesty intended to "clearly indicate" that there is still another throne awaiting Him? Dr. Thomas himself admits in explanation of Hebrews viii. 1, 2 (pp. 102, 106) that Christ is "on the Throne" and that "as King, He bestows God's power." Hebrews does not foster the hope of a millennium yet to come, but is antimillennialistic. Christ's priesthood forbids the thought of a coming reign on earth. In Hebrews vii. 26 we are told that the kind of a High Priest which "became us" was one which was "separate from sinners and made higher than the heavens," and, most important of all (viii. 1), One who is set "on the right hand of the throne of the Majesty in the heavens." Hebrews makes it clear that "if He were on earth He should not be a Priest," and that He must minister "in the true tabernacle" in heaven (viii. 4, 2). Such statements rather discourage the thought that Christ will ever return from the

heavenly sanctuary until He has saved to the uttermost end of time those that come unto God by Him.

It is refreshing to read a book of such a scholar as Dr. Thomas which seeks to acquaint men with what the writings of Scriptures themselves say. There is much need of just such books today. Someone, reviewing recently a book bearing the title, *The Book of Genesis*, remarked: "The aim of the work is not to acquaint the student with the book of Genesis so much as with how the school of critics who reject the historicity of the book may yet get religious value from it," and then concludes by saying: "It would be well if critical scholars who believe in the historicity of the Scriptures would prepare such guides to study, as didactically able as this, only giving their readers more direct contact with the books of Scripture and less with even their truer theories of Scripture." That wish is fulfilled in such a work as this guidebook of Dr. Thomas to the study of Hebrews.

*Grand Rapids, Mich.*

H. HENRY MEETER.

*The Temptation of our Lord; Considered as Related to the Ministry and as a Revelation of his Person.* By H. J. C. Knight, D.D., Bishop of Gibraltar, 1911-1920. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. New York: The Macmillan Co. Pp. 162.

Bishop Knight's lectures on the Temptation were first delivered and published as the Cambridge Hulsean Lectures of 1905-6. They are now republished as a memorial of an active, spiritual and scholarly divine. An excellent introduction contains an appreciation of Dr. Knight, and a sketch of his busy and consecrated life. But the book is not a memorial: it is a spiritual force, an exposition of the Person and Work of our Lord of permanent value to Christian scholarship. It is unfortunate that Dr. Knight's English is heavy and at times even obscure, lacking that clarity of expression which the "art of the blue pencil" gives; yet despite this handicap of an involved style, no student will get far in *The Temptation of Our Lord* without acquiring that interest which makes it hard to put a book aside unfinished.

Though written at the beginning of the twentieth century, the book is especially timely in the emphasis that is found throughout upon the historicity of the Four Gospels, and the Deity of Christ. This is especially notable because in dealing with the temptations of Jesus Dr. Knight is necessarily writing of the human nature of our Lord, and is studying that portion of Scripture which, perhaps more than any other, has of recent years been symbolized and moralized into the mythic realm of "value judgments."

One need but read the fourth and last lecture of the book to know that, if elsewhere Dr. Knight describes the Baptism of Jesus as the climax of the development of His Messianic consciousness, "the point of complete apprehension by the Lord's human mind of the fulness of all that He was" (p. 10), and if he describes the forty days, "issuing in the crisis of three final temptations" as the decisions reached by Him regarding His Person, Work, and Means of Work, nevertheless Dr. Knight

is throughout thinking and speaking of the human nature of Jesus, and His human nature only, with always in his thought as a never-lost-sight-of background, the realization of the deity of "this same Jesus."

The three Temptations are considered as closing a period of probation, as being a selection from many made by Jesus Himself for our better understanding of His Person and Mission, as the end of His period of human growth, and as the key to His active ministry. Luke's order is followed. Dr. Knight is not satisfied with the "usual interpretations" that Christ was tempted to use His Divine Nature to satisfy the flesh, to set up an earthly kingdom and to test the Father's protecting care (pp. 115-116). These seem to him inadequate explanations of the effect of the baptismal experience upon our Lord's human nature, and of small value in any interpretation of His active ministry. He would rather see the temptations as, of course, historic occurrences in the Wilderness, yet also as a struggle whereby Jesus gained for Himself His own clear and final recognition of the principles obligatory to His ministry; principles embodied in His three answers to the Tempter from Deut. viii. 3, vi. 13, and vi. 16 (p. 114).

"In the first Temptation the Lord dealt with Himself" (p. 154). Aware, in His human nature, of His divine Sonship,—an awareness confirmed by the baptismal proclamation—probation must make clear to Him that "the principle of the incarnation shall rule His active ministry" (p. 114). His human nature, that is, shall have "fullest play and unimpaired operation." Here, therefore, in Luke iv. 3, 4, "we behold our Lord determining for Himself that respect for the integrity of His human nature, and submission to it, are obligatory upon Him" (p. 173). The first Temptation is an expression of Christ's loyalty to the Incarnation, bringing to men a deeper recognition "of the fulness and truth of His human nature" (p. 117), and interpreting that part of His ministry wherein we see His prayerful dependence upon the Father (pp. 117-19). This is Jesus as we see Him for instance in Phil. ii. 6 ff (p. 154).

In the second Temptation, Lk. iv. 5-8, our Lord's mind turns not inward as before, but outward. It is his final acceptance of "the range and means of His work as the Christ" (p. 120). "He recognized as present fact that in the Kingdoms of the earth the Evil Will claimed and exercised authority, a permitted authority, indeed, but a real one" (p. 86). His antagonism to this Will, His tremendous personal struggle (p. 123), His irreconcilable hostility, are revealed through the second temptation; and that Temptation shows to us our Lord's recognition of the range of His work, where the sole and obligatory means to victory must be His cross (p. 124). He recognizes as His work the complete and final conquest of sin, Satan, death. The probation, therefore, issues in Christ's rejection of any lesser range to His work than the absolute overthrow of Satan and the making of all things new. It is a declaration of war, an acceptance of a challenge to mortal combat with Sin.

The first Temptation determines the law ruling His Person, the second, the range of His Work, and the third (Lk. iv. 9-12), its conditions

of accomplishment (p. 100). It "involves a ministry under Law, and the Law is the known will of the Father, which, in every sphere is to receive unquestioning homage" (p. 114). It can be expressed in one word, *faith*. The questions of His mode of appearing to men, His method of appeal, and His offering of Himself, are decided by this probation, wherein Christ recognizes the coöperation of the human will and of human faith in the application of His work to men (p. 129). The question is this: Shall He offer Himself to men by an irresistible and supernatural knowledge of Himself, which would stunt man's moral capacity by not calling it into play (p. 105), or shall He treat men as self-determining, "the human will as a fortress . . . which the moral law of His being forbids Him even to assail" (p. 158)? This third Temptation, therefore, bears upon every appeal of Christ to the faiths of men and explains both the giving and the withholding of "signs."

It will be noticed that in order to secure this imperfect analysis of the argument, it has been necessary to weave together portions of Dr. Knight's exposition widely separated in the volume itself. This lack of clarity and well-knit development of thought in *The Temptation of Our Lord* is the one outstanding fault of the volume. But in endeavoring to bring the exposition thus into a short outline, the reviewer hopes that he has succeeded in showing something of the spiritual depth of Dr. Knight's meditations, and their helpfulness to the devout student of the self-revelations of the Son of God.

*Delaware City, Del.*

ROBERT CLAIBORNE PITZER.

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## SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

*Das Heilige. Ueber das Irrationale in der Idee des Göttlichen und sein Verhältnis zum Rationalen.* RUDOLF OTTO, Professor der Theologie in Marburg. Elfte Auflage. Verlag Friedrich Andreas Perthes, A.-G. Stuttgart-Gotha. 1923. Ss. 228.

*The Idea of the Holy, An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine and its Relation to the Rational.* By RUDOLF OTTO, Professor in the University of Marburg. Translated by John W. Harvey, Lecturer in Philosophy in the University of Birmingham. Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 1923. Pp. 228.

This book was first published in 1917, but owing to the war it has just come to our hands in the eleventh edition. The English translation above noted is from the ninth edition. It calls for no separate review. It is a very good translation of a book difficult to translate because of the strangeness of the terminology and the use of terms drawn from the Latin, though Otto is never an obscure writer. Also the Preface to the English translation is exceptionally good in stating the relations and significance of the position taken by Dr. Otto.

Turning to the book, which has had quite an influence in Germany and elsewhere, it is, in a word, a work on the psychology and philoso-



phy of religion which seeks to bring out the transcendent, unknowable, and ineffable aspects of the Divine nature as "indicated," rather than apprehended, in certain religious feelings. Also it is an attempt to show how these "non-rational" factors are related to the rational ones; or to the side of the Divine Being which can be conceived.

We do not agree with the Kantian and Friesian philosophy which underlies Otto's position, but we do think that it may have some good influence in America where religious thought has either taken up with the idea of a "finite God," or, in the case of old-fashioned Modernism, has tended to regard God as simply our Friend or loving Father, too good-natured to be feared, too much tied up in the world-process, and, in a word, too much like one of us, to be the real object of religion. And more than this, Otto's wide knowledge of the history of religion results in showing that the God of so-called "Liberalism" or "Modernism" is not and has not been the God who is the object of all human religion from its lowest to its highest forms. The God of the Bible, certainly, is a God not only to be loved but to be held in awe and reverence, One before whom we feel not only our sinfulness, but our creaturehood and nothingness. If we are told to "rejoice" in Him, it is nevertheless only with "trembling."

Turning to outline briefly Otto's book, we note that the first part deals with the psychology of religion. In all religions there are "rational" and "non-rational" (*irrational*) elements. In the theistic conception, for example, we predicate of God spirit, reason, will, goodness, eternity, omnipotence, consciousness. These are "clear concepts" capable of definition; they are "rational" predicates. But they do not exhaust the Being of God. There are also "non-rational" elements, indefinable and unknowable to reason, capable of being hinted at or indicated by the feelings aroused. The fact that Deity has both these aspects, Otto expresses by the category "the Holy." We are accustomed to identify this with moral perfection, but such is not the primary meaning of this idea. It expresses the ineffableness and transcendence of God which can only be experienced, not expressed. To characterize the corresponding religious feelings Otto has coined a Latin term. Just as the word *omen* gives us the adjective *ominous*, so he says the noun *numen* can give us the adjective *numinous*. So he speaks of *numinous* feelings. These feelings give hints at this hidden side of God. Such a feeling is, above all, that of our nothingness and creaturehood, which is more than a mere feeling of dependence. The Deity thus in one aspect may be characterized as "aweful mystery" (*mysterium tremendum*). This awefulness denotes absolute unapproachability, overpowering majesty, absolute energy. We see in all religions feelings of "fear, horror (*Grauen*), powerlessness and our nothingness." The element of "mystery" also enters in. This means that the Deity is "wholly other" from us. We find here the feelings of "stupor," of being stricken with silence, and of absolute strangeness over against "the wholly otherness" of God.

Regarded in another aspect "the Numinous" is felt as the absolutely

attractive (*fascinosum*), "quelling yet entrancing." This aspect stands in a harmony of contrast with that of "awefulness," and this contrast is one of the chief phenomena in the history of religions. This element of "attraction" (*fascinosum*) has certain "rational" analogies in the ideas of the love, mercy, and graciousness of God. But these ideas do not exhaust this aspect of Deity. There is a non-rational element in which God is not only looked to for help, but desired for Himself. The corresponding feeling is that of longing (*Sehnsucht*), which is more than a desire for any good that can be expressed, and a feeling of blessedness which is more than the satisfaction over the granting of any humanly conceivable blessings.

When regarded from still a third aspect, "the Numinous" or Deity appears as that which has absolute value, over against which there is nothing of value. This aspect arouses the feeling of "profaneness" which is by no means identical with that of sinfulness or ethical imperfection, and which arouses the feeling of need for atonement.

These so-called "numinous" feelings are made clearer, according to Otto, by noting the means by which they are aroused. These are "indirect" and "direct." The former are all the means of arousing similar or analogous feelings in the natural sphere. Paintings which represent the "frightful," the "horrible" may arouse a religious feeling of awe. The artistic representations of the sublime are allied to feelings of reverence for the Divine mysteriousness. The direct means are only two, "darkness" and "silence."

Following this psychological exposition Otto illustrates his view by pointing to cases of "numinous" feeling in Luther and the Bible. He also shows how a legitimate "moralizing" and "rationalizing" of these feelings has gone on in the higher types of religion. The highest point in religious development is reached when the rational and non-rational elements "fully interpenetrate" one another. It is not to be supposed that higher religions are the product of a naturalistic evolution from lower forms. It is the higher development of culture which calls forth higher forms of man's latent religious nature.

The second part of the book we may call the philosophy of religion. It is a religious epistemology or theory of knowledge. Here we find the influence of Kant and Fries. "The Holy" is a category made up of rational and non-rational elements. In both aspects it is a pure "*a priori* category." The rational ideas of religion are called forth in connection with experience, but are not the products of it. The same is true of the non-rational elements. The idea of "the Numinous" and the corresponding feelings are *a priori* or innate elements in human nature. They are simply called forth by history and experience. It is true that historical events are required to arouse these *a priori* ideas and feelings, but they are none the less *a priori*, i.e., grounded in human nature, and history is only the "occasion" of their appearance and development. And this is also true of the combination of both these elements in religion. This combining of the rational and non-rational elements is necessary *a priori*,

and grounded in our nature. In this *a priori* necessity lies the justification of the objective validity of religious ideas.

Nevertheless religion must be aroused and called forth. How then is religion "experienced"? There must be external historical facts or an "outer revelation," and there must also be a power to recognize the Divine in this external revelation. Otto calls this power "divination," which is the power to discern the Divine in external events and persons. Like Schleiermacher, Fries, and DeWette, Otto ascribes such a religious "intuition" to the human spirit. It is, however, actualized only in "prophetic" natures upon which the ordinary man must depend. Jesus above all others had such a prophetic gift. But He was more than this. He was not only the "subject" of divination, but also its "object." Others recognized the Divine in Him. This is true of His first followers, and it is true today. Through contemplative reflection on Jesus and the New Testament redemptive history we experience "salvation," which is independent of exegetical and historical details.

Thus the experience of religion and of Christianity rests on this two-fold basis of intuitive endowment and external manifestation.

This in brief outlines the author's position. What is to be said of it? First, that it represents a timely reaction against certain more or less recent tendencies in religious thought. It recognizes the infinitude and transcendence of God and will have nothing to do with the reduced God of modern liberalism, or the finite God of those for whom the problem of evil has usurped all other considerations. Again, though feeling is given too large a place, nevertheless the *a priori* character of religious ideas is recognized and the objectivity of these ideas is emphasized even though it may not be adequately grounded. It is a wholesome reaction against the subjectivism and extreme empiricism of much American religious psychology, as well as against pragmatism. Further it separates itself from the unwholesome revival of certain types of mysticism by recognizing the rational element in religion and by direct assertion that mysticism exaggerates the so-called non-rational element in religion. It is a book which the so-called "modern man" might do well to study.

Nevertheless Otto's book is open to serious criticism both in its psychological and philosophical parts.

Beginning with the former, the manner in which he distinguishes between the rational and the non-rational elements in the conception of God is not in accordance with the facts. In this point we do not think that the criticism of Professor E. W. Mayer, formerly of Strassburg, is quite fair to Dr. Otto. Writing on Otto in the *Theologische Rundschau*, (Jahrg. 20, Heft 7-8, p. 224) Mayer adopts a different definition of the terms and criticizes Otto. By "rational," he says, we mean that which is a necessity of thought, and by "irrational" its contradictory opposite. From this point of view, he says, we cannot say that those predicates which Otto calls rational are any more necessities of thought than those which he calls irrational or non-rational. When we ascribe to God reason, consciousness, and will, that is no more a necessity of thought than

when we ascribe to Him "awefulness" (*tremendum*) or "attractiveness" (*fascinosum*). On the contrary it is less "paradoxical" that the Infinite God should be thought of as majestic and awful than that love for us creatures should be ascribed to Him. There is truth in this, but Mayer's definitions of rational and irrational would not be accepted by Otto. Nevertheless, as Mayer points out, even from Otto's standpoint, his distinction does not hold good. If by rational predicates such as personality, love, and will, we mean ideas taken from our known world of experience, and by non-rational predicates we mean the opposite of these, then we must say that the awful majesty of God is conceivable just as much as His love or goodness, while in both cases the Divine attributes contain more than we can ever know or fully grasp. So likewise the feelings of awe and longing in relation to God are no more out of analogy with such feelings directed to human objects than are our trust in and love for God different from trust and love to our fellow men. The truth is that while there is a distinction between the "communicable" and "incommunicable" attributes of God, both are to a certain degree conceivable and knowable, while in both cases there is more than we can ever know. The simple yet profound truth is that our knowledge of God is partial. That which we do know of Him, we know imperfectly, and there is infinitely more in God than we can ever know. But this distinction, which is the true one, does not coincide with that of Otto between the rational or conceivable and the non-rational or inconceivable, for that which is absolutely inconceivable is entirely unknowable. The depths of God's Being none can fathom, but His love is as infinite and incomprehensible as His awful majesty and transcendence. Our knowledge of God is, as we said, only partial, but it is partial throughout, and in addition there is more in His infinite Being than we can ever know or conceive and toward which we can consequently have no emotional attitude other than the reverence we feel for God as God in His whole nature. Yet Otto has emphasized a truth too long forgotten by our petty modern conceptions of God. No one by searching can find Him out. He dwelleth in light inaccessible, unto which no man can approach. His ways are not our ways, nor His thought as our thoughts. To have this emphasized in an age when the conception of God in some circles of religious thought had fallen so low that the ascription of Deity to Jesus in the same circles has meant nothing, and to have it emphasized by one who knows the history of religions, is a great gain, especially if the English translation of Otto shall find its way to the so-called liberalism or modernism of America.

The philosophical or epistemological part of Otto's book is also highly unsatisfactory, and principally in two respects. In the first place Otto's thought does not rise above natural religion. His position is not new. It is simply the Friesian philosophy of religion. He gives no adequate place to the historical element in religion and especially to the historical Christian revelation. All religion, including Christianity, is traced back to *a priori* rational elements. The way in which he relates his idea of



"divination" to the historical Jesus shows this clearly. It is true that he says that Jesus is more than a prophet who has this power of "divination." Jesus is said to be the "object" of the religious consciousness. But after all this only means that we somehow feel the presence of God in Jesus. In the last analysis, therefore, Jesus is only a means by which these vague religious feelings are aroused in us. The essence of Christianity, as well as of religion, is found in the *a priori* element, not in the historical revelation. In this way we may have, perhaps, natural religion but no Gospel. Unless Jesus is divine, unless He died for our sins and rose again we have no historical and supernatural Christianity and no Gospel of good news. And no *a priori* intuitions or feelings can give us Christianity for it is a historical religion. Neither can we know *a priori* that Jesus is the incarnate Son of God, nor what He has done for our salvation. Nor can Jesus be the object of religious adoration and trust unless we do know who He was and what He did. The philosophy of Kant and Fries leaves no room for a genuine historical revelation, much less for a supernatural one. But since this is precisely what New Testament Christianity claims to be, no philosophy of religion is adequate which does not take account of all the relevant phenomena and at least examine these claims. The New Testament furnishes examples of what Otto calls "numinous" feeling, but it contains a clear revelation of who Jesus was and what He did and does for man's salvation. Otto's English translator allies him with the mystics; Mayer calls his philosophy of religion a type of rationalism. It makes little difference. Christianity is not the product of reason or feeling, and the great Christian facts are more than the occasion of calling forth the *a priori* elements of religion. They claim to be, and if there is any historical Christianity, they are, the supernatural work of God for man's redemption. Strip them of this claim and you strip them of all that renders them specifically Christian.

In the second place the natural knowledge of God is not adequately grounded. We are not, it is true, asked to believe in that which is self-contradictory, or in propositions that contradict each other. But we are required to believe in that which is paradoxical. What is claimed is that these religious feelings give us a real knowledge of a Being whose nature is above knowledge. But this is impossible. If the nature and attributes of God are "inexpressible," then God is the Unknowable. The Bible tells us that the heavens declare His glory and the firmament showeth His handiwork. Paul says that the invisible things of God are understood by the things that are made, even God's eternal power and Godhead. It is also true that we are "to keep silence before Him." But this is because we know His majesty and holiness and we are sinful creatures. Silence and darkness may arouse vague feelings in us, but these feelings give us no knowledge. All religious feeling depends on ideas of God, and these must come from the revelation he has made in the human heart and in nature. The truth was expressed by the old theologians when they



said that there is more in God than we can know and that which we do know we know only partially.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

*Aufsätze das Numinose Betreffend.* RUDOLPH OTTO, Professor der Theologie in Marburg. Verlag Friedrich Andreas Perthes A.-G. Stuttgart-Gotha. 1923. Ss. 258.

This volume contains the appendices to the author's book *Das Heilige*. Some of them were printed as appendices to the book, and many have been added. They contain examples of what Otto calls "the *Numinous*" which we have described in reviewing the eleventh edition of his book. There are twenty-seven chapters, and this volume of illustrations is longer than the book *Das Heilige*. The author draws from his wide knowledge of the literature on religious philosophy. He finds examples of what he wishes to illustrate in Chrysostom, Augustine, Luther, Zinzen-dorf, Ruskin, Parker, and others. He draws upon the art of Islam and the paintings of Buddhism. He finds his ideas illustrated in certain Biblical doctrines, and discusses what he calls "the prophetic experience of God," and many other topics. The volume serves well to illustrate the former book, and exhibits the wide scope of Otto's learning. It is dedicated to the memory of his friend, Wilhelm Bousset.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

*What is Modernism?* By LEIGHTON PARKS, D.D., Rector of St. Bartholomew's Church in the City of New York, Author of "The Crisis in the Churches," "English Ways and By-Ways," etc. New York and London: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1924. Pp. 154.

Dr. Parks has undertaken a hard task in this little volume. The question raised in the title of the book is not easy to answer. Scarcely two Modernists agree in what they affirm. They do not even agree in what they deny, although for the most part what they deny is just historic Christianity. Probably Dr. Parks is not far from right when he says that "Modernism is not a body of doctrine. It is a state of mind." A state of mind is hard to describe. According to Dr. Parks the Modernist wishes to reassure men and women that the old faith can be so stated as to harmonize with the new knowledge that has come to men of the present age. But, as in the case of most Modernists, we find that what Dr. Parks considers as the new and "larger" knowledge is not the surely ascertained results of the natural sciences or of historical criticism, but a philosophical or speculative point of view. In this respect Dr. Parks is more difficult to understand than many, if not most, Modernists. If Jesus is a mere man, then it is conceivable that His teaching might have to be corrected, as Dr. Parks asserts that it must be. But if the Incarnation is one of the foundations of Christianity, as Dr. Parks asserts, then Jesus must be God and we ought to accept His authority as a teacher. And if Dr. Parks can really believe in so stupendous a miracle as the Incarnation, why does he find it impossible to accept the Virgin Birth? Of course he adduces the old objections to the evidence for the Virgin

Birth, and asserts that it is a question of evidence, but he likewise makes it perfectly plain that the modern man cannot believe in it. Again he says that beside the Incarnation, the Resurrection of Christ is the second great pillar of Christianity. But he affirms, in the familiar fashion, that the manner of the Resurrection as bodily is a matter of indifference, and then proceeds to a very inadequate attack upon the historical evidence. But the very term means a rising again of the body which was buried, and if we mean only the immortality of Jesus' human soul or His continued influence, then why not say that there was no resurrection, as there certainly was not if Christ's body was not raised. The objections which Dr. Parks makes to the evidence for the Resurrection and the Virgin Birth are very old and have been satisfactorily answered again and again by competent New Testament scholars.

In regard to the bodily Resurrection of Christ, the discussion is very brief. Dr. Parks will not even admit that the Apostles believed that the body of Jesus was raised from death, and then seeks to explain the belief from "appearances" or "visions." He stoutly maintains that the account of Paul's conversion in Acts renders doubtful his belief in a bodily resurrection which he admits to be the natural interpretation of 1 Cor. xv. In the Gospel of Matthew when Jesus met the women as they turned from the tomb and they held him by the feet, Dr. Parks says a bodily appearance is suggested, but when Jesus appeared to the eleven on a mountain in Galilee, while they worshipped Him, "some doubted." This statement is arbitrarily taken to mean a mere vision without any bodily form, and so to nullify the other statement about the women. Luke's account of the appearance to the two disciples on the way to Emmaus is set aside without discussion on the ground that "many" think this is a later addition to the Gospel. The accounts in John's Gospel of the appearance to Mary Magdalene and the "story of Thomas" are simply dismissed with the utterly irrelevant remark that this Gospel asserts that those who have not seen and believed have greater faith. No attempt is made to explain the empty tomb, the belief of the Apostles, and the accounts of bodily appearances.

The discussion of the Virgin Birth is longer, but equally arbitrary. The clear statements of Matthew and Luke are discounted. The writer of Matthew, we are told, "may have had his account modified" by an editor under the influence of the Septuagint translation of Isaiah's prophecy. While the statement in Luke's Gospel is probably not from Luke since if Luke had known of the Virgin Birth, Paul must have also, and we do not find it in Paul. The idea that the story arose from a pagan source is abandoned, and all the stress is laid on the Greek translation of Isaiah to explain the origin of the birth narrative, in spite of the fact that it was not held in Jewish circles familiar with Isaiah. Much also is made of the influence of the doctrine of original sin which Dr. Parks utterly repudiates. We do not claim expert knowledge of New Testament criticism, just as Dr. Parks does not, but we are bound to say that this treatment of reliable historical sources seems to us highly subjective.

We are led to suspect an anti-supernaturalistic bias, and when we turn back to the previous discussion of "The Supernatural and the Miraculous," we find it. We are told that the Modernist does not deny the supernatural, but only the "old dualism," which supposes that God intrudes His power in the sphere of second causes. All religion, Dr. Parks says, is supernatural. By this he means what Ernst Troeltsch meant when he affirmed belief in a mystical contact with God in all religions and called it "inclusive supernaturalism," and denied any special intervention of Divine power in Christianity, and what he termed "exclusive supernaturalism." But the Christianity of the New Testament claims to be supernaturalistic in this exclusive sense. Do away with this kind of supernaturalism and you have done away with Christianity in the historical, *i.e.*, the New Testament sense of the term. Moreover, as we said, if Dr. Parks really believes in the Incarnation of the Son of God, how can he deny the exclusive supernaturalism of Christianity, and why should he object to lesser miracles like the bodily Resurrection and the Virgin Birth?

But does Dr. Parks really believe in the Incarnation and the Deity of Christ? This is a difficult question to answer. When one ascribes Deity to Jesus, all depends on what is one's conception of God. And we may search this book from cover to cover without being able to learn just what is the author's conception of God. The "mechanistic" conception of the universe is described as the "old dualism" between God and the world. Although pantheism is denied, yet God is denied the power to intrude in the sphere of second causes, and the "supernatural" is defined merely as the "super-human," or used in the sense of modern philosophical idealism as against materialism. God is simply the universal Spirit in whom we all "live and move and have our being." There is really no adequate basis here for a qualitative distinction between Jesus and other men. Furthermore the doctrine of the Two Natures in Christ is abandoned as only a creedal statement. But in reality it is the expression of the undoubted New Testament facts that Jesus was all that God is and all that man is except sinfulness. Without the doctrine of the Two Natures no idea of an Incarnation is possible save in the philosophical pantheizing sense that God is incarnating Himself in humanity. But this is not the Christian conception. Dr. Parks would probably repudiate this pantheizing idea, but once one seeks to reconstruct a so-called historical Jesus, different from the Jesus of the sources, calls in question all His miracles that cannot be naturalistically explained, asserts that His teaching must be corrected, and rejects the high supernaturalism of the New Testament records, it is difficult to see how belief in the Incarnation and Deity of Christ can be retained. It is difficult also to see how Dr. Parks can make this Jesus the object of religion and not simply the first example of faith, as is characteristic of the typical Modernist. In a word, Dr. Parks' modified Modernism is untenable, and is hardly characteristic Modernism.

Finally, to turn to the first part of the volume, again we must take exception to the author's statements. We think he is correct in saying that

the Modernist does not deny the historicity of Jesus, and that this question is antiquated. Professor Weinel in a recent article on German theology at present, also asserts this. But the question still remains whether the quest for the liberal Jesus of Naturalism has not proved a failure. We think it has, and we think that competent historical students of the New Testament are more and more coming to this conclusion. What are we to do with our Lord's Messianic consciousness? What shall we say of His claim to be coming to judge the world? What can be done with His consciousness of oneness with His Father in a metaphysical sense? Dr. Parks' easy-going assertion that His teaching is to be corrected will not help. These great things cannot be gotten rid of as not historical. They are in our sources. And if Jesus really did so teach and this teaching is false, how can He be even our example, much less the object of our faith? In point of fact there is no historical proof for the existence of the modern liberal Jesus nor for the modified liberal Jesus of Dr. Parks. The adherents of the Christ myth, and the "consistent eschatologists," may be passing or clinging to a lost cause, but they have at least demonstrated the purely imaginary character of the modern liberal Jesus. And even could all the difficulties be surmounted, it would still remain a fact that this Jesus, even if he existed, could never account for the origin of Christianity. It is the divine Saviour of Paul and Peter and John and of all the New Testament who has given rise to that historical religion known as Christianity.

Enough has been said to give the reader an idea of the author's position. We will spare ourselves and him a discussion of the chapter on "Intellectual Integrity" in which the author seeks to justify subscription to the Church's creeds by proving that it is impossible to "say what one means" or "to mean what one says." We impute dishonesty to no man. God alone is judge of the conscience. Men's motives can safely be left to Him when we find it hard to understand how the Modernist can subscribe to the great Christian creeds.

*Princeton.*

C. W. HODGE.

## PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

*Why I Believe in Religion.* By CHARLES REYNOLDS BROWN, The Washington Gladden Lectures for the Year 1923. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1924. Pp. ix and 175.

This is a series of popular lectures, six in number, delivered, first at Columbus and later at the Pacific School of Religion, Berkeley, in January 1924. The several lectures take up the fundamentals of the Christian Faith: Belief in God, The Person of Christ, The Atonement, Prayer, The Bible, and The Future Life. The course is intended by the author to be a "popular" treatment.

This book belongs to a large group of recent treatises by theologians, professional and amateur, who have attempted to re-state the great

Christian doctrines in new forms which are not "theological," not "abstruse," not "dogmatic" and which "accept the findings of science." In other words this book is a liberal presentation of historic Christianity.

The author proclaims himself to be a Theist. He is opposed to the materialistic explanation of the universe. God pervades the universe in the way that the Ego pervades the body, to use the author's figure.

Concerning Christ, Dr. Brown takes the "higher view." Jesus was not "simply a great man." He was "in a unique sense" the Son of God. "He has for us all the religious value of God." In reading these modern treatises which choose language so carefully, one would like to hear sometimes the simple, plain and short statement: Jesus Christ is God.

Dr. Brown has a philosophy of prayer which justifies the habit of prayer though it puts God off somewhat at a distance from the one who prays. The Scriptures contain the Word of God, but one doubts if Dr. Brown would say that they are the Word of God. He told a man on a train once, quite frankly, that he did not believe all of the Bible, but selected the true from the false "by my own moral judgment, and the test of experience." He tells us to believe the Bible "with wise discrimination."

The heart of this book is the chapter on the Atonement, "The Power of Atonement," Dr. Brown calls it, and this title shows at once his "tendency." Here is the acid test of every man's theology. Here you can note the difference between The Gospel and "any other gospel." Dr. Brown bravely abandons all the Biblical words which explain the meaning of the Atonement, because they are "oriental" or "local" or have to do with "Jewish thought." "Discriminating people" have, he says, discarded the substitutionary and satisfaction theories. All the past ideas are forsaken because they reflect the thoughts of their day. As with all other liberals, Christianity is always a fluid thing, protean in its forms, and the Scriptures are but a cross-section, the first century edition of Christianity.

Liberalism tells every age to fabricate its own theology out of its experience. The idea that the writings of the Apostles are in any sense authoritative and final is foreign to the modernistic school. Such a view, of course, takes one far afield from historic Christianity. Reading Dr. Brown's chapter on the Atonement one is perplexed to discover that the author seems to want to reject with his mind what he would fain keep in his heart. There is a note of resentful scorn for the "satisfaction theory" and the idea that Christ "satisfied Divine justice." But we read that "His (Christ's) sufferings were at once unique and representative" (p. 79).

Dr. Brown gives what seems to be his version of the Atonement in a story which he relates. It tells of a father who heard that his son was in prison in his college town, put there for wrong-doing. The grief-stricken man proceeds at once to the jail and through the bars embraces his wayward boy and weeps on his neck. This is the Atonement. But one is at a loss to see how this is the Atonement. Dr. Brown says, that "the



Lord laid upon the father the iniquity of his child" (p. 69). But such is not the case. What is laid on the father is not iniquity but a great grief to think that his son would do such a thing. The son's status is not changed by the sorrow of the father. For one thing, the prison doors do not open. All sympathy in the world will not atone. Dr. Brown uses a legal figure, and so we may be permitted to retain it. It is quite Scriptural. The boy is under judgment. The law will take its course. The heart of the father is broken at the sin of the son. This is a true picture of our Father in heaven. This fact, however, is not an Atonement. The problem remains unsolved so long as the son remains incarcerated. To carry on the figure: after the tears we may believe that the father sets to work to make good the boy's obligations towards the Law, pay the fine and secure his release. That is what God did for man. He paid the penalty for sinful man in the Person of His only begotten and well beloved Son. "The Lord laid upon Him the iniquity of us all." But that is the doctrine of satisfaction!

The advocates of liberalism cannot answer the question: How does the death of Christ save us? They assert that it does, and all Christendom agrees, but they reject the Scriptural explanation. We hear that "this abiding moral interest of God in man was declared in its highest form, it was manifested in time by what Jesus Christ did on Calvary. And it is that which saves men from their sins when they are brought within its power and made ready to act in cooperation with it for their moral recovery" (pp. 67-68). We are saved "by the abiding moral interest of God." But how? "This abiding moral interest—was manifested—by what Jesus Christ did on Calvary." Does the preposition "that" refer to "what Jesus Christ did on Calvary"? It says, "and it is that which saves," etc. But this is the doctrine of substitution. Dr. Brown does not want to commit himself to this, so he adds, "when they are brought within its power and made ready to act in cooperation with it for their moral recovery." The hands are the hands of Esau but the voice is the voice of Jacob. It is the philosophy of self-salvation hiding behind the familiar cloak of the blessed Gospel.

Again, after saying that the blood of the soldier purchases the freedom of the country, and the blood of a friend who dies for another becomes redemptive, Dr. Brown goes on to say, "in like manner 'the blood of Christ' represents the highest moral energy of His matchless life freely given on our behalf, and by that energy men are saved" (p. 77). But how? How does "that energy" "save"? The only answer is one which the Modernist dislikes to give. The blood of Christ saved by blotting out the ordinance written against us. Christ nailed it to the Cross. He, by his death, satisfied Divine justice.

The Modernist's gospel like Dr. Brown's book lacks one very important chapter, the chapter on Sin. The only reason why this weak refusal to give the full measure of the Gospel message persists is because the idea of sin has been so much diluted that not much of any atonement is felt to be needed. But give a man a conviction of sin and he will want to

answer that question "how," and that answer is and always will be the old, old story of Jesus and His love.

Lockport, N.Y.

STEWART M. ROBINSON.

*The Fourth "R," The Forgotten Factor in Education.* By HOMER S. BODLEY. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co. Pp. 271.

This book has for its theme the necessity of teaching Righteousness as the fourth "R" distinguished from the three "R's" (Readin', 'Ritin', and 'Rithmetic), representing intellectual culture.

"Righteousness" is defined as the "fundamental law" and "spirit of right relations." It is to be inculcated by teaching in our schools "The Goodness of God and Altruism"—"without infringing upon any creed or sect." Jesus is recognized as the "Great Teacher," the acceptance of whose spirit "transforms our spirit."

The motive of the book is to set the human elements of the distracted world right with each other and with their Maker and so to abolish war. The work is so arranged with "topical suggestions" at the end of each chapter that it could be used as a text book.

The author's English is very clear, and the book has real merit. More than one half is devoted to the teleological argument for the existence and goodness of God. This very interesting and comprehensive panorama of God's nature-plan constitutes the greatest value of the book as an intellectual creation, abounding with most illuminating quotations from the master-minds of science. The spiritual value of the work is its voluminous and rich quotations from the Bible, arranged so as to set forth the great goodness of God, and concluding with an anthology of choice poetry.

If the author had lived in the second century his thought would have been called Docetism, for it centers in the "Spirit of Jesus" as the power for Righteousness. It ignores the Atonement and leaves the Sin-Problem unanswered. "Without the shedding of blood (as suffering and death) there is no remission" or putting behind the evils and imperfections of life (p. 199). He seems to mean "suffering and death" in *general*. But this way is not God's way, and never can reach the goal. "I, if I (my Spirit) be lifted up (made prominent) will draw all men unto me" (p. 254). But "I" is *Jesus in real person*, the man Christ Jesus, and "lifted up" is John's term for *the exaltation of Jesus by the death of the cross*. "Men are born again by this pollenizing process, by receiving His loving kindness, who, in turn, function in altruistic service" (p. 257). This is the way proposed by the author. Alas! it is not God's way. It ignores the atoning blood of Jesus Christ his Son that "cleanseth us from all sin," and the "righteousness which is by faith" in what Jesus did.

We close the book with the regret that such a polished shaft by such an earnest bowman should fall short because he did not draw it back "all the way to Calvary."

Minneapolis.

JOHN TALMADGE BERGEN.

*More Twice-Born Men.* By HAROLD BEGBIE. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1923. Pp. 164 and Preface.

In this book Mr. Begbie adds to his description of "twice-born men." But while his former book dealt with the "down-and-outs" this one deals exclusively with university men. The body of the book at least consists of a series of character sketches or rather self-revelations on the part of young men who have obtained more or less distinction in university circles.

Without exception the changed lives described by Mr. Begbie in this book are the result of the work of the Rev. Frank Buchman—of whose activities in university circles we have been hearing considerable of late. While, in obedience to Mr. Buchman's wishes, there is no direct mention of his name, he being always referred to as F.B., yet it is an open secret that he is the hero of the book. Though Mr. Begbie gives us to understand (preface, p. ix) that the book was written with Mr. Buchman's sanction, yet it seems evident not only that he was not consulted in the course of its preparation but that he did not even know its contents until it appeared in completed form. Not only is it difficult to suppose that Mr. Buchman approves of the interpretation Mr. Begbie places on his work but Mr. Begbie tells us that one of his reasons for including one of the narratives was the belief that "F.B. will not be able to read so courageous and appealing a statement without seeing that his influence is wholly independent of his theology" (p. 38). Certainly if Mr. Buchman approves of this book—of which he has been the occasion at least—he is a different sort of man than other sources of information indicate.

It is a question how much real knowledge of Mr. Buchman and his work this book will yield its readers. They will get the impression that he is a remarkable man who has been remarkably successful in creating a new and intelligent interest in religion in student circles—an interest that has changed the lives of many of these students. They will also get the impression that he has been conspicuously successful in the very difficult work of creating a vital interest in religion in modern university circles, both in this country and England, despite the fact that he holds to many outgrown religious ideas—"as dead for all honest men as the Ptolemaic astronomy or the rites of Dionysus"—such as that there is a miraculous element in conversion; that Christ himself is an active agent in bringing about the results in which he rejoices; that He offers guidance in the everyday decisions of life; that there is help, other than literary, to be derived from reading the Bible, because it is the mouth-piece of the living Spirit; that God interposes in the affairs of men and holds colloquies with them; that He answers sincere prayer, even prayer for material help; that Jesus is both an object of worship and "the propitiation for the sins of the whole world"; and strangest of all, perhaps that mankind is fallen and guilty, in contradiction of "the sublime theory of evolution." Its readers will also get the impression that at the bottom of Mr. Buchman's success is his ability to deal with the individual, his mastery of what he calls "soul surgery" by which he brings the in-

dividual soul face to face with God and its sin and leads it to realize that it is "necessary to hate sin, forsake sin, confess sin, and to make restitution" if it is to enjoy an uninterrupted consciousness of God and be helpers of others, savers of other souls.

But while this book tells us more or less of Mr. Buchman's work and method, yet the reader sees these things only as they are interpreted by Mr. Begbie. While the book purports to "faithfully describe" the work of Mr. Buchman, yet the work is explained "as I see it, not as F.B. sees it." In fact it is not unfair to say, it seems to us, that the book has been written not so much to acquaint the public with Mr. Buchman and his views and methods as to acquaint it with the views and methods of Mr. Begbie. As a result the task of the reader who is interested in learning about Mr. Buchman is somewhat like the task of the reader of the Gospels who is interested in learning about Jesus—according to certain critics. Just as according to these critics we see the teaching of Jesus in the Gospels only as they have been interpreted, or rather misinterpreted, by the early disciples, so this book contains the views and methods of Mr. Buchman only as interpreted, perhaps misinterpreted, by Mr. Begbie. The outcome is, of course, that while the book contains first-hand information about Mr. Begbie it contains only second-hand information about Mr. Buchman and the young men whose changed lives are described—as seen through the more or less astigmatic eyes of a somewhat unsympathetic reporter.

Mr. Buchman, it seems, is not only interested in securing conversions but believes that certain theological beliefs are essential to the success of his efforts. Mr. Begbie, however, is convinced that such is not the case, that "a man can be turned from sin, and can experience that merciful change of heart and will which we call a new birth with no actual reference to any of the orthodox dogmas of the Christian religion." "It may be true, or it may not be true," he tells us, "that God repented of His creation, that Christ came upon the earth to make atonement between God and man, and that because of the sufferings of Christ God is now willing to accept our hearty repentance for our sins. These teachings may be true or untrue, but their acceptance is not essential to the great and wonderful spiritual experience of conversion." It is clear that Mr. Begbie's own views of Jesus are those of current religious naturalism. He values Him as teacher, as inspirer, as an incarnation of universal truth, but he is far from seeing in Him an object of faith and worship. His critical viewpoint is such that he is even able to say—having the question, "What think ye of Christ?" in mind—that it is "quite impossible for a man who has made even a cursory study of the documents to believe that Jesus ever asked such a question; certainly it was never asked in that form. The word Christ was not known to Jesus, and was never applied by the Greeks to any human being until after His death. Again, it is a solitary question, remote from the whole character of the life of Jesus; a life, we may surely say, which never wasted a moment in metaphysical speculation. Not what a man thought about Him was the

preoccupation of Jesus, but whether that man was doing the will of God." Evidently Mr. Begbie has not paused to consider that there are conversions and conversions. No doubt there are conversions that take place without any reference to Christian beliefs, but that these are Christians' conversions is more than questionable. Nothing is more certain than that if there is such a thing as conversion, in the Christian sense of the word, it cannot be naturalistically explained. No doubt Mr. Begbie seeks to explain instances of Christian conversion naturalistically, but in the course of his explanation he eliminates all that is distinctive of Christian conversion.

Mr. Begbie's present interest in the power of religion to change the lives of men, to produce that phenomenon we call conversion finds its explanation, apparently, in the fact that it "furnishes evidence for the religious theory that personality is only a stage in evolution, and that the next stage is the survival of that personality as a spirit of the universe" Mr. Begbie is fairly obsessed by the theory of evolution, as understood by the Neo-Lamarckians, more particularly as understood by J. F. Simpson in *Man and the Attainment of Immortality*. After many millenniums of suffering evolution has brought personality into existence on this earth, so we are told, and in the fact of conversion Mr. Begbie finds a reason for believing that personality will persist on the part of those who seek spiritual satisfactions—in a word, that man is immortal. Sin, the function of the will in conversion, love in God and man—everything is defined according to this all-controlling theory of Lamarckian evolution. Mr. Begbie's great desire is to bring men to believe that they are immortal. He calls this "the one great central teaching of the Master which saves the individual and glorifies the human race" and believes with a child-like faith that if men in general could be brought to believe that the "attainment of personal immortality is the object and consummation of all the travail of the earth's ages" there would be an end of the brawlings of materialism and that a "peace hitherto unknown on earth would inspire our politics, our commerce, our manners, and our art." The Churches, according to the same authority are "depressed and disheartened and in an evil plight chiefly because they have no thesis of existence in their minds, no creative conception of the theory of evolution."

It speaks highly of Mr. Buchman's work that Mr. Begbie should find in it proof of his pet theory. In order that he may do this, however, he is obliged to give a naturalistic explanation of what Mr. Buchman himself evidently regards as a supernatural phenomenon. In as far as the instances cited are cases of genuine Christian conversion we are sure that Mr. Begbie has not so much explained them as attempted to explain them away.

Princeton.

S. G. CRAIG.

*Synthetic Christianity*, By LYNN HAROLD HOUGH. Abingdon Press, 1923. pp. 208.

It is the purpose of these lectures, as the title suggests, to present



Christianity as the reconciliation, the synthesis, of elements and experiences in individual and social life which appear to be discordant; and the work is well done. There are five chapters: Triumphant Truth; Triumphant Goodness; Triumphant Beauty; Triumphant Brotherhood; Triumphant Godliness: and in respect to each of these spheres it is shown that the religion of the Scripture furnishes the final answer to the aspirations and the needs of men. In an interesting and effective way it is made plain how Christianity has appropriated the elements of truth contained in the various philosophical, ethical and religious systems which men have fashioned, and carries them to their ultimate issue in God as he is revealed in Christ.

A wide range of thought is embraced, and outline sketches, in vigorous and stimulating form, are given of the course of history and poetry and art. In the outline of philosophy contained in Chap. I. it is hard to see why even in a discussion necessarily so restricted the name of Francis Bacon should be omitted. But throughout the volume there is exhibited keen psychological insight, philosophic grasp, and command of the great ethical and religious principles that in successive ages have controlled the minds of men. The style is clear and vigorous, at times even brilliant. As an illustration of the method by which apparently contradictory elements are reduced to harmony we may quote this passage from p. 78: "That creative altruism which is the very genius of the life of Jesus is the reconciliation and the synthesis of every productive element in the philosophy of self-assertion and the philosophy of self-denial."

Words of high praise are spoken of President Wilson, as "a scholar and a thinker and a convinced idealist of immovable purpose. . . . His work as a prophet was superbly done. He won the attention of the whole world. He kindled the heart of humanity as it has been kindled by no leader in the modern period of history" (pp. 151 f.). "The League of Nations may be no more than a step. But it is a step in the inevitable direction" (p. 165). And the author speaks with the voice of the Church of Christ as it has been uttered by its representative assemblies when he asserts that "in the United States there is a slowly but surely rising tide of impatience with a sordid national selfishness and a gradually maturing conviction that we must put our shoulders under the load and lift our share of the burden of the world" (p. 154). At every point of the discussion Christ is given his rightful place as Savior and Lord.

Princeton.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

*Cyclopedia of Sermon Outlines.* By REV. AQUILA WEBB, D.D. LL.D., Author of "One Thousand Evangelistic Illustrations." With Introduction by Rev. Charles L. Goodell, D. D., New York: George H. Doran Co. 1923. pp. 336. Price \$3 net.

The outlines are gathered from many sources, and most of the books of the Bible are represented. Good judgment is evident in the selection, and the work of abridgment seems to be well done. An index of subjects makes the material readily available. An index of authors would have added to the value of the book. The outlines are ordinarily brief, yet

they are not mere skeletons, but exhibit the style as well as the thought of the preachers from whom they are drawn.

The book is advertised as "The one best help to sermon-making on short notice." It will be helpful or harmful to the minister as he uses it wisely or unwisely. To rely upon books of this character is fatal to originality and independence of thought, and makes a man a homiletic cripple. But if they are used by way of suggestion and stimulus, they may be of value. It is the part of wisdom to resort to them only occasionally, when peculiar pressure is put upon the preacher, and he finds himself unable to devote to his pulpit preparation the full measure of time which he is accustomed to give it. Ordinarily it is better for him to rely upon himself. The man who depends upon the work of others will steadily grow weaker, while the man who in reliance upon the Spirit of God searches the Word for himself, however imperfect his early attempts may be, will grow steadily wiser and stronger with the progress of the years. We may properly seek help in our work from the learning and labors of wise and godly men, but we must suffer no man to do our work for us.

*Princeton.*

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

*Story-Sermons for Juniors.* By ALFRED J. SADLER. With an Introduction by Calvin W. Laufer. Abingdon Press, 1923. pp. 224.

The Preface informs us that these story-sermons "were given to the Junior congregation of the First Presbyterian Church, Jersey City, New Jersey, during the past five years, and are now published at the urgent request of many who have heard them."

The children's sermon has become a part of the established order of service in many of our churches, and numerous volumes of sermons of this kind have been published. Mr. Sadler groups his sermons under three heads—General, Serial Stories, Special Day Stories. Apt illustrations are drawn from the Bible, history and child life, valuable lessons are inculcated, and the teaching in general is true to the great principles of the Word of God. But there is a single unhappy exception. We read with surprise and grief on p. 54, "When God made the days, he gave us six days for ourselves, for our work and for our pleasure—Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, and Saturday, all but one. Sunday he kept for himself. Shall we be like the mean beggar and steal that day for ourselves, instead of spending it in doing things for God?" This statement, which unhappily is not without parallel in church literature, involves a psychological absurdity and a doctrinal heresy. It is impossible to divide life into compartments, like a modern steamship, assign certain quarters to God, and retain the rest for ourselves. We cannot worship God acceptably on Sunday, if we have devoted the days of the week to our own purposes and pleasures. And it is the first principle of Scripture teaching that God claims us as his own, with all that pertains to us, of time and strength and talent and possession. He gives us nothing absolutely, but all that we have we hold in trust for him. He does not give us six days for ourselves, nor one day, nor one hour. All our time is his, and every moment is to be employed ac-

ording to his will for his glory. The church is insisting upon the great principle of stewardship, but if our children are to receive teaching of this character what will be the fruit of it in riper years? The preacher probably spoke in this way without realizing the import of his words, but the matter is of such consequence in its bearing upon Christian life and service that it cannot be suffered to pass without protest and rebuke.

Princeton.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

*The Haunted House and Other Sermons.* By HAROLD E. LUCCOCK. Abingdon Press, 1923. pp. 248.

The Haunted House is the Soul of man, and the ghosts that haunt it are the animal nature, the savage instincts, "the child you used to be," and the owner. The evolutionary hypothesis is accepted as accounting for the genesis of man, body and soul; and upon the authority by no means convincing, of H. G. Wells, an inconceivable sketch of time is assumed to allow room for the development of the animal into the human type of life. Nowhere is there a suggestion that man was a direct creation, or even the spirit of man. Yet the owner is the Holy Spirit.

In general, however, the sermons are scriptural in their teaching, and are fresh, striking and interesting in an unusual degree. The illustrations are well-chosen and illuminating, and the style is strong, clear, incisive. Now and then there is a phrase which jars, as when we read that Jesus was an "utterly reckless innovator" (p. 146). Whether we accept the doctrine of verbal inspiration or not, no one who has any acquaintance with the writings of the Church fathers could pronounce it "quite a new fangled idea" (p. 142).

It has been said that the sermons are Scriptural. But to this must be added, *so far as they go*. For the conspicuous defect of the volume, as of many others, is that the message of the cross is wanting. This is true even of Sermon XI. "Calvary and Main Street," and Sermon XIII. "Translating the Cross." Christ is represented as a friend, an example, but he is not set forth in an adequate way as a Savior. The cross "is a personal call for sacrificial action" (p. 198). That is the habitual representation of the sacrifice of Calvary. Jesus has set us an example of self-sacrificing service. Of the cross as an altar on which the Son of God is offered as a sacrifice for the sins of men nothing is told us, and the very heart of the Gospel, the good news of redeeming grace, is wanting.

It is greatly to be deplored that a preacher of such penetration and power should be content to dwell upon the circumference of the truth instead of reaching the centre, and preaching the Christ who bore our sins in his own body on the tree.

Princeton.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

*A Cruise to the Orient.* By ANDREW W. ARCHIBALD, D.D. The Stratford Co., Boston. Pp. 286.

The design of the book, in the words of the author, is "to stimulate to the mobilization not of troops but of travellers for a peaceful pene-

tration of the Near East under the new conditions." There is an introduction, consisting of about one-third of the book, that deals with the world war, especially with the events subsequent to the ending of hostilities. Then there follow chapters on Rome, Athens, Cairo, Karnak, Constantinople and Jerusalem.

The style is vivid and pleasing and the author succeeds in making his reader "see the picture." A unique feature in this book is that the traveler is acquainted with the treasures of the various lands, not only as they are preserved in the remaining monuments, but as they are found in the history, literature or mythology to which the author so often refers. But the author spoils what would have been a delightful guide to the inexperienced traveler, or a book of pleasant memories to the seasoned veteran, by giving too much space to the world war. One rather tires of the endless tirade against all that is German.

There are sixty-four illustrations, which add to the appreciation of the word-pictures, and a useful index that has real homiletic value.

Glenolden, Pa.

CHARLES F. DEININGER.

*A Young Man's View of the Ministry.* By S. M. SHOEMAKER. Associated Press, New York, 1923. Pp. 86.

"I have written this book," the author tells us, "because there are some things which I very much want to say to that large number of young men, especially college undergraduates, who are in doubt about where to invest their lives." The book throbs with a passionate desire to open the eyes of young men to the immeasurable service a real minister can render. There are six chapters: The Work, The Message, The Call, The Need, The Reward, An Appeal.

Pastoral calling, personal work and the message receive particular emphasis. "It is a good plan to make it a rule to visit someone every day. A hundred calls a month will keep a man from growing lax about calling. It is almost without question the greatest means by which people are held to the Church." Personal work with individuals is "by far the most important work in all the ministry." Men are not converted by preaching. Personal work is the only thing that will do it. The message is the eternal truth as it is in Christ. "When a minister of the Church begins to put off the Lord Jesus Christ for a lot of thin man-made philosophies, when he begins to base his message on poet and sage and sociologist rather than on the word of God—it is simply time he went on the lecture platform instead."

Probably every minister has felt that certain choice spirits in his congregation ought to enter the ministry. What shall he do? How go about finding God's will for them? There are not enough sermons directed toward persuading young men to choose the gospel ministry. There are those who say they would not dare suggest to a youth to enter the ministry. Yet they dare to urge him into law or banking or medicine. Eventually they urge him to do anything by which he can earn an honest living. This book is written for the purpose of urging young men to consider the claims of the ministry and it will be found suggestive and helpful.

Norristown, Pa.

J. M. CORUM, JR.

*One Hundred and One Hymn Stories.* By CARL F. PRICE. New York: The Abingdon Press. Cloth, 12 mo., pp. 109.

All pastors have discovered by experience how much good stories about the origin and use of favorite hymns add to the appreciation of these hymns and how truly they aid the worshippers to sing them with understanding and with fervor. It is true also that Christians who are not called upon to lead in public worship are interested in such narratives touching upon the lives of hymn writers and the influence of their productions. Therefore, this little book will be found of interest to a wide circle as it contains annotations of some of the most familiar and best loved of our English hymns. The treatment of each one of these compositions is concise and covers in practically every case only a single page in this little handbook.

*Princeton, N.J.*

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*The Lord's Supper.* By BISHOP FRANCIS WESLEY WARNE. New York: The Methodist Book Concern. Cloth, 16 mo., pp. 85. Price 50 cents.

The author of this brief discussion has served for many years as a Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church in India. During this long period of service he had occasion at many times to instruct native preachers in reference to the sacraments. In order to help others in such instruction with a view to their teaching the people who were under their guidance, Bishop Warne prepared this little volume which deals with the institution of the Lord's Supper, with its true interpretation and with its significance as a "Memorial," a "Eucharist," a "Covenant." To the end that the material might be of service to the church at home, particularly in the instruction of young people, this brochure has been prepared and printed for circulation in America.

*Princeton, N.J.*

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*The Treatise to Theophilus.* By T. L. ABORN, B.A., B.Sc., B.D. Morehouse Publishing Company, Milwaukee.

These two volumes of Notes on the Gospel According to St. Luke seem intended by the author both as an apologetic and an analysis. Attention is called to the method of the Evangelist: "With every vitally important part of his proof, he either gives the names of living eye-witnesses, . . . or else gives copies of documents, to the originals of which the inquirers could turn, and test their accuracy." In this field, and particularly within the compass of the first chapter, there are numerous suggestions of value. The Analysis—the main body of the work—divides the Gospel into four sections: What Jesus began to do and to teach; What Jesus did; What Jesus taught; and What Jesus taught and did as a Ruler, Judge, Prophet, Christ, and Son of God.

What is stressed throughout is the gathering and training of followers and co-laborers, whom the author sees advanced from stage to stage of holy orders (Preachers, Representatives of the Suffering Servant, and Ministers of the King, p. 591). The churchmanship of Mr. Aborn is very much in evidence, as when he sees in the raising of Jairus' daughter



a symbol of baptismal regeneration, appending the remark that the age of the child fixed no time-limit for baptism (p. 235). We note, too, that the laying on of Christ's hands at the healing of the woman disabled by a spirit of infirmity finds its parallel in the gifts of the Holy Spirit conferred at Confirmation (p. 463). The Romanist view of divorce is expressed.

Waiving discussion of the analysis furnished, the reader will find that the bulk of the work reads very much like average pulpit discourses—to which source, in all probability, this publication is to be traced.

Lincoln University, Pa.

EDWIN J. REINKE.

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## BOOKS RECEIVED

*Training for Power and Leadership.* By GRENVILLE KLEISER, formerly Instructor in Public Speaking at Yale Divinity School, Yale University; author of "How to Speak in Public," "Great Speeches and How to Make Them," "How to Develop Self-Confidence in Speech and Manner," "Complete Guide to Public Speaking," "How to Build Mental Power," etc., etc. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1923. Pp. 383.

This book is a manual of practical efficiency. It contains much helpful information; many valuable rules and suggestions are given. But it is a six-day book: Sunday is ignored. The one thing which is most needful is omitted. Thus, in the chapter on "Faith the Power-Builder," the reader is told, "Have faith in yourself"; "Have faith in your resourcefulness"; "Have faith in your work"; "Have faith in your future"; "Associate with men of self-faith." Have faith in God—is not included! Yet the book is written by a former instructor in a Divinity School.

*One Hundred and Seventh Annual Report of the American Bible Society* 1923. Together with A List of Auxiliary Societies, Their Officers, and An Appendix. New York: American Bible Society, 1923. Pp. 402.

In seventy years the presses of the American Bible Society printed twenty million Bibles, thirty-five million Testaments, twenty-two million portions. In the year 1922 the Society printed 442,869 Bibles and nearly ten times as many Testaments and portions. The story of this great work and of the even more fascinating work of distribution through agencies, colporteurs, etc., is told in this very interesting report.

*The Methodist Book Concern, A Romance of History.* By H. C. JENNINGS, for twenty-four years one of its publishing agents. New York: The Methodist Book Concern, 1924. Pp. 281.

A sketch of the growth and work of this great religious publishing agency since it was founded by the Conference in 1789, with Francis Asbury presiding. It is therefore doubly appropriate that Asbury's words: "The propagation of religious knowledge by means of the press is next in importance to the preaching of the gospel" should be made the motto of the volume. While the book is largely historical and bio-

graphical, it deals also with the present and future. Thus in the chapter "Shall the Scope of Our Work be Enlarged?" the statement is made "It would seem that any book that is fit for our people to read is fit for The Book Concern to print." Were this policy adopted and broadly construed there would be little to distinguish The Book Concern from such business houses as Macmillan, Scribner, Doran, Nelson, etc. The line between religious and secular would disappear.

*United States Catholic Chaplains in the World War.* New York: Ordinate Army and Navy Chaplains, 1924. Pp. xxxv, 359.

This volume contains brief biographical sketches of the "1023 Catholic Chaplains" who were in active service either with the Army, Navy, or K. of C.

*Thy Sea is Great, Our Boats are Small, and Other Hymns of Today.* By HENRY VAN DYKE. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1922. Pp. 32.

Seven new and three earlier hymns are published in this little collection. The new ones are entitled: Voyagers, The Burning Bush, Children in the Market-Place, Jesus Return, One in Christ, Foundations, and Victoria. The earlier hymns are : Hymn of Labor, Hymn of Joy, Peace Hymn of the Republic.

*Children of the Way.* By ANNE C. E. ALLINSON. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1923. Pp. 193.

"The stories here are of the early Christians when Christianity was spreading so simply as not even to arouse opposition, from servant to mistress, from friend to friend, lawyer to client, and when little gatherings everywhere in Rome were discussing the 'new spirit.'" The treatment indicates that the author is a decided liberal in theology. Whether the "new spirit" represented in this book as Christian would ever have aroused the wrath of Nero may be questioned; it is too eclectic and nebulous to develop martyrs. But that it could ever have conquered the Roman world seems impossible.

*Cave Boys.* By H. M. BURR, author of "Donald McRea," "Around the Fire," etc. New York: Association Press, 1923. Pp. 200.

The most significant thing about this book is the fact that it is published by the Association Press which is now using as its trade-mark a "triangle" across which are written the words "Books with a Purpose." The purpose of this book is to teach evolution in story form to the adolescent; and that this is the case is further indicated by the phrase on the wrapper—"A Book for Boys—to Be Passed on to Dad." The author speaks of these stories as "back-log fancies" and refers the reader to Osborn's *Men of the Old Stone Age* for the most complete and authoritative statement "regarding the scientific details of the life of primitive man." The danger in such a book as this, is that the "back-log fancies" will be regarded by the boy reader and even by his father as something more than fancies.

*Personal and Business Efficiency.* By C. A. HENDERSON, M.A., Professor of Psychology, Babson Institute, Wellesley Hills, Mass.; formerly Assistant Professor, College of Business Administration, Boston

University, with Courses in Industrial Management, Sales Management and Personal and Business Efficiency. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1923. Pp. viii, 300.

This book contains much that is suggestive and valuable. But the statement in the last chapter that men who are "big and well-balanced in personality, are cast inevitably upon religion," comes as a decided surprise in view of the fact that religion is all but ignored in the nearly 300 preceding pages. The brief discussion of religion, when it is finally reached, is sadly inadequate. "The three great themes of religion are God, Duty and Immortality" (p. 293)—ignores sin and salvation. Redemption is par excellence the major theme of the Bible. And the discussion of the "three great themes" is inadequate. In discussing immortality, for example, the resurrection of Christ is ignored.

*The Lutheran World Almanac and Annual Encyclopedia for 1923.*

Compiled and edited by the Statistical and Year Book Committee. New York: The National Lutheran Council, 437 Fifth Avenue, 1923. Pp. 293.

This Almanac is intended to fill the need for a book containing reliable and authentic facts concerning the great Lutheran Church in its entirety. This aim it seems admirably calculated to fulfil. The book is crammed with valuable information; yet is a marvel of condensation.

*The American Jewish Year Book* 5684, September 11, 1923, to September 28, 1924. Volume 25. Edited by Harry Schneiderman for the American Jewish Committee. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1923. Pp. ix, 594.

Along with the survey for the year this volume contains several short articles; among them being one "Portraits of Early American Jews" by Hannah R. London, with fourteen illustrations. There is also "A Classified List of Standard Books in English on Jewish Subjects," by I. George Dobseva. The volume includes the Sixteenth Annual Report of the American Jewish Committee and the Report of the Thirty-fifth Year of the Jewish Publication Society of America.

*The Methodist Year Book, 1924.* Oliver S. Baketel, editor. New York: The Methodist Book Concern. Pp. 352.

This year book of the Methodist Episcopal Church is now in its ninety-first issue. While dealing primarily with the Northern Branch of the Methodist Church in America, and its many and varied activities and interests, there is also a valuable chapter on World Wide Methodism.

*The Feet of the Messenger.* By YEHOASH [Solomon Bloomgarten]. Translated from the Yiddish by Isaac Goldberg. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1923. Pp. 296.

An account of a visit to the Holy Land by an American Jew, shortly before America entered the World War.

*Epitome Theologiae Moralis universae per Definitiones, Divisiones et summaria Principia pro Recollectione Doctrinae Moralis et ad immediatum usum confessorii et parochi excerpta e Summa Theol. mor. R. P. Hier. Noldin S. J. a DR. CARLO TELCH, quondam professore Theologiae moralis et Iuris canonici in Pontificio Collegio Iose-*

phino, Columbi Ohioensis, U.S.A., et ab eodem secundum novum codicem iuris canonici tertio recognita. Editio 6a. Oeniponte (Innsbruck, Tirol, Austria, Europe) Typis et Sumptibus Fel. Rauch, 1924. 16mo, pp. xlii, 571.

*An Historical Survey of Jewish Philanthropy.* From the earliest times to the nineteenth century. By EPHRAIM FRISCH. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1924. Pp. xi, 196.

*Selected Religious Poems of Solomon Ibn Gabriol.* Translated into English verse by ISRAEL ZANGWILL, from a Critical Text edited by Israel Davidson, Ph.D., Professor of Mediaeval Hebrew Literature in the Jewish Theological Seminary of America. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1923. Pp. lix, 247.

"The Schiff Library of Jewish Classics" of which this is the first volume to be issued aims to do for the literature of Judaism what the "Loeb Classical Library" is doing for Greek and Roman literature. The Hebrew text is vocalized; and the English translation which is rather free is given on the opposite page.

*Nature et Obligations de l'Etat Religieux.* Discipline actuelle, Traite de l'Etat Religieux du P. Gautrelet, S.J., entierement refondu et accommodé au nouveau Droit. Par LUCIEN CHOUPIN, S.J., Docteur en Théologie et en Droit canon, Professeur de Theologie morale et de Droit canon au Scolasticat d'Ore, Hastings. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, Editeur. 1923. Pp. x, 581.

*William Jennings Bryan. A Study in Political Vindication.* By WAYNE C. WILLIAMS. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1923. Pp. 127.

*The Law of the Octave in the World and in the Word.* By E. J. PACE, D.D. Chicago: The Bible Institute Colportage Association. Pp. 28.

*The Syntax of the De Civitate Dei of St. Augustine.* A Dissertation Submitted to the Catholic Sisters College of the Catholic University of America, in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. By Sister MARY COLUMKILLE COLBERT, M.A. Washington: The Catholic University of America, 1923. 8vo, pp. x, 105. [The Catholic University of America Patristic Studies, Vol. IV.]

*Wandlungen in Goethes Religion. Ein Beitrag zum Bunde von Christentum und Idealismus.* Von D. KARL BORNHAUSEN, Professor an der Universität Breslau. Berlin: Verlag von Alfred Unger. Pp. 85.

*La Notion de Force dans le Système d'Aristote.* Par HENRI CARTERON, Professeur Agrege au Lycée de Montpellier, Docteur ès Lettres. 1924. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin. 8vo, pp. xi, 281.

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*American Church Monthly*, New York, July: JOSEPH G. H. BARRY, What Shall Children Read?; WILLIAM S. BISHOP, Family Life and the Holy Trinity; HAMILTON SCHUYLER, George Fox—an Appreciation; RUPERT D. TURNBULL, The Decay of Atheism; C. H. PALMER, The Eastern Church and Reunion. *The Same*, August: ARTHUR C. CLARKE, Realism and Religion; J. G. H. BARRY, Children and the Bible; WILLIAM C. SEITZ, Ecclesiastical Laws Regarding Matrimony. *The Same*, September: J. G. H. BARRY, The Priest as Judge and Director; C. H. PALMER, The Catholic Church in France; FREDERICK O. MUSSER, The Gift of the Spirit through the Church.

*Biblical Review*, New York, July: HAROLD P. SLOAN, The Christ of the Ages; E. M. MARTINSON, Paul as Pastor; WILLIAM H. JOHNSON, Evolution and the Fall; A. C. BLUNCK, Religious Denominationalism in the Light of Modern Thought; BINNEY S. BLACK, Child Evangelism.

*Bibliotheca Sacra*, St. Louis, July: The Story of Ancient Sodom in the Light of Modern Science; R. J. LOVE, Christian Optimism; CHRISTOPHER G. HAZARD, Pulpit Embarrassments; HARRIS L. LATHAM, Instrument or Idol.

*Catholic Historical Review*, Washington, July: FRANCIS S. BETTEN, An Alleged Champion of the Sphericity of the Earth in the Eighth Century; WILLIAM M. T. GAMBLE, The Monumenta Germaniae Historica: its Antecedents and its Motives; FLORANCE M. GILLIS, Matilda, Countess of Tuscany; St. Norbert and the Tankelin Heresy.

*Church Quarterly Review*, London, July: WILFRID RICHMOND, Dr. Holland's Philosophy of Faith; MORTON LUCE, Shakespeare and Nature; G. W. BUTTERWORTH, The Translation of the New Testament; F. HAROLD



SMITH, The Incarnation and Incarnation-Beliefs; F. R. BARRY, New Testament Interpretation.

*Congregational Quarterly*, London, July: MALCOLM SPENCER, Christian Vocation and the Social Organism; R. T. HERFORD, Jesus, Paul and the Pharisees; S. H. MOORE, Aufklärung and the Hymn; F. W. RAFFERTY, The Pulpit, Pew and Politics; A. NEAVE BRAYSHAW, George Fox; H. H. OAKLEY, Some Memories of a Quiet Life among Yorkshire Independents.

*East & West*, London, July: W. A. WICKHAM, Patrick Gordon and his Geography; R. D. ACLAND, The Christian Puran and its Author; CANON G. CALLAWAY, Ubuntu (Humanity); M. MACKAY, The Future of the "Anglo-Indian"; S. K. ROY, The Indian Church Measure; E. RYERSON, Shinto and the Japanese Government.

*Expositor*, London, July: W. EMERY BARNES, "Ten" Treatises on the "Ten" Commandments; HERMANN GUNKEL, The Secret Experiences of the Prophets; G. J. R. MACAULAY, The New Psychology and the Christian Doctrine of Sin; W. D. NIVEN, George Fox and the Scriptures. *The Same*, August: C. J. CADOUX, Ten Best Books on the Synoptic Gospels; R. DUNKERLEY, The Reliability of the Gospels; F. R. TENNANT, Faith, Hope, and Knowledge in I Corinthians 13; G. H. BOX, Early Christianity and the Hellenic World. *The Same*, September: G. H. BOX, Ten Best Books on the Prophetic Literature; H. H. ROWLEY, The Belshazzar of Daniel and of History, I; D. PLOOIJ, The Anti-Sabbatic Dilemma in the Gospels; A. E. GARVIE, The Experience of the Grace of God in Forgiveness; D. H. MACQUEEN, The New Jerusalem and Town Planning.

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ment; WILLIAM B. FORBUSH, *Preaching to the Eye-minded*; F. S. SCHENCK, *Preaching on the Golden Rule in Its Application to Business*; ALBERT B. WEGENER, *The Value of Play in Moral Training*. *The Same*, September: *Theological Seminaries under Fire*; EDNA D. PROCTOR, *Glory of Toil*; C. H. BARNETT, *The Church Bulletin Board*; LYNN H. HOUGH, *The Mind of the Preacher*; WM. E. BARTON, *Balanced Homiletical Ration*.

*International Journal of Ethics*, Chicago, July: ROY W. SELLERS, *Emergence of Naturalism*; C. DELISLE BURNS, *Labor and the League*; ADOLFO PASADA, *The League of Nations: a Process*; R. F. SWIFT, *Security in Modern Life*; NORMAN BOARDMAN, *The Ethics of the Problem*.

*Jewish Quarterly Review*, Philadelphia, July: SAMUEL POZNANSKI, *The Arabic Commentary of Ibn Bal'am on the Twelve Minor Prophets*; V. APTOWITZER, *Observations on the Criminal Law of the Jews*; A. YELLIN, *Notes on the Syriac Version of the Story of Ahikar as Edited by J. Rendel Harris*.

*Journal of Negro History*, Washington, July: A. A. TAYLOR, *The Negro in South Carolina during the Reconstruction*.

*Journal of Religion*, Chicago, July: WILLIAM E. HAMMOND, *Does the Church Lead?*; D. LUTHER EVANS, *The Reactions of a Religionist to Behaviorism*; HENRY P. SMITH, *The Apologetic Interpretation of Scripture in Islam and in Christianity*; ARCHIBALD G. BAKER, *Enlisting the Missionary in Research Work*; WILLIAM H. NORTON, *Influence of the Desert on Early Islam*; DONALD W. RIDDLE, *The Martyr Motif in the Gospel according to Mark*.

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*Lutheran Church Review*, Philadelphia, July: A. T. W. STEINHAEUSER, *Cultivation of the Inner Life*; CARL STANGE, *Religion as an Attitude, as Devotion to a Founder, and as Christianity*; ANDREW G. VOIGHT, *Discourses in the Gospel of John*; HENRY OFFERMANN, *The Cross of Christ in the Epistles of Paul*; EMMANUEL HIRSCH, *Idealistic Philosophy and Christianity*; EMIL E. FISCHER, *The Church and Social Problems*; S. G. VON BOSSE, *Musings of a Bi-lingual Pastor*.

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*Monist*, Chicago, July: G. MITTAG-LEFFLER, Introduction to the Theory of Analytic Functions; JAMES B. SHAW, Science and Mysticism; RAYMOND LENOIR, Systems of Aesthetics in France; OLIVER L. REISER, Creative Monism; RAYMOND H. WHEELER, Freedom vs. Determinism in Relation to the Dynamic vs. the Static.

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*New Church Life*, Lancaster, July: GEORGE DE CHARMS, Divine Providence and Human Freedom; SIGRID C. ODHNER, What are the New Documents? *The Same*, August: L. W. T. DAVID, The Book of the Generation of Jesus Christ; GEORGE DE CHARMS, Attacking the New Church; K. R. ALDEN, New Church Elementary School Education. *The Same*, September: THEODORE PITCAIRN, The Saving Idea of God; L. W. T. DAVID, The Twelve Sons of Jacob.

*Open Court*, Chicago, June: GEORGE B. FOSTER, The Message of Bjornson; HERBERT LOEWE, Moslem Culture of Today; EDWARD DAY, Jesus' Contact with the Essenes; J. V. NASH, A Religion in Brief; HARDIN T. MCCLELLAND, Moral Validity in a Vulgarian Age. *The Same*, August: WILLIAM NATHANSON, Revolution and the Culturalist Conception of History; HELEN N. GLASSFORD, What is Your Creed?; HARDIN T. MCCLELLAND, Piety and the Poseur's Policy of Power; JANET B. CHRISTIE, Psychology and the Communist; HAROLD BERMAN, Progressive Theology.

*Reformed Church Review*, Lancaster, July: DAVID B. SCHNEDER, Thoughts concerning What it is to be a Christian; HORACE R. BARNES, Post-War Labor Problems; E. H. ZAUGG, Present Race Problem; BERNARD C. STEINER, A New Epoch in Church History.

*Review and Expositor*, Louisville, July: M. ASHBY JONES, Race Consciousness in the Relation of Whites and Negroes; H. L. WINBURN, Deity of Christ and Missions; HERMON H. HORNE, Christ in Man-Making; W. T. WHITLEY, The Insignificance of the Apostle Paul to his Own Generation.

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